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1he music of a civilization has far-reaching consequences on consciousness
and, thus, influences the basic nature of a society.”

~ Frank Herbert
The Dosadi Experiment, 1977

Hi! The creator too is blind,
Struggling toward his harmonious whole,
Rejecting intermediate parts,
Honors and falsities and wrongs;
Incapable master of all force,
Too vague idealist, overwhelmed
By an afflatus that persists.
For this, then, we endure brief lives,
The evanescent symmetries
From that meticulous potter’s thumb.

~ Wallace Stevens
“Negation”

ABSTRACT
Both the punk rock end Christian rock music subcultures have been the subject of
analyses that cast them in “negationist” terms-as groups critically opposed to
popular/secular culture. Despite their categorization of these music genres as antitheses,
however, no analysis has gone so far as to read them specifically in the context of German
philosopher GAV.F. Hegel whose dialectical model systematized the opposition of thesis
and antithesis. Moreover, no analysis has juxtaposed the two suspiciously similar
subcultures in dialectical terms, and theorized them in terms of their documented
opposition to each other. Such is the goal of this thesis.
Therefore, beginning with Greil Marcus’ and H.R. Niebuhr’s negationist readings
of punk and Christianity, respectively, this thesis applies the second chapter (“SelfConsciousness”) of Hegel’;

enomenology o f Spirit ( 1807) to the punk and Christian

rock music subcultures, analyzing them concomitantly in relation to both the
mainstream/secular culture they have refused and each other. This paper may be
described, then, as a Hegelian reading of rock music the goal of which is to locate, through
textual analysis, homologies between the punk and Christian rock subcultures. The texts
in question include each genres’ songs (lyrics and their performance), couture, album art,
and even the genres’ commercial practices.
Following definitions and a very brief history of each genre, the categorization and
interpretation of their negative desire in the context of Phenomenology\ and the
exploration of punk’s religiosity, the essay will offer two primary conclusions. First,
despite the complete opposite ideologies/theologies that inspired and continue to inspire
these groups’ negationism (not to mention their hatred for each other), the subcultures are

actually responding similarly to the domi’.iant culture, turning them, paradoxically, into
“identical opposites” whose refusals of each other are ironic and perhaps unwarranted. In
effect, this suggests that the fluid superficial features of all would-be negationist
subcultures are, while relevant, secondary both in terms of the groups’ original impulse to
negation and the theoretical consequences for the subcultures’ adherents following their
rebellion. Specifically, it is negation itself that is an impossible position. Second, while
negation fails communities in that it simply displaces rather than resolving the
philosophical and social enigma, the conceptual area where negation has succeeded (in fact
is necessary in dialectical terms) is in supplying individuals (the individual selfconsciousness as described by Hegel) with both a lexicon and forum for both cultural and
self-criticism and a better understanding of both the self and heretofore negated Other
(and, by proxy, Spirit), which becomes practical, paradoxically, only when negation is
itself negated and the grander dialectical chain consummated.

DC

INTRODUCTION
In 2004, Youth For Christ (YFC), a Bible-based, evangelical youth outreach
organization with chapters in over 40 states and 100 countries, launched their
“opposites” advertising campaign. Offering viewers a series of “before-and-after”
advertisements wherein a traditional teenage agitator, the “vandal,” “loner,” or “gang
member,” is recast into an “artist,” “poet,” or “pastor,” respectively, the campaign
compelled the observer to think twice when scrutinizing youth culture. “Some see an
outcast...” remarked one ad, for example, pairing this line with the picture of a sneering,
sideburned, Caucasian youth looking both aloof and surly in sunglasses and an olive t-shirt
and standing in front of a red-bricked wall. “We see a Mentor,” the ad responds
confidently, directing the viewer’s attention to the larger of the ad’s two juxtaposed
images: the outcast’s doppleganger-Other whose smiling, hazel-eyed, trim, and almost
effeminate face disarms the judgmental critic and evokes (second) thoughts of tolerance
and grace. “Look through the eyes of YFC,” urges the advertisement finally, reminding
each of us to refrain from judging books by their cover.
The sophisticated campaign utilized billboards, magazines, and other direct
marketing media to reach a broad demographic of not only fickle, malleable adolescents,
but stodgy and suspicious adults likely alienated by youth culture. It was a well-executed
effort. For all its professionalism, however, the campaign’s message was curious. On the
one hand, the ads suggested that those who are typically seen by society as marginalized-and specifically recalcitrant teenagers-are not only worth a second, deeper look, but
retain limitless positive potential and must be respectfully regarded as such. On the other
hand, the ads imply that in their “before” state youth cannot teach, mentor, or inspire

those around them, or that they are somehow, by virtue of their (perhaps voluntary)
marginalization, defective and in need of both a cosmetic and theological makeover. As a
result, each of the campaign’s six “opposites” advertisements—wherein the before-Christ
image is diminished and offset in comparison with the valorized “after” image of the
clean-cut, respectable, and, we must assume, Christian teen—implicitly conveyed not only
the undesirability of the marginalized (an interesting message given Christianity’s own
history), but Christ’s tangible necessity, His incomparable ability to transform
undesirable elements into less objectionable members of society.
One of the campaign’s ads featured what can only be interpreted as a “punk” girl.
Wearing a red and black plaid tank-top with a zipper down the middle, the teenage punk
rocker in this particular portrait parades not only a trace of cleavage but countless ear, lip,
nose, and even cheek piercings with aplomb. Her lavender “liberty”-spiked hair (so
named for the style's resemblance to the clunky tiara that adorns the Statue of Liberty’s
lime noggin) "ontrasts markedly with her very pale, tattooed skin and blood-red lipstick.
Appropriately, chains dangle around the punk’s neck; her visible wrist sports a studded
bracelet. Standing in front of what appears to be a graffitied, dirty metal garage door, in
an urban alley perhaps, she is staring directly—almost confrontationally-at the viewer,
unashamed and immodest in her assertion of self. “Some see a rebel...” reads the copy
that accompanies this portion of the poster.
Below the peripheral punk is a much larger, much “cleaner” version of the same
girl. Taking up the bulk of the ad, the decidedly non-punk girl now forgoes her erstwhile
stare and demurely, coyly even, peruses a soft binder of some sort, religious instructional
material perhaps. Her long, brunette hair is meticulously brushed, her bangs pulled back
and out of her eyes. Wearing brown-rimmed glasses and a respectable navy blouse, the
girl has traded her punk studs and piercings for a single pair of earrings, rust-colored
2

fingernails, and a modest necklace-a crucifix, perhaps, but the pendant is hidden. Crucifix
or not, however, the girl is, at this point, far from threatening. “We see a leader,” YFC
concludes.
This very advertisement appeared on a billboard in Grand Forks, North Dakota,
early in 2004 not far from the University of North Dakota campus; it was, at least in
part, an affirmation of the thesis that follows, for this particular juxtaposition actualized,
in priceless metaphorical terms, an abstract idea that 1 have been toying with for some
time: the coupling of punk rock subculture with evangelical Christian subculture (and
more specifically Christian rock), both of which have not only made the refusal of
popular culture the quintessential component of their ideological base, but have also gone
great and documented lengths to dismiss each other. The interpretation and consequences
of this coupling of are the subject of the following essay. To begin, despite the two
groups’ self-styled status as “underground,” the YFC advertisement demonstrated in no
uncertain terms that punks and evangelical Christians are not, in fact, disengaged from
culture: this billboard appeared on the corner of a busy intersection in the literal middle of
Middle America (the geographical center of the North American continent being only two
short hours northwest in Rugby, North Dakota), qualifying their twenty-first century
ubiquity. Moreover, if even these storied, and at times exceedingly zealous, subcultures
have synthesized with their parent culture (and each other in the form of Christian punk
music), can any anticultural or “negationist” movement hope to remove itself invariably
from popular culture or “the Other”; and if so, can they thus be anything but negligible if
they refuse to engage the world, can their refusal actually change the culture they so
loathe?
These and other questions will be addressed directly; before continuing, however,
the reader should know that although this piece is largely theoretical, much empirical
3

research, including a series of very tangible material homologies between the two
subcultures (e.g., their eschatological tendencies, internal debates over authenticity,
disparagement of “hippie” culture, and demographic constitution of predominantly white
males) went into its construction. For the most part, these empirical links have been left
out. But these links are not inconsequential, and I wish the reader to be aware of their
existence. For instance, even the genres’ bands’ names cross at times, resembling each
other denotatively but connoting completely opposing theologies and ideologies. In one
particularly significant and telling case, one letter separates an evangelical Christian rock
band from their hardcore punk counterparts: New Zealand-based Christian pop-rockers
Hoi Polloi, for example, could be hardly less like Scottish anarcho-punks Oi Polloi, whose
anti capitalist songs viciously condemn nuclear power, pollution, imperialism, pro-Lifers,
and homophobia. The name “hoi polloi” itself is the phonetic English spelling of a Greek
phrase that means “the masses” or “common people/crowd.” This phrase, adopted for
obvious theological reasons by the Christian band, was modified by the Scottish punk
band which affiliates itself with “Oi” punk, a sub-genre of punk (often associated with
various racist ideologies) that seeks to align itself with working class communities and
values. Such a juxtaposition is a discursive gold mine, indeed; however, any further
description and interpretation of such material similarities are here shelved.
As a result, what follows is a predominantly theoretical—and overwhelmingly
Hegelian—reading of the punk and evangelical Christian rock music subcultures and,
perhaps more significantly, a broader critique of “negationism” as a philosophical
position and a defense of synthesis. Perhaps my decision to focus on theory was
felicitous however, for a far more qualitative version of the argument that follows was
actually published (by a well-known punk activist ironically enough) during the writing of
this thesis, Mark Andersen’s All The Power: Revolution Without Illusion (2004). Mixing
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personal experience, history, sociology, and a hint of theory, Andersen updates Regis
Debray’s 1967 essay Revolution in the Revolution? (Andersen’s graduate work focused
on guerilla movements in Latin and South America) toward the criticism and apology of
his own American “guerilla” movement (i.e., activist punk). In so doing, Andersen
challenges the self-satisfied-yet-ineffective refusal of American culture he sees blanketing
the twenty-first century New Left community and suggests, as the book’s back cover
puts it, “how the seemingly most idealistic of enterprises-revolution—might be
practically accomplished.” Andersen’s goal is similar to mine; but where I am abstract
and theoretical, he is more practical and concrete—the Marx to my Hegel. Nonetheless, 1
would like to believe both constructions are necessary, useful, and reinforce each other.
To distinguish myself further from Andersen, though, the reader will note that this
essay concludes, it seems, by advocating a return to what today are largely regarded as
Romantic and anachronistic nineteenth century notions of Transcendentalism or Idealism.
Verily, the notion that it is up to the “enlightened” individual self-consciousness to
change or “fix” the world—to alter the Other—and that this enlightenment is the result of
aesthetics and/or philosophical self-exploration seems something of an outmoded concept
in a postmodern, poststructuralist society; the writer acknowledges this subtext and
attributes it, for better or worse, to this paper's reliance on Hegel specifically and
eighteenth and nineteenth century philosophy in general. Acknowledging that revolution
begins with the individual—but admitting, too, that in the twenty-first century West the
“bloom has clearly gone off the global revolutionary rose” (177)—Andersen largely shrugs
off the merits of individual enlightenment and advocates a fuller, more pragmatic,
communal approach to criticism of the sociopolitical mainstream. For instance, following
his description of an Earth Liberation Front (ELF) act of radical refusal of American
culture (the 2003 sabotage of a Wal-Mart construction site in Martinsville, Indiana),
5

Andersen accurately suggests that such subjective expressions of discontent have “no
objective impact” on consumer culture and do nothing, despite being labeled “activist,” to
produce any actual change of the capitalist system the members of ELF supposedly
despise. “In order to win the struggle,” counters Andersen,
we have to organize creatively across boundaries to build on our strengths,
assembling powerful, flexible, multi-issue coalitions. Conversely, we need
to avoid dogmatic stances that would tend to marginalize ourselves from
the mass of people here and abroad—and we must begin the work right
where we are. We cannot afford to blithely dismiss the concerns and
feelings of “most people,” even here in our relatively privileged context.
(24)
One might add “especially here” in response to Andersen’s last sentence above, and I
could hardly agree more; the philosophy grounding this response is detailed below.
But the academic conclusions that follow must be understood less in the context
of Marxism and twentieth century communal separatist movements than of Hegelian
philosophy and specifically his Phenomenology o f Spirit (1807), the very focus of which
is the development of the individual mind or self-consciousness. Like Andersen, I defend
Hegel’s third dialectical position-synthesis-and call it not only a more effective way of
approaching the refusal of culture, but, beyond Andersen, a more radical one in that it
requires the very negation of one’s own subculture. Indeed, not only punk, but the ELF,
evangelical Christian subculture, or any peripheral “guerilla” movement that frames itself
as opposed to the status quo must be abandoned outright by the individual if (s)he hopes
to avoid sociopolitical obsolescence. For all his excellent, pragmatic proposals, not even
Andersen goes so far as to call his own punk subculture—and negationism as a broader
philosophical stance—ideologically ineffectual. Thus does this document, which too
6

stresses engagement with the Other, distinguish itself from Andersen: synthesis still
requires, at least according to Hegel’s system, the negation of the negation; and if any
negationist or avant-garde movement is to remain vital and avoid digging itself into a
theoretical rut it must eventually be renounced by the individual self-consciousness,
which must engage the Other in order to alter it. Put another way, the individual who
abandons punk, for instance, is actually the one who preserves the subculture’s health
and makes punk’s very negation—Hegel’s second of three dialectical positionsmeaningful as opposed to vacuous. Or, at the risk of sounding hawkish, in order to save
punk the individual must destroy it. In this way, this thesis is less a defense of steadfast,
if multilateral, negationism than its criticism.
This emphasis on the individual self must not be confused with narcissism, or
even some version of existentialism, however. While both existentialism and narcissism
are addressed, this paper also argues that the individual self-consciousness must
eventually join the conventional, “mainstream” community and work within it if it hopes
to succeed in what Zizek rails the seifs “teleological project.” As such, solipsism,
narcissism, and nihilism all are necessarily dismissed as unsuitable. And this is as it
should be in postmodernity, for as the world itself grows increasingly “globalized,” as the
lines that separate nations, cultures, economies, and aesthetic forms vanish outright
(rather than merely blur), the individual cannot help but find herself inescapably
enmeshed in the politics of both her local hamlet and the world-community. Thus is the
ante upped for each of us; as ineluctably synthesized selves, not only does our
association with the system become more consequential, but our criticism of it as well.
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“I’LL BE YOUR MIRROR”
“Since then I have seen her desire for the beautiful, her love of life,
walk hand in hand with unloveliness and all that negates life. Why,
! ask, must the opposites walk hand in hand?”
~ Agnes Smedley1
A drab July afternoon in Fargo, North Dakota. In the face of persistent rain and
under threat of lightning, however, a bustle of activity envelops a soggy field situated
immediately northwest a leaky-roofed FargoDome event center on the North Dakota
State University campus. Flanked by dozens of painstakingly arranged tour busses and
merchandise tables, hundreds of dripping fans, musicians, technicians, and security
personnel mill about struggling to keep warm waiting for the next act to begin on this
latest stop on the Vans Warped Tour, the annual 30-plus date, multistage cross-country
punk road show. After a short lull the band Anti-Flag, an aggressive veteran
Pennsylvania quartet, appears on the main stage, plugs in, and tears into a fierce set that
includes songs off its 1999 album A New Kind o f Army, whose cover art is the angular
art istic rendering of three spike-haired and leather-jacketed “punks” raising, in a mock Iwo
Jima tribute, an inverted American flag. The music stops as abruptly as it began and the
characteristically hostile Anti-Flag lead singer “Justin Sane” darts maladroitly about the
stage spewing vituperative admonitions of not only George W. Bush but Osama bin
Laden and Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon for their continued roles in the escalation of
political violence across the globe. The music blisters again, and a contentious but well
received Anti-Flag set is finished in just over thirty minutes.2
Only days earlier and less than an hour away, evangelical hard rockers Skillet and
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the Christian ska-punk ensemble The Orange County Supertones find themselves kneedeep in native prairie grass, performing very loud, very fast, and very nontraditional
songs of praise to thousands of teenagers and adults alike at the Soo Pass Ranch, a 600acre natural amphitheater situated on the outskirts of Detroit Lakes, Minnesota—better
known as host to country music’s premier annual festival concert We Fest. These bands
represent but two of the more than 60 Christian bands, inspirational speakers, and youth
ministers on the bill for SpiritFest Midwest, an annual outdoor Contemporary Christian
Music (CCM) gala that since 1998 has drawn as many as 34,000 Christian music fans to
northwestern Minnesota’s lakes region in a single weekend.1 The Supertones are
particularly popular this day, intermingling songs off their latest album Hi-Fi Revival
(2002)—such songs as “Hold Onto Jesus,” “Gloria Hallelujah,” and “I’m Just a Man”—
with spiritually encouraging commentary for their audience. Elsewhere on the
campground a booth is plugging Revival (whose cover art is an underwater photograph of
the band members from the neck down, their heads above water and just out of view—an
anonymous, reverse baptism of sorts), other Supertones albums, and band “merch”—
clothing, stickers, and even a Supertones bracelet. The Christian message is continued
online: “We definitely want to preach and sing about Christ, but not a false sense of
Christianity,” says bassist Tony Terusa on his band’s Internet site. “To us, it’s just
complete reliance on Christ and on the Holy Spirit in this tough world. There are so
many struggles and so many joys and so many hardships and so many blessings but
without Christ, all of those things are nothing” (Orange County Supertones).
Same planet; different worlds. Indeed, be it Rolling Stone or MTV’s “Total
Request Live,” a dizzying Southern California or the sparsely populated cultural
wasteland of the American Middle West, both Christian rock and punk rock have become
fixtures of twenty first century American popular culture. Although each has certainly
9

seen its share of “crossover" rets in the last thirty years (from pop diva Amy Grant or
Stryper’s yellow and black

,ack of Christian “heavenly” metal to the new wave punk of

Devo, Green Day’s pop-punk, and Nirvana’s “grunge”), neither genre has been as
ubiquitous, popular, or profitable as they are of late. Indeed, although each originated
alongside—and as we shall see in partial response to—the late-1960s American
counterculture, no

ger can either be classified as subterranean genres.4 And while their

subcultures’ entrance into popular culture (e.g., the genres’ very ability to organize and
sustain the commercial tours and festivals described above) horrifies many of the groups’
founders, pc aps more unsettling to the most zealous members of these groups is their
association tere; the animosity each genre has shown the other is well documented.
Nevertheless, this association, as this thesis argues for reasons both empirical and
theoretical, is relevant and even ineluctable. Qualitative and historical analyses indicate,
after all, that beyond their shared origins, the subsequent developmental paths undertaken
by the Contemporary Christian music and punk rock subcultures have been virtually
identical, and that the two share even today numerous characteristic traits—for instance,
eschatological leanings, internal debates over authenticity, disparagement of “hippie”
culture, and a demographic consisting of predominantly white males (all of which belie
not only their near opposite ideological and theological natures, but their fierce dismissal
of each other). Furthermore, this comparable birth and development has resulted in each
genre’s simultaneous and predictable entrance into the broader twenty first century North
American popular culture milieu.
This is not an empirical analysis, however. Although hia. >ry is necessary to
contextualize the forthcoming interpretation of these subcultures, this document is first
and foremost a rock and roll exegesis, a “thought experiment” to quote existentialist
philosopher Soren Kierkegaard. But neither is it a traditional pop exegesis, for it offers a
10

hypothesis concerning the rejection of both rock and roll and the culture in which it
resides. All superficial characteristics aside, that is, the element that primarily separates
these groups from other popular music subcultures and makes their juxtaposition most
appropriate is the groups' outright denial of their parent culture and theoretical practice
of negation, as defined, in the context of punk, by music writer Greil Marcus (Lipstick
Traces, 1989), and in the context of Christianity by Christian theologian H. R. Niebuhr
(<Christ and Culture, 1951). As such, it should come as no surprise that the forthcoming
argument is governed principally by Hegel’s dialectical method whereby any concept or
theoretical position known as the thesis (affirmation) is proven inadequate or inconsistent
and thus rejected by an antithesis (negation). But as the negation too is shown to be one
sided and imperfect, it is abandoned by the “negation of the negation” or synthesis of the
two opposing concepts. This synthesis also serves as a new thesis for some future
negation, and the dialectical process may continue ad infinitum or terminate depending on
the context of the particular dialectical movement in question. This method Hegel
describes as the superlative model of authentic philosophic discourse, as “the only true
method” (qtd. in Singer, 196), because it contains, as French Hegelian Jean Hyppolite
explains, “its own criticism within itself’ (158).
Thus the implicit theoretical statement offered below is that the punk and
Christian rock “negations” described by Marcus and Niebuhr can be understood as rock
and roll versions of the secondary phase of Hegel’s dialectical process, as the antithetical,
desire-fueled blossoming of self-consciousness (which, for Hegel, correlates to Spirit’s
unfolding of itself) described specifically in the second chapter of Hegel’s Phenomenology
o f Spirit (1807). This blossoming (itself involving a series of internal “determinate
negations”) concludes when self-consciousness achieves Absolute Knowledge or the
knowledge of self, other, and God (all of which Hegel suggests eventually coalesce),

turning these “identically opposite” negationist music subcultures into movements that
perform a role comparable to religion for their adherents in that they reify the seifs
search for Spirit. This paper may be described, then, as a Hegelian reading of rock music,
the goal of which is to locate, through textual analysis, a series of specific homologies
between the punk and Christian rock subcultures. Not only are the groups being framed
as negationist in the context of popular culture, however, but as dialectically opposed to
each other, as the latter half of this chapter illustrates. Thus this document asks (and
hopefully answers) the questions: What happens when we formally apply Hegel’s
dialectic—specifically as described in Phenomenology, i.e., in the context of
consciousness—to Marcus and Niebuhr’s description of these social groups as
“negationist” in their relation to popular culture; and what does these groups’—who too
treat each other as the enemy—juxtaposition reveal about the efficacy of negation itself as
an ideological position? Throughout the text the reader will recognize the recurrence of
the dialectic, as interpreted by this writer, cited in the context of self-consciousness and
desire. Theoretical texts aside, the objects of analysis are punk and Christian rock song
lyrics, their performance, and occasionally secondary aesthetic “texts” such as album art
and couture.
Following definitions and a very brief history of each genre, the categorization and
interpretation of their negative desire in the context of Phenomenolog}>, and the
exploration of punk’s suspiciously Christian religiosity, the essay will offer two primary
conclusions. First, despite the complete opposite ideologies/theologies that inspired and
continue to inspire these groups’ negationism (not to mention their hatred for each other),
the subcultures are actually responding similarly to the dominant culture, turning them,
paradoxically, into “identical opposites” whose refusals of each other are ironic and
perhaps unwarranted. In effect, this suggests that the fluid superficial features (musical
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sound, style, and attitude) of all would-be negationist subcultures are, while relevant,
secondary both in terms of the groups’ original impulse to negation and the theoretical
consequences for the subcultures’ adherents following their rebellion. Specifically, it is
negation itself that is, as we shall see, an impossible position. Second, while negation fails
communities in that it simply displaces rather than resolving the philosophical and social
enigma, the conceptual area where negation has succeeded (in fact is necessary in
dialectical terms) is in supplying individuals (the individual self-consciousness) with both
a lexicon and forum for both cultural- and self-criticism and a better understanding of both
the self and heretofore negated Other (and, by proxy, Spirit), which becomes practical,
paradoxically, only when negation is itself negated and the grander dialectical chain
consummated.
*
We shall dive into negation momentarily. Before any analysis of popular music
subculture can occur, however, to help the reader get a sense of how the punk and
Christian subcultures are being understood in this thesis one must first articulate a
definition of the genre(s) in question, not to mention the term “genre” itself. Of course,
the classification of texts in the Western tradition is a vexing and complicated issue, the
entire history of which need not be recounted here. Very generally, the notion of genre
begins with Aristotle, who distinguished between drama and epic. Later writers, many of
who rightly commented on the artificial and problematic nature of genre, added basic
distinctions between drama, narrative, and lyric (each of which are further divided, e.g.,
tragedy and comedy in theater). Certainly the use of a single definition of a single genre in
a single artistic medium is abusive in that it ignores centuries of debate. Notwithstanding,
for the sake of brevity this problematic distinction is necessarily made here. Taking a
page from Kant’s third critique, then, in his analysis of value judgments in popular music,
13

Performing Riles: On the Value o f Popular Music (1996), Simon Frith makes three general
arguments regarding the generic labeling of popular musical styles (which perhaps fall
under the traditional category of lyric): generic categorization is a commercial construct
that organizes the marketing of music commodities; such labels help frame, for musicians,
“the playing process” or the sound and style of a band (rock, reggae, funk) and their
selection of venues and distributors/record labels; and genres organize, for audiences, the
listening process. These functions of genre in music must be understood concomitantly,
says Frith—a Marxian critic often associated with the Birmingham School Cultural Studies
crowd-which “make clear that generic labeling involves a complex interplay between
musical, marketing, and ideological forces” (84). As a result, Frith notes that genres
operate in exclusive terms to establish ideologically and artificially constructed (by fans,
musicians, joumalists/critics, and corporations) boundaries that are often more concerned,
ironically, with keeping a certain listening demographic out than in:
The industry aim is to retain the promise of exclusivity, the hint of generic
secrets, while making them available to everyone. It sometimes seems,
indeed, as if a genre is only clearly defined (its secret revealed) at the
moment when it ceases to exist, when it can no longer be exclusive. (88,
emphasis added)5
Thus generic classification, which Frith argues “lies...at the heart of pop value judgments”
(75), is best understood in terms of political economy: the categorization of musical
commodities (sound recordings, performances, and even personalities) and their
presentation to a specific demographic. In the context of commodification and alienation,
then, Frith closes his discussion of genre by turning to the work of Franco Fabbri to argue
that a musical genre is a “set of musical events (real or possible) whose course is governed
by a definite set of socially accepted rules” (91). These genre-defining rules can be
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grouped under five headings—formal and technical rules, semiotic rules, behavioral rules,
social and ideological rules, and commercial rules.
Briefly, formal and technical rules are literally the genre’s sound-its aural features,
the skill of its musicians, even the instruments used (or consciously not used). Semiotic
rules are the genre’s “rules of communication, how the music works as rhetoric” (91).
Fabbri suggests semiotic rules determine the meaning conveyed by a particular song or
artist through (often) rote generic conventions. Behavioral rules, which are closely
affiliated with semiotic rules, are just that: the conduct, on stage and off, of a genre’s
musicians and fans. The behavioral rules governing those who consider themselves
members of heavy metal subculture, for example, will differ thoroughly from those whose
preference is folk music. Social and ideological rules, which too relate to behavioral rules,
refer to “the nature of the musical community and its relationship to the wider
world... what the music is meant to stand for as a social force, its account of an ideal world
as well as of the real one” (93). In other words, for Frith a genre’s ideological rules
represent the attitude of the genres’ artists and fans to the world. Last, commercial and
juridical rules refer to a genre’s posture toward the production and distribution of their
music, including such issues as the pressing and marketing of albums, copyright, and even
performance venues and ticket prices.
While Frith acknowledges the limitations of Fabbri’s scheme, its rigid inability to
allow for evolution within genres for instance, his point is well-made: genres, especially in
the context of popular music, are the ideologically constructed result of (conscious and
unconscious) collaboration between musicians, fans, and multiple industry factors (record
companies, radio stations, journalists), and are best read in the materialist context of
political economy. Furthermore, genres “bring together the aesthetic and the ethical” (95)
and are thus often more exclusive than they are inclusive, constructing themselves in
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terms of otherness. To embellish, Fabbri/Frith, however, each of these generic rule
categories must also be understood as developing both diachronically and dialectically.
One cannot fully appreciate or understand the behavioral, semiotic, and technical rules of
early rock and roll (not to mention its ideology and ethic) without recognizing how this
genre was influenced by the semiotic and technical rules of blues and gospel artists.
Thinking more along the lines of Hegel, that is, one genre cannot be conceived in isolation
or ahistorically; the very “other” a genre strives to differentiate itself from must be
understood as requisite to the new genre’s very conception of itself, and this is where
negation comes into play generally.
In order, then, to develop coherent, contextualized definitions of the “punk” and
“Christian rock” genres and frame their historical development, this thesis must first
establish a of “dialectic of rock” with an ear toward Frith and political economy. To help
establish this specific dialectic, Marxian critic Fredric Jameson’s “Periodizing the 60s”
(1984) surfaces as the most appropriate theoretical aid. In this essay, much of which
anticipates his landmark work of theory Postmodernism, Or, The Cultural Logic o f Late
Capitalism (1991), Jameson “periodizes” the 1960s homologically in terms of the relation
of First World and Third World political discourse, tracking four “levels” of historical
change that he feels occurred in the 1960s: revolutionary politics, cultural production,
economic cycles, and the philosophy of history itself. The First World 1960s culture on
each of these levels, says Jameson thinking in terms of causality, is a direct response to
die Third World 1960s culture wherein the anticoloniahsl (and often loosely “Marxist”)
movements in Africa, Indochina, South America, and even the American South during the
1960s and early-1970s both frame and generate the First World counterculture and New
Left movements in the West, especially in those First World nations involved in Third
World colonialist endeavors such as France and the United States. “It can be argued that
16

the most characteristic expressions of a properly First World 60s are all later than [these
Third World decolonization movements],” Jameson writes, “whether they are understood
in countercultural terms—drugs and rock—or in the political terms of a student New Left
and mass antiwar movement” (180).
Amidst a commentary on the supersession of Sartrean existentialism by
structuralism/poststructuralism where he invokes Hegel’s master/slave dialectic toward
the analysis of colonialism, Jameson then offers two dialectical moments or “breaks” that
help us comprehend the “meaning” of sixties as an era: 1967-68 and 1973-74. This first
break is significant for Jameson because it marks the ascendence of decentralized,
postmodern guerrilla movements in South Americp and Palestine, among other locales, and
saw the publication of Regis Debray’s Revolution in the Revolution?, a criticism and
advocacy of guerilla warfare (Debray, a French national, was a friend of Che Guevara).
The direct result of this Third World anticolonialist activity, says Jameson, is the cresting
of the countercultural wave in the colonizing First World as exemplified by the Monterey
Pop Festival, May 1968 in France, and the Democratic National Convention riots in
Chicago.6 The latter break (the true end of the sixties) saw the beginning of America’s
withdrawal from Vietnam, the abolition of the American military draft, a Chilean coup in
which Augusto Pinochet’s military regime overthiew the socialist Allende government,
and a world economic crisis that “put a decisive full stop to the economic expansion and
prosperity characteristic of the postwar period generally and of the 60s in particular”
(205). This break is significant in that each of the examples noted contributed to the end
of mass politics (at least on the Left) and the turn to more individualized or self-centered
political dialogue Left and Right.
Jameson concludes his periodization by describing the sixties as an “immense and
inflationary issuing of superstructural credit; a universal abandonment of the referential
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gold standard; an extraordinary printing up of ever more devalued signifiers” (208), the
end of which resulted in the eventual “proletarianization” of “all those unbound social
forces that gave the 60s their energy” (208) by the middle-1970s. This proletarianization
of dissent (once described by critic Harold Rosenberg as “the process of
depersonalization and passivity”7) is the “cultural turn” that signals the very beginnings
of postmodernism or the global dominance of “late capitalism” which Jameson goes on to
describe in his later work.
Sticking with “Periodizing the 60s” for the moment, however, already, we can see
a theoretical problem with what Jameson calls his “historical periodization” that more
traditional historians are quick to note: it is itself ahistorical and highly interpretive. The
more empirically minded social scientist or dismissive critic, in other words, would
certainly call Jameson’s effort, which follows Althusser (and even the Foucault of
Archaeology o f Knowledge), to produce, as he admits, not “History ‘as it really
happened,’ but rather to produce the concept of history” (180) revisionist and egregious
in its discursive distortion of fact and lack of discipline. History cannot be “interpreted”
as a literary text at will the conservative historian might cough, removing his wingtip and
pounding it on the polished oak table; one cannot focus on a single historical/cultural
moment and extrapolate with impunity. Indeed, despite his materialist assumptions
about various Third World “Marxist” revolutionaries and Hegelian suggestion early on
that “History is Necessity”—that the “60s had to happen the

it did, and tha,

opportunities and failures were inextricably intertwined, marked by the objective
constraints and openings of a determinate historical situation” (178)—Jameson betrays his
own dialectical materialism in going on to track specific “levels” of culture in the 1960s in
a “postmodern” and decontextualized sort of way. Liberating philosophy, poetry, and
political economy from each other and history, for instance, Jameson elides the
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boundaries separating high and low culture, pop music and philosophy, giving equal
weight to the exegetical worth of each of these levels (in other words assigning the Beatles
the same historical import as Che Guevara—in the same academic arena).8 N 't only the
grizzled historian but the literary Formalist and/or New Critic would scoff at such a
method.
His lesser inconsistencies and methodology aside, however, Jameson is
nonetheless valuable to this thesis in that his model allows for the isolation of that
dialectical “moment” that causes the student, politico, and prole alike to muse, as Greil
Marcus once put it, “Wow, the world seems different today” (“Punk and History”).
This thesis too considers 1968 such a moment for not just the world, but the subcultures
in question. More importantly, Jameson’s model is invaluable here in that in dealing with
the “politics of otherness” in its periodization, it illustrates how “brief sketches” of
seemingly unconnected strands (levels) of a particular historical narrative, can actually
detect regularities within the periodized era and perhaps help corroborate one’s theory of
a particular historical moment. This verification of seemingly dissimilar threads becomes
important in the analysis that follows, for only after Jameson’s suggestion that “it is
surely only against a certain conception of what is historically dominant u, hegemonic
that the full value of the exceptr

can be assessed” (178-79) can the present

interpreter best develop a reading of “negationist” cultural movements (especially those
that at first appear to have nothing in common or are, in fact, opposed to each other) and
present their dialectical development concomitantly. “What is at stake, then, is not some
proposition about the [mythological] organic unity of the 60s on all its levels,” Jameson
clarifies, “but rather a hypothesis about the rhythm and dynamics of the fundamental
situation in which those very different levels develop according to their own internal
laws” (179). This dynamic, multivalent, “periodized” treatment of the sixties—combined
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with Frith’s definition of musical genre as political economy—thus provides the model,
exploited egregiously here, by which the negationist punk and ( iristian rock music
subcultures might be tracked homologically on both the religious and popular culture
levels and eventually shown to share a whole series of Hegelian 'regularities.”
With Hegel, Jameson, and Frith all in mind, then, this thesis will outline a very
brief dialectical history of rock, all of which will lead finally to the definition and
valorization of the exception rather than the rule. Indeed, one can already see the dialectic
at work in the complicated realm of American popular music, and specifically rock and
roll, by the 1950s. If rock in the late-1950s, as epitomized in Elvis Presley, can be framed
a sort of revolutionary affirmation of postwar youth culture (and specifically white,
middle class youth culture) in that it provided the theoretical starting point for a new
generation/gem ., itself the synthesis of country, bluegrass, blues, gospel, and even jazz)
he early sixties was punctuated by the antithesis of electric guitar rock that was the
sonically lighter (but directed at a similar demographic as rock) folk music of Joan Baez,
Bob Dylan, and Pete Seeger (not to mention Motown’s R&B).9 But even the popularity
of traditional acoustic folk music was fleeting as the genre found itself similarly
inadequate, commercially or otherwise, the moment folk and rock synthesized. Although
Dylan himself did not “go electric” publicly until the 1965 Newport Folk Festival
(supposedly to audience howls of “Judas!”), “folk-rock” bands such as the Byrds were
covering his and other folk artists’ songs (e.g., “Mr. Tambourine Man”) in concert and on
album before Dylan’s Newport performance. Thus began the renaissance of rock in
America, a revival aided greatly by the 1964 “British Invasion” of rock groups such as the
Beatles and Rolling Stones, among other Britons.10
And as the First World counterculture (also a largely Caucasian, middle class
phenomenon) grew during these years and beyond in response to Third World
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sociopolitical upheavals says Jameson, even more so did much of young America’s ear for
the more aggressive and rebellious sounds of rock, and especially the “psychedelic” and/or
protest variety: 1967 saw releases by the Jimi Hendrix Experience (Are You
Experienced?), Country Joe and the Fish (Electric Music for the Mind and Body), the
*

Rolling Stones (Their Satanic Majesties Request), and two from the Beatles (Sgt. Pepper’s
Lonely Hearts Club Band and Magical Mystery Tour), all of which did well commercially.
The following year saw the release of Creedence Clearwater Revival’s eponymous debut,
Music from Big Pink by the Band, and more “classic” albums by the Beatles, Rolling
Stones, and Hendrix, among other notable rockers. Thus did rock more officially recover
its affirmative status—despite the era’s designation as “counterculture”—and in this
resurgence the reader can already recognize the rock dialectic, as >■v- re, in popular
culture.
At this point Jameson’s 1967-68 surfaces as the “moment” in which two new
rock and roll sub-genres materialized to negate not only commercial rock, but popular
culture itself In April 1968, the Psychedelic Stooges (later just the Stooges), the Motor
City 5 (or MC5, later blamed for starting the D.N.C. riot in Chicago), and Frank Zappa’s
Mothers of Invention played a modestly attended concert at the Grande Ballroom in
Detroit, Michigan. The lead singer for the Stooges, a short, wiry Doors fan who called
himself Iggy Stooge, was already notorious for his audience-baiting and performing in
such non-traditional, non-sexy, and quintessentially non-rock star attire as white ankle
length nightgowns, aluminum foil afros, and peanut butter; his scarcely competent backing
band had been playing their instruments for hardly a year. With a less-than-subtle cry of
“Kick out the jams, motherfuckers!” the MC5, managed by White Panther Party leader
John Sinclair, likewise tore through their dazzling, frenetic, and jazz-influenced set of acid
rock; the Mothers of Invention stuck to their crass, cartoonish antics and habitual derision

of the United States military."
While not the first of its kind, this show—and especially its now legendary lineup
of bands—signified the emergence of an amped up, acerbic, and bizarre rock derivative that
had been brewing in the American cultural underground since the middle sixties in
response not to American colonialism perhaps, but pop culture itself and the selfrighteous and impotent (at least according to these new bands) counterculture in
particular. Whether the Doors and Mothers of Invention in Los Angeles, the Stooges and
MC5 in Detroit, the Velvet Underground and Fugs in New York, and countless lesserknown acts, a new variety of avant-garde, atrociously loud, raunchy, implicitly political
(as opposed to the explicit politics of the counterculture), and self-consciously offensive
rock and roll had emerged from coast to coast. Featuring grating, prurient, profanity
laden, thinly-veiled songs about homosexuality, boredom, hard drug addiction (e.g., heroin
as opposed to marijuana), violent revolution, and dozens of other heretofore-taboo
subjects in American music, sung often by shoddy, talentless “musicians” who were at
times carelessly indifferent if not deliberately abusive toward their audience, this new
music negated not only rock proper but all of mainstream American culture; and it stood
in stark contrast, intentionally so, to the more widespread and media-savvy
“counterculture” movement. This “proto-punk,” as it is often called, immediately
inspired (and continues to inspire long after the more popular counterculture was
proletarianized as Jameson would say) several equally crass derivatives, including the
gilded and gender-bending “glam” punk, represented by the cross-dressing New York
Dolls and David Bowie/Ziggy Stardust, and (following more in the footsteps of the Velvet
Underground and Fugs) the antipop art punk of Television, Pere Ubu, and Patti Smith
Band, all of which released albums in the early- and mid-1970s.
By 1976, the traditional sound and style of this budding antipop genre, which by
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now had become known simply as “punk,” crystalized following the eponymous debut
of New York's the Ramones, who released what is considered by many fans the definitive
punk record: Ramones.'1 This album established what is typically understood even today
as the customary punk sound-loud, fast, and short rock songs with such absurd, ironic,
and antisocial titles as “Blitzkrieg Bop” and “Now I Wanna Sniff Some Glue.” At the
same time, over in England former New York Dolls manager/fashion designer Malcolm
McLaren, who had returned home following that band’s breakup, began work on
assembling an act that would more explicitly politicize (and stylize) American punk for
an economically stagnant Great Britain. This act surfaced in 1976 as the Sex Pistols and
was followed by other political British punk acts such as the Clash and the Damned.
It should now be briefly noted that this period of middle-seventies punk is often
described as the genre’s initial stage, as punk’s “thesis” (not to mention the moment of its
quick “death”), especially in British literature on the subject.13 In America, too, punk
from this era is often considered a genre-founding response to both disco and the
corporate-backed “prog” and “arena” rock represented by such acts as Yes, Aerosmith,
the Eagles, and Emerson, Lake & Palmer (all of whom punks from this era considered the
result of the counterculture’s “sellout”). This new retrograde music subculture
epitomized by the Ramones, Sex Pistols, and Clash supposedly returned rock and roll
music to its simpler and more capricious, while simultaneously mercurial, roots.
Acknowledging that such an argument may be defended (as does Marcus in Lipstick
Traces) depending on one’s textual and theoretical focus, this essay assumes the position,
following the aforementioned thinkers, that middle- and late-1970s punk represents but
one stage in punk’s internal dialectical, and that “punk” first screamed its way into
existence in the middle/late-sixties as part of a broader cultural break and in response to a
particular cultural moment—the counterculture and/or emergence of postmodernism—and
23

continues to evolve today.
After all, despite the so-called “death” of punk in the late-1970s, American punk
not only hung around, but grew much more angry and aggressive in its drive to eschew
culture and commodification in the early-1980s, resulting in the even faster (achieving
perhaps what Mel Brooks might christen “ludicrous speed”), louder, and more chaotic
“hardcore” punk of Bad Brains and Minor Threat in Washington D.C., and Black Flag and
the Dead Kennedys in Southern California among countless others. Already a media
spectacle as a result of McLaren’s Sex Pistols, who disintegrated on-stage in San
Francisco in 1978 (only moments before Sex Pistols singer Johnny Rotten’s infamous and
genuine audience query “Ever get the feeling you’ve been cheated?”), this was also the
time that adulterated versions of punk first became marketable, through a sort of
“corporate detournement,” as “new wave” to mainstream music consumers, a synthetic
genre which, it should be noted, coincided with the birth of Music Television.14 And as
punk went pop with MTV, new negationist permutations of the genre emerged, hardcore
aside, in the 1980s including skinhead/neo-Nazi punk, crust, anarcho-punk, and postpunk/indie.
By the 1990s, punk again found itself synthesized, commodified, and on the cover
of Rolling Slone in the form of the Pacific Northwest’s own punk hybrid “grunge” and its
torchbearing band Nirvana. Following the unexpected success of Nirvana (who in
interviews cited as influences punk groups like the Pixies, Flipper, and Siouxsie and the
Banshees), the music industry again began marketing as “alternative” any agitated, youthoriented guitar rock and traditional punk again broke the mainstream surface with Green
Day, the Offspring, and many other erstwhile “underground” bands finding themselves
the owners of gold (and even platinum) records. Five years into the twenty-first century
punk lingers in popular culture with several pop-punk acts appearing regularly on “Top24

40” and Billboard singles charts;15likewise, new acts come together each day who make it
their goal to keep “their music” underground or segregated from the Other to which they
are opposed: commercial pop culture. The reader will thus recognize the dialectic (and
Frith) at work even within the punk genre: a new, “edgy” rock genre develops under the
mainstream radar, negating popular culture; this music is discovered, labeled, and
promoted vigorously (typically in a diiuted—or synthesized—form) by the record and
radio industries, journalists, and even fans; thus the genre’s founders and/or subsequent
negation-minded purists refashion the music to which they f<tl a proprietary relationship
into a form hopefully less marketable/commercial, again negating pop culture, and so on.
Given this evolutionary history and fluidity, then, how does one define punk for a
contemporary Hegelian analysis? According to Mike Watt, formerly of the San Pedro,
California, band Minutemen, punk is much more than a musical genre demarcated by
rhythm, sound, or geography:
I still think of punk as a state of mind and not a style, so h j w can it go out
of fashion? “Alternative” and “new wave” were horrible terms, totally
limiting words. “Punk” can mean anything. That’s how it started out-it
was whatever you wantjed] to chain it to—but understand this: It’s always
going to bust out on its own, there’s always going to be something that’s
kind of wild and you’re going to call it punk. (Spitz and Mullen, 283)
As Watt alleges, any number of people will give you any number of definitions of punk: a
music genre, an ideology, a style, an attitude, or each of these at once. Punk cofounder
Legs McNeil, for instance, defended the title of his short-lived magazine by arguing that
for him and his friends, “The word ‘punk’ seemed to sum up the thread that connected
everything we liked—drunk, obnoxious, smart but not pretentious, absurd, funny, ironic,
and things that appealed to the darker side” (204). This is perhaps what Marcus had in
25

mind when he suggested romantically: “Punk was not a musical genre; it was a moment in
time that took shape as a language anticipating its own destruction, and thus sometimes
seeking it, seeking the statement of what could be said with neither words nor chords. It
was not history” (82). Bringing a more right-of-center perspective into the debate, artist
Frank Kozik later asked “What is punk rock but free enterprise? It’s the purest concept
of capitalist democracy: create your own system” (Sinker, We Owe You Nothing 178).
Adds William S. Burroughs, “I always thought a punk was someone who took it up the
ass” (McNeil and McCain, 209).
All of this results in a cacophonous conundrum: if punk, in this dialectical context,
has such a multiplicity of definitions and disparate denominations—if it is really as open
to interpretation as Watt says—is a meaningful, objective definition feasible? The
Ramones and Minor Threat (whose technical sound and band ideologies are quite different
from each other) are classified as punk by fans, critics, and fellow musicians; but so are
the coprophagous G.G. Allin and English rocker Elvis Costello. As Kevin Mattson
argues, “Cleat ly no single definition of this youth subculture will stick.” Indeed, why has
the term “punk” stuck? Not to be deterred by such questions, the Oxford English
Dictionary provides several definitions for the term punk, including “harlot” and “rotten
wood.” In the context appropriate here, the noun punk is also “something worthless” or
a “person of no account, a worthless fellow; a young hooligan or petty criminal.” The
origins of this definition date to the early twentieth century. Accordingly, “punk rock” (a
term supposedly first used by David Marsh in the May 1971 issue of Creem in reference
to Rudi Martinez of ? [Question Mark] and the Mysterians) is defined as “a loud, fastmoving style of rock music characterized by aggressive and deliberately outrageous lyrics
and performance” (OED).
But even this definition is problematic, for neither the Velvet Underground, ? and
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the Mysterians, the Stooges, nor any of the earliest proto-punk bands were especially
aggressive or fast; it was not until the middle seventies that the music evolved into its
faster form. Nonetheless, these groups certainly established themselves early on as
amateurish and unpolished whether on stage or record. Speed aside, then, for the
purposes of this thesis punk music is, as Oxford suggests, exceedingly loud; the songs are
often shorter than the average pop hit, and the musicians (in contrast with their popular,
professional counterparts) imprecise, self-taught, talentless, and remedially minded
apropos the chords/rhythms they produce. Returning to Frith, these constitute punk’s
technical rules.
Next, because they are often inseparable in punk subculture the genre’s semiotic,
behavioral, commercial, and ideological rules are here discussed correspondingly. Early
semiotic rules included, to borrow from Dick Hebdige, a specific sartorial symbolismtorn, filthy, and pastiche clothing covered in swastikas or other offensive emblems and
phrases (Sid Vicious aside, Ron Asheton of the Stooges and David Bowie were known to
wear entire Nazi uniforms on stage and in public); safety pins; colored/spiked/no hair
communicating decay, negationism/nihilism, and dark antipop irony. The pastiche style
is largely out ot fashion today as most punks are more subtle in their couture; however, it
is not uncommon to see body piercings, leather, and variegated hair at punk concerts. In
line with this symbolic negation punks and their audiences were/are, behaviorally
speaking, rebellious, vulgar, misanthropic, pessimistic, often violent, and (significant to
this essay) either atheist or exceedingly skeptical of organized religion—and specifically
Christianity. Their self-injurious performances, pessimistic and taboo lyrics, and bold
statements of personal independence or self-hate all contribute to an overall do-it-yourself
or “DIY” minimalist aesthetic, and culminate ideologically in a self-imposed exile from (or
negation of) mainstream cuUure. Thus punk often manifests itself, in terms of political
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economy, as a sort of anticommercial genre boasting band-owned/managed record labels
and distribution networks, parsimoniously produced recordings made on secondhand
instruments (resulting in inexpensive records for fans), self-booked tours completed with
members’ own vehicles, and low door prices for concerts often performed for all-ages
crowds in such noncommercial venues as house basements, warehouses, and skateparks.16
Acknowledging the disparate nature of the subculture and the dictionary definition
above, this generic description of punk as primarily negationist in multiple contexts
(technically, semiotically, ideologically, commercially, behaviorally) is how the term
“punk” is employed in this thesis. Both punk’s initial 1968 negation of culture and
punk’s internal dialectic will be considered in chapter one, again in the context of Hegel’s
Phenomenology o f Spirit. The specific bands discussed in the following chapter as
epitomizing Hegel’s description of the development of self-consciousness include Black
Flag, the Dead Kennedys, Crass, Fugazi, and Richard Hell and the Voidoids.
*
Of course punk was not the only negationist genre that surfaced in 1968 and can
be read dialectically; as proto-punk was emerging across the nation, the fathers (and
mothers) of Contemporary Christian music too were slowly beginning to utilize the tools
of popular culture in an effort to reject it. As early as 1967 the Electric Prunes, a
psychedelic Los Angeles rock group, recorded Mass in FMinor, their rock and roll
version of a Roman Catholic Mass (sung in pre-Vatican II Latin for a post-Vatican II
world). The album, whose cover featured a variegated rosary set amid a purple
background, follows the traditional Mass exactly-side one featuring “Kyrie Eleison,”
“Gloria,” and “Credo”; side two “Sanctus,” “Benedictus,” and “Agnus Dei.”17 Shortly
thereafter (April 1968), the Bay Area band People! covered the Zombies’ “I Love You
(But The Words Won’t Come)” which was released as a single on Capitol Records.
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Peoplel’s frontman was a little-known born-again Christian songwriter named Larry
Norman. “I Love You,'1soon the fourteenth most requested song in the country, was to
be included on the band’s forthcoming debut album, tentatively titled by Norman We
Need A Whole Lot More o f Jesus and a Lot Less Rock and Roll. Fearing the non-salability
of Jesus, Capitol summarily intervened and released the album simply as I Love You. In
protest, Norman left the band the day the album was released and immediately began a
more ministerial, and less commercially successful, solo career.18
While not the first rock musician to take Jesus seriously in his music, Norman is
today considered the “Father of Christian Rock” by most Christian musicians and
industry personnel (although perhaps not by fans as the next chapter illustrates). Born
into a religious Texan family in 1947, Norman actually spent his young adult years in
Southern California. By his twentieth birthday he had taken an active role in a nascent
“Jesus movement,” a nondenominational grass roots Christian revival movement
consisting mostly of young people, especially former hippies, whose “One Way” logo
was the crudely drawn silhouette of a hand with its index finger pointed upward.19 The
Jesus movement was comprised of “Jesus People” or “Jesus Freaks” who were often, put
simply, erstwhile hippies who had become “totally disillusioned with the counterculture
revolution, the ‘peace,’ ‘love,’ ‘flower power’ movement, LSD, and so forth” (Balmer,
Mine Eyes Have Seen the Glory 21). Like proto-punk, for these young people the
counterculture—and certainly the rest of secular culture—was to be rejected; “dropping
Jesus” replaced dropping acid and “free love” soon came to mean the love of Christ.
Characteristics of the Jesus movement included a very in-your-face style of evangelism,
the belief that one must accept Jesus Christ as a personal savior to avoid spending
eternity in hell, a heavy apocalyptic/millenarian tone or the expectation that the End
Times were near, and criticism of both mainstream American consumer culture and the
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counterculture they deemed ineffectual, amoral, and hardly “counter” to the rest of secular
culture.
After fermenting in the underground for a few years the Jesus movement climaxed
around 1971, as part of what has been described by William McLoughlin and Robert
Fogel as a broader American religious revival, when it was discovered by the mainstream
media and covered everywhere from Time and Newsweek to Rolling Slone and multiple
television news magazines. Billy Graham even expressed a close affinity to the Jesus
movement and a renewed hope for America’s religious future in a book published that
same year: The Jesus Generation. Nineteen seventy-one also saw the off-Broadway
theatrical release of two religiously themed “rock operas,” Godspell and Jesus Christ
Superstar, which dramatized the Jesus story for theater audiences through rock music
(both plays were turned into motion pictures in 1973). But as the counterculture waned,
or, again, was proletarianized, so did the Jesus movement; by 1975 the Jesus movement
had again returned underground only to be kept alive by an ever dwindling, yet zealous,
number of chapters scattered throughout the nation, many of which remain to this day in
various forms.
Its greater demise notwithstanding, in less than a decade the Jesus movement had
more than made a mark on the mainstream American culture to which it was opposed.
And as sociologist Robert Ellwood observes, the supreme and enduring legacy of the
Jesus movement was its music: “[T]he great vehicle of the Jesus movement is music. It is
largely music that has made the movement a part of pop culture, and it is the Jesus
movement as pop culture that distinguishes it from what is going on in the churches” (6364). Add Christian music historians Jay Howard and John Streck, “[this] tentative
incorporation of new sounds into the gospel canon would give way to the formulation of
a new genre of rock music: Jesus Rock” (29). And it is this Jesus Rock, a rock-based
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style of music whose lyrics espoused a Christian message, that would eventually come to
he known as today ’s Contemporary Christian music.20
At this point a brief digression concerning the elephant in the parlor that is the
country and western music genre is in order. The same momentous year Iggy Stooge
played a concert covered in peanut butter and Larry Norman began his rock ministry,
Johnny Cash at Folsom Prison was accorded the Country Music Association Album of
the Year award. This album was followed by the equally popular Johnny Cash at San
Quentin. What is worth noting about these two records is not only their revolutionary
concept, but their subtle Christian religiosity. That is, a record company’s decision to
produce multiple live albums recorded in various prisons at the height of the
counterculture is remarkable in its own right; but it did so in the context of a Christian
singer/songwriter who had, it could be argued, “not come to call the virtuous but sinners
to repentance” (Gospel of Luke, 5:32). Rather, although they contain no hymns or
blatantly Christian/evangelical songs or “sermons” from stage, certainly these albums’
theological and egalitarian implications were not lost on Cash, who considered himself
born-again following a failed suicide attempt only months before recording the albums.
Thus although one might comfortably bracket country music in discussing the dialectic of
punk rock, it is more di fficult to do so in the realm of Christian rock and roll.
As was mentioned in passing above, country never fell as far out of favor in
commercial and pop culture terms the way so many other genres-big band jazz, folk, and
even early rock—did. Its popularity remains to this day. In fact, country music, and
especially the likes of Hank Williams and the aforementioned outlaws, is as requisite
listening as the blues of Robert Johnson, Sun Ra, Leadbelly, or Howlin’ Wolf for any
sincere (punk) rocker. For example, Missouri’s defunct Uncle Tupelo (credited with
popularizing, if not inventing the “alt-country” genre) was as comfortable covering the
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Carter Family (“No Depression”) as the Stooges (“1 Wanna Be Your Dog”) on their early1990s country-rock albums.21 This point is necessary because the “default faith,” if you
will, of country music, and certainly the gospel-influenced blues and early rock, is
Christianity. Such a point suggests (especially when fastened to the fact that the earliest
rockers discussed below retain strong Christian roots) that despite its refusals of religion,
secular rock (and even punk) retain, whether they wish to admit it or not, religious roots.
Thus, even before this particular juxtaposition of punk and Christian rock and the
significance of their similarities is proposed, the two are linked as a result of the grander
dialectical evolution of popular music covered earlier in brief.
With this in mind, then, how do we define Christian rock and roll specifically?
Since they came from strong religious backgrounds, are Elvis and Jerry Lee Lewis (who is
related to Jimmy Swaggart) Christian rock? Certainly the Christian rock that began with
the Jesus movement is as disparate as punk and too can be read dialectically, as we shall
see. But what characterizes a rock song as “Christian”? Perhaps the most telling feature
of Christian rock that has remained from its origins to today is the emphasis it places on
pious lyrics; that is, as an industry CCM is the only form of rock and roll that looks to
the lyrical content of its artists exclusively for a generic classification. Indeed, in terms of
technical style there is Christian punk, pop, country, hard rock, and metal; the unifying
factor in each of these dissimilar musics, the component that makes them CCM
generically, is their lyrical focus: Christ. Unfortunately, this definition is inadequate for it
suggests that any rock song to discuss Jesus in an earnest way is Christian rock, which is
of course not the case. In fact, Jesus seems to have been a popular subject in rock lyrics
throughout the sixties and seventies; in addition to country’s default piety and the
transparent Peter, Paul, and Mary, countless other rock acts made unaffected references
to Christ in their songs from this era, including Elton John, Neil Diamond, Simon and
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Garfunkel, George Harrison, Norman Greenbaum, and Vanilla Fudge.22 For the purposes
of this thesis a more specific definition is required.
For that definition we turn, in part, to Howard and Streck’s critical (if largely
sympathetic) analysis of the Christian music industry, Apostles o f Rock: The Splintered
World o f Contemporary Christian Music (2001), which treats CCM (as this writer does
with punk above) as an ideologically diverse genre home to several different “sects” that
have developed and evolved dialectically in response to each other and a dynamic secular
culture. Defining Christian music primarily in terms of community, Howard and Streck
argue that in general:
Christian Contemporary music is an artistic product that emerges from a
nexus of continually negotiated relationships binding certain artists, certain
corporations, certain audiences, and certain ideas to one another. It is the
art produced by an art world [here the writers are referring to sociologist
Howard Becker’s “art worlds” paradigm] that surrounds a heterogeneous
grouping of sometimes competing, sometimes complementary, and
sometimes unrelated discourses concerning moral values, artistic values,
commercial values, social values, and religious values. (14)
This is the beginning of a more coherent definition; however, it is still a bit vague.
Returning to Frith’s genre rules, then, we can see that Christian Contemporary music, like
punk, fits uneasily into the formal/technical category. Again, CCM as a music
community is really a collection of several generic sounds. Regarding Frith’s remaining
genre rule categories, however, Howard and Streck, who loosely base their categorization
of Christian rock and roll on Niebuhr’s Christ and Culture, divide Christian rock music
into three general types-separational, transformational, and integrational Christian
music—each of which follow different semiotic, behavioral, commercial, and
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social/ideologioal precepts and appear to be differentiated primarily by their attitude
toward the secular world.
Sepaiational Christian musicians, the original and largest group, see the secular and
the Christian as unequivocally oppositional. As a result their music acts as a form of
anticultural ministry and serves three purposes: to proselytize, to praise Jesus, and to
encourage existing believers. As it is contrary to their anticultural nature, mainstream
success is typically far below the radar of separational bands; thus they are marketed
exclusively as Christian music, predominantly in Christian bookstores, and actively
eschew commercial media and secular attention (which they tend not to receive as a result
of their stance anyway). Artists falling into this group can be read as fitting into
Niebuhr’s “Christ against culture” category of Christians, discussed in depth in chapter
two, whose rhetorical emphasis on evangelism, exhortation, worship, and a strict refusal
of the world—or negation as this writer argues—constitutes their ideological make-up.
Rejecting the separational approach as ineffectual and only “preaching to the
choir,” later Christian musicians began arguing for better cooperation with the mainstream
music industry and secular culture as a whole. These integrational bands, while not
explicitly evangelical rhetorically or behaviorally, also give listeners all the sound and
style of today’s most popular rock and roll but offer symbols, lyrics, and lifestyles that
remain consistent with Christian values: a more positive, wholesome alternative to much
of today’s secular rock music. Such crossover artists typically see themselves as
entertainers who happen to be coming from a Christian perspective and include the
aforementioned Amy Grant, Stryper, P.O.D., and Christian punks MxPx. For these
Christian bands and their fans, commercial success and collaboration with non-Christian
record labels, promoters, and radio stations is certainly no ideological contradiction. In
fact, collaboration is seen as necessarily bringing the gospel (even if it is a more watered34

down version of it say critics) to the masses and is encouraged as something to strive for
in terms of creating a balance with the otherwise hedonistic world of sex, drugs, and rock
and roll. Thus, integrational CCM can often be found in both Christian and secular
retailers. This group mirrors Niebuhr’s “Christ of culture” category of Christians who
see no fundamental incongruity between Christ and culture, which they describe as two
sides of the same coin—different but forever and unavoidably in contact.
The third (synthetic) dialectical step within Christian rock and roll is represented
by transformational artists. This group serves as a sort of late mediator between the
separational and integrational groups: separate from the world (usually “underground”)
but unopposed (or perhaps simply indifferent) to commercial success should they be
fortunate enough to find it through their art. Transformational musicians lack the
utilitarian component of both the separational and integrational sects; that is, they are
interested less in using their music for evangelical, ministerial, financial, or culture
countering purposes than in making “art for art’s sake.” Such artists simply happen to be
Christian, or at least Christian-influenced, and see their art and their religion as indivisible
and complementary. Their rhetoric, behavior, ideology, and attitude toward the
commercial side of their craft all reflect this position, and, as a result, tend to flounder in a
musical no man's land. In an interesting ideological commentary on both secular and
Christian retailers, that is, transformational Christian musicians are rarely marketed as
Christian m isic in Christian bookstores while simultaneously tending to receive little
respect from the secular industry as a result of their music’s religious content.
As the reader will have likely noticed, Howard and Streck’s tripartite
categorization of Christian rock looks suspiciously Hegelian in form. Their
empirical/sociological analysis, however, steers largely clear of theory and scarcely even
investigates theology. Hegel is mentioned not once, and Niebuhr in passing early on—
35

despite their debt to his heuristic. Thus their analysis is something of an awkward choice
for this largely theoretical and interpretive thesis. However, as very few empirical (and
even fewer theoretical) analyses have been done on Christian rock music-and as Howard
and Streck’s Hegelian form grounds the forthcoming analysis and invokes dialectical
materialists like Frith and Jameson—their text proves useful. If nothing else, it provides a
historiographic reading of Christian rock, which the authors suggest began, like punk,
around the time of Jameson’s 1967-68 break and describes this initial burst of Christian
rock as anticu. aral. In addition, Howard and Streck provide a detailed reading of CCM in
the context of political economy and provide a “materialist critique” of the genre near the
end of their analysis.
Returning Frith to the debate, then, and valorizing specifically Howard and
Streck’s “separational” Christian musicians (the original and still largest category of
Christian rock musicians), CCM is here defined as a rock and roll genre that, like punk,
was established and continues to operate upon the negation of mainstream (secular)
culture in ideological, behavioral, and commercial terms. The lyrics tend to express
affinity for Christ, of course, and the the artists and their fans tend to operate as a
“continually negotiated” community, to use Howard and Streck’s words; but the key to
understanding Christian rock here is the dialectic, and specifically negation. As such, the
separational Christian rock acts given a Hegelian reading in the following chapter include
Petra, Resurrection Band, and the aforementioned Larry Norman. Not only do these
artists best exemplify Niebuhrs “Christ against culture” construction as the
antimainstream negation of secular culture, but they provide, in the context of
Phenomenology, the most useful illustration of the internal dialectical development at
work in the Christian self-consciousness as it strives to unite with Spirit.
*
36

Before particularizing the subcultures’ Hegelian parallelism in the following
chapter, a brief history of the divide that has separated Christianity and rock and roll is in
order, if for no other reason than to establish the aforementioned ancestral enmity
between Christian and punk rockers (despite their shared historical roots) and to highlight
the irony of this antagonism given their dialectical resemblance and comparable late
mainstream visibility.
Ignoring briefly the forthcoming analysis of these subcultures’ overall negationism,
perhaps the best example of both genres’ late mainstream ubiquity (e.g., their presence on
MTV, “Top-40” radio, and commercial achievement) can be seen in the success of acts
such as MxPx and New Found Glory, both former Warped Tour participants, who, while
not the first openly Christian punk b?.nds, have finally managed to profitably synthesize
the two negationist subcultures, paving the way for the ambiguously Christian and radio
friendly hard rock and “positive punk” of Good Charlotte, Creed, and Switchfoot enjoyed
by many secular rock fans and Christian youth alike.23 But these bands, while increasing
in number, are still the exception, nor. the rule, as the CCM and punk worlds have
traditionally held each other at arm’s length.24 And, one might think, for good reason.
Although the line is blurring, resulting often in calls for the intensified refusal of culture
by separational Christian groups and hardcore punks, even today it is obvious that the
two genres, as they are defined above, are complete opposites theologically and
ideologically, negation aside. Whereas CCM as a genre is largely understood by Christian
musicians, their fans, and the secular crowd as evangelical, promoting the love of self and
a personal relationship with Jesus Christ, and otherwise morally exceeding the rest of our
nation’s “depraved” pop culture (through expressions of the virtues of sexual continence
and teetotalism. and a general advocacy of spiritual rather than material concerns), punk
was/is, quite the reverse. As a result, punk music has, from its anticultural beginnings to
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today, held little regard for the American cultural mainstream and anything that resembles
a thesis of authority, specifically the socially conservative, evangelical wing of Protestant
Christianity that grew (and continues to grow) increasingly visible, not to mention more
politically savvy, within American culture following the Second World War.2'
As has been exhaustively documented elsewhere, rock and roll had been branded
by countless conservative churches, ministers, and laypersons as evil, immoral, and even
Satanic long before Johnny Rotten’s fiercely enunciated declaration that he is an
Antichrist on the Sex Pistols’ first single “Anarchy in the U.K.” (1976). Despite the
robust Christian backgrounds of early rockers Elvis Presley, Jerry Lee Lewis, Little
Richard, and Chuck Berry, not to mention rock’s affinity to gospel music, countless
socially conservative congregations and ministers demonized rock and roll thoroughly in
the 1950s and early-1960s.26 One of the better examples of this condemnation was the
Reverend David Noebel, former Associate Evangelist with Billy J. Hargis’ Christian
Crusade. “Finally, music that is basically un-Christian, that lures us from first principles,
washes our minds in cheap filth, evokes righteous feelings, and incites to rebellion will be
rejected out of hand when our lives are truly ‘hid with Christ in God,”’ (241) Noebel
pontificated in Rhythm, Riots and Revolution (1966). “The hard fact is that in the present
revolutionary era, heavy beat music has become the catalyst for the young radicals in their
announced plans not only to destroy Western culture, but to dethrone God” (The Marxist
Minstrels, 70) the Reverend would go on to say referring specifically to the Beatles,
Rolling Stones, and Fugs.
Of course Noebel had more than enough evidence for his opinions: many of the
aforementioned early rockers, religious backgrounds or not, were notorious for their
outrageous conduct, sexuality, and unpredictability: “He looks mean,” writes Nick
Tosches of a drinking Jerry Lee Lewis’ scarcely Christian demeanor on stage. “But not as
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mean as last night, when he straightened out that chump in the audience with one fast,
cruel line; when he threw that swaggering record company lifer from his dressing-room;
when, at night’s end, he dared any man present to lift a hand against him” (108). Or, as
Clarke says referring to punk, “If any punk rocker had tried spitting on Jerry Lee Lewis,
he would have found out what danger was” (500). And, of course, in 1966 John Lennon
infamously suggested the Beatles were “more popular than Jesus,” which they perhaps
were. Indeed, concerned clergymen likely saw rock as the catalyst that turned these
heretofore pious and/or respectable musicians away from God.
But while outrageousness in rock was nothing new, the calculated irreverence—if
not outright sacrilege—that surfaced with punk was jaw-dropping to such antirock
advocates as Noebel. The earliest examples of punk contempt for not simply religion but
Christianity can be seen in the behavior and songs of the Doors, Stooges, and the Velvet
Underground. In 1966, the Velvet Underground recorded The Velvet Underground and
Nico. an album whose playlist included the provocatively homoerotic “I’m Waiting for
the Man” (sung by Lou Reed) and the self-explanatory “Heroin” and “The Black Angel’s
Death Song.” On the West Coast, self-proclaimed “shaman” and Doors singer Jim
Morrison was busy quoting the unambiguously non-Christian philosopher Friedrich
Nietzsche in interviews as early as 1967; according to Riordan and Prochinsky, Morrison
was, at the height of the Doors’ popularity, an “acid evangelist” to a music cult (152).
With less eloquence, New York poet and punk rocker Patti Smith—whose debut album
Horses (1975) contains the lyric “Jesus died for somebody’s sins, but not mine”—
expressed her opinion of a certain evangelical speaker particularly popular in the sixties
and seventies: “1 mean, Billy Graham is a great performer, even though he is a hunk of
shit” (McNeil and McCain, 161). Later punk audiences (ca. 1976) were treated to the
antics of Wayne County and the Back Street Boys, a New York band led by the cross
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dressing Wayne/Jayne County, whose stage show climaxed with the spattering of chicken
blood and smashing of a miniature Christ statue by Wayne as (s)he sung the band’s
“Storm the Gates of Heaven” (McNeil and McCain, 272). Johnny Rotten too calls
religion “creepy” in his autobiography and claims that he “never had any godlike
epiphanies or thought that God had anything to do with this dismal occurrence called life”
(19), while the late punk misogynist and sadist G.G. Allin frequently claimed to be the
resurrected Son of God between the performance of such songs as “Expose Yourself to
Kids” and “Gypsy Motherfucker.”
This punk attitude toward Christianity and, by proxy, CCM changed little for
later punks: British anarcho-punks Crass released Christ —The Album in 1982 (the cover
art for which was simply a negated cross in grayscale); and California hardcore punks
Dead Kennedys likewise offered the world Frankenchrist in 1985, an album which
resulted in a lawsuit against the band’s lead singer Jello Biafra who was charged with
“distributing harmful matter to minors” (“History”). Although the legal suit was not a
direct result of the album’s intentionally provocative title or the band’s views toward
Christianity—rather it was the result of the band’s inclusion of part of an H.R. Giger
painting (“Penis Landscape”) in the album’s artwork—their rejection of not only religion
but Christianity in particular was no secret. As Biafra sings on “Moral Majority,” from
the band’s 1981 album In God We Trust Inc. (a song which follows a track entitled
“Religious Vomit”),
You say, ‘God loves you. Come and buy the good news’
Then you buy the president and swimming pools
If Jesus don’t save until we’re lining your pockets...
God must be dead if you’re alive
Circus-tent con-men and southern belle bunnies
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Milk your emotions then they steal your money
It’s the new dark ages with the fascists toting Bibles
Cheap nostalgia for the Salem witch trials...
Blow it out your ass. Jerry Falwell...
Twenty-first century punk criticism for both Christian music and Christianity
ranges from specific: “I’d have to agree that alot [sic] of Christian contemporary music
makes me sick. It’s even worse for a Christian group to be fake and sound like everyone
else because they are supposed to be worshipping God. I really hate most Christian
music”; to general: “[The] world would have been a better place without religions” (Bad
Religion). Likewise, as Greg Graffin, lead singer for Los Angeles-based punks Bad
Religion shouts on “Materialist,” from from his band’s 2002 album The Process o f Belief,
“I want to believe in you, but my plan keeps falling through,” he sings of an anonymous
higher power, “1 know I have to face the harshness, grin and bear the truth,”
And I have to walk this mile in my own shoes
And I’m no fool!
I’m materialist!
Call me a humanist
And I guess I’m full of doubt, but I’ll gladly have it out with you
I’m materialist
I ain’t no deist
It’s there for all to see, so don't talk of hidden mysteries with me
Although such words typically elicit an unfavorable response to and criticism of
secular punks amongst contemporary Christian musicians and their fans, to the contrary,
the overall modern CCM response to punk is less blatant than the likes of Noebel. In
fact, many young Christian rock fans, as the aforementioned bands MxPx and New Found
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Glory can attest, enjoy punk today, at least in musical terms: “I just prefer more, like,
punk rock and stuff like that," an unidentified teenager told National Public Radio
correspondent Lynn Neary at the 1996 Washington for Jesus rally. “There’s a lot of
Christian music that’s punk rock?” Neary replied honestly. “Oh, yeah, there’s a whole
lot. I’ve got a lot of music that’s Christian and punk rock” (“Teens”). Clearly evangelical
Christianity appears to have warmed considerably to both rock and punk.
But while the Christian response to punk music and style has evolved, the
response to traditional punk ideology has not. “Bad Religion influences thousands of
kids to hate God,” laments MxPx bassist Mike Herrera. “I went to [their] show in
Seattle. It felt so evil” (qtd. in Joseph, 235). Having fully incorporated modern punk’s
sound and style (or form) into Christian music, in other words, most contemporary
Christian criticism of punk culture (or content) relates to its criticism of the secular world
in general: the rejection of Christ and/or God, antiauthoritarianism/anarchism, sexual
liberalism, violence, the consumption of drugs and alcohol, and general profanity. Their
theological differences notwithstanding, however, the late confluence of CCM and punk
exemplified by Herrera’s band should come as no surprise, for despite their distinctions
and historical enmity a closer look at both subcultures reveals that they share an
astonishing number of characteristic traits and points of view and have found themselves
in the middle of very similar battles over the “meaning” and thrust of their movements,
“selling out” to mainstream American culture, and, most significantly, their self-applied
adoption of negation, a theoretical reading of which now begins.
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II

FLY IN THE OINTMENT
“Opposition to the herd is as good as separation from it.”
- Sigmund Freud'
In his history of atheism The Anatomy o f Negation (1886), American critic Edgar
Saltus, Schopenhauerian and poison-penned friend of Oscar Wilde, minces no words in
characterizing his philosopher-idol’s contemporary and rival: “That he was a charlatan is
clear,” harangues Saltus referring to G.W.F. Hegel. Unfortunately, Hegel’s influence, the
critic continues grudgingly, “is too substantial to be quieted by any requiescat, however
determined. In spite of the hilarity of the impolite, his spectre looms through the most
rational forms of contemporary negation” (169). Whereas it pains Saltus to provide Hegel
the slightest coverage, in other words, as a responsible scholar of “contemporary
negation” he must. He does so poorly, however. Ignoring Hegel’s grander Christian
metaphysic and eventual Lutheran apologia, Saltus generalizes the philosopher’s
dialectical system as an empty ruse, categorizing Hegel as one of several thinkers,
including Fichte and Schelling, whose words “created doubts, not convictions...made
disbelievers, not converts” (167-68). And save a fawning duplication of the
Schopenhauer of The World as Will and Representation (1819), Saltus’ more specific
criticism of Hegel is notably absent, making his sweeping critique both precarious and
puzzling, especially given the title, subject, and dialectical vocabulary of Saltus’ polemic
and his personal bias: Saltus was himself an atheist.
Hegel’s alleged hilarity notwithstanding, Saltus would be further pained today to
learn that history has been kinder to the philosopher from Jena than to Schopenhauer and
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certainly Saltus (this is both ironic and appropriate given Hegel’s self-referential words on
the necessarily evolutionary nature of history); from Marx forward the dialectic has
proven inestimably influential and remains a useful theoretical instrument. Even today
Hegel’s triune system can be observed across the academic landscape, philosophy aside,
from literary analysis to semiotics and communication theory, Dewey to Derrida.
Accordingly, the dialectic lends itself majestically to this twenty-first century cultural
critique which examines groups who would make negation the keystone of their
ideological architecture. More specifically, following a review of the “SelfConsciousness” portion of Hegel’s Phenomenology o f Spirit (1807), the ensuing chapter
analyzes the punk and Christian rock subcultures’ respective negations of culture
concomitantly and in the dialectical context of Phenomenology, offering several
representative acts which correspond to one of Hegel’s “stages” of self-consciousness.
Before these analyses can proceed, however, the groups’ broader “negationism” of culture
must first be established. In the Christian context, then, Helmut R. Niebuhr’s Christ and
Culture (1951) is read in order demonstrate the tension that has existed between
Christians and the cultures in which they have found themselves from the birth of
Christianity to the present; the discussion of punk negationism looks primarily to Greil
Marcus’s Lipstick Traces (1989), which imagines punk, and the Sex Pistols specifically,
as the latest in a century-long succession of related (and largely European) negationist
aesthetic movements.
“With A Red Guitar On Fire: Desire.”2
As the first chapter suggested, from their conspicuous and critical 1967-68 break
with popular culture to their late pop ubiquity, the punk and Christian rock subcultures
share several defining characteristic traits. All superficial similarities aside, however, the
principal feature that links the early Jesus rock and proto-punk subcultures—and today
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links separational Contemporary Christian music and most underground punk—is their
emphasis on negation: both groups were (and most versions still are) ferociously striving
for not simply differentiation from but a robust refusal of their parent culture in multiple
spheres: politics, aesthetics, theology (or its absence), ideology. This rejection begins
with a restless desire; the groups’ dissatisfaction with the status quo in each of the above
areas and more renders them profoundly antagonistic to culture and zealous in their thirst
for its transformation. As Marcus suggests early on in Lipstick Traces,
What remains irreducible about [punk] music is its desire to change the
world. The desire is patent and simple, but it inscribes a story that>s
infinitely complex—as complex as the interplay between everyday gestures
that describe the way the world already works. This desire begins with
the demand to live not as an object but as a subject of history—to live as if
something actually depended on one’s actions.... (5-6)
Stacy Thompson too analyzes punk in the context of desire, arguing that punks “attest to
a continuing cultural desire for something else” (Punk Productions 156) above-or in the
context of “the underground,” perhaps below—and beyond the status quo. “Punk in
general can be grasped as a material exploration of how a specific set of illicit desires
repressed within a dominant social order return to haunt it and, in the best cases, blast
cracks in its surface” (6). No truer words could have been written on behalf of the
Christian rock and roll discussed here, which is, as we shall see, foundationally critical of
the culture in which it finds itself and staunch in its desire to change the world through
evangelism, faith in a God ignored by secular culture, and works that change the godless
world for the better. It is this displeasure with culture, this desire to both reject and
remedy it, that heralds both groups’ respective negations.
The consequence of this negationist desire is described by Hegel in the “Self45

Consciousness” portion of his most famous work Phenomenology o f Spirit. In
Phenomenology—which is appropriately divided i i three sections: Consciousness, SelfConsciousness, and Reason—Hegel outlines the historical, evolutionary journey of the
individual mind from relative unconsciousness to Absolute Knowledge. Peter Singer
summarizes this volume, composed expeditiously in Jena as Napoleon’s brisk and
advancing army unsettled many a Western European, by calling it an answer to the
question of why the history of the world is nothing but the development of absolute
knowledge (185). Keeping the book’s title in mind, another way of framing Hegel’s
argument is to say that it represents the historical, dialectical blossoming of Spirit. As
Hegel says in the book’s “Preface,” the goal of Phenomenology is to “help bring
philosophy closer to the form of Science, to the goal where it can lay aside the title of
"love of knowing’ and be actual knowing” (3). With this ambitious statement grounding
his argument, Hegel proposes that through the seifs dialectical development of
consciousness, the consciousness of God-actual knowledge of the Absolute-can be
achieved. But this process takes time, of course, and can only be achieved through a
series of “determinate negations” where each form of consciousness reveals its inadequate
or less-than-absolute status and must be abandoned.
In sketching Spirit’s unfolding, Hegel proposes several sequential levels of
consciousness, including but not limited to: sense certainty, perception, understanding or
latent self-consciousness (these first three fall under the heading “Consciousness”), selfconsciousness proper, Stoicism, Skepticism, Unhappy Consciousness, and Absolute
Knowledge. Hegel begins “Self-Consciousness,” in true dialectical form the antithesis or
negation stage of the three parts of Phenomenology, by positing that once consciousness
becomes self-aware it cannot exist in isolation; self-consciousness demands an external
object or “other” from which to differentiate itself. Once this other is determined, writes
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Hegel, consciousness desires to assert itself through the possession, transformation, and
even abolition, of the other: “self-consciousness is thus certain of itself only by
superseding this other that presents itself to self-consciousness as an independent life;
self-consciousness is Desire” (109). In fact, to exist in a state of self-consciousness is to
experience a sort of interminable desire to alter the object external to the self, to make the
foreign other less foreign, to possess it and know it fully. Paradoxically, since the other
gives rise to the self s understanding of itself, self-consciousness maintains a negative,
dependent relationship with the external other. And because sen-certainty is bound to
the object, self-consciousness can neither supersede nor possess the object genuinely.
Realization of this paradox reproduces desire and self-consciousness remains unsatisfied.
In order for the self-consciousness to satisfy its desire then, Hegel says that the
object must negate itself, meaning the foreign other must too present itself as selfconsciousness. Thus the “other,” Hegel explains, is best understood as another negative
self-consciousness which also desires the transformation of any opposing selfconsciousness:
In the sphere of Life, which is the object of Desire, negation is present
either in an other...ox as a determinateness opposed to another indifferent
form, or as the inorganic universal nature of Life. But this universal
independent nature in which negation is present as absolute negation, is the
genus as such, or the genus as self-consciousness. Self-consciousness
achieves its satisfaction only in another self-consciousness. (110)
This opposition of self-consciousnesses is illustrated through the infamous “Lordship
and Bondage” (master-slave) dialectic where the two self-consciousnesses, seeking
recognition from the other and proof that they are not bound to the material world, engage
in a life-or-death struggle both to dominate and alter the other self-consciousness. In the
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midst of battle, however, both self-consciousnesses realize that the death of the other
would likewise obliterate the sought recognition--or as Hegel writes, “self-consciousness
learns that life is as essential...as pure self-consciousness” (115)-and the battle ends with
the would-be victor sparing, but controlling, the life of the other. The result of this is an
unequal situation where the victor is independent (existing only for itself) and the loser is
dependent (existing for the other). The former is the lord, continues Hegel, the latter is
the bondsman (115).
Having won the contest, the lord is loosed of his desire to control the other;
unfortunately, as the other is now a dependent thing, the lord no longer receives
recognition from this other (rather, recognition is received but it is coerced). The lord is
also relieved of his need to work on the material world and becomes useless. The
bondsman, on the other hand, being dependent on the lord, too receives no genuine
recognition; and as the losing combatant, he retains his deep desire to change the other.
But in contrast to the lord, the bondsman is able to work on the external world through
his labor and keep desire at bay, if only ephemerally. Or, as Hegel puts it, “Through
worl ...the bondsman becomes conscious of what he truly is. [...] Work...is desire held in
check” (118).
In either case, the situation is unstable in that self-consciousness recognizes it
retains elements of both lordship and bondage, resulting eventually in a “negative middle
term” Hegel describes (following the discussion of Stoicism and Skepticism which will be
treated in detail below) as an “Unhappy Consciousness.” Whether master or slave, that
is, although self-consciousness (in seeking Spirit) desires independence from the material
world, it cannot escape the world save death, the ultimate negation. Relatedly, selfconsciousness also fails to receive the genuine recognition from another independent selfconsciousness and ends up an “alienated soul.” Nevertheless, the dialectical movement
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continues and self-consciousness slogs slowly toward Absolute Knowledge. Only in this
context does the object of self-consciousness also exist as its subject where the self seeks
to know—and receive recognition from—not simply objects, but subjects that think and
seek knowledge as well. This realization—that self and other are united in their searcheventually becomes explicit for self-consciousness, says Hegel, and self-consciousness
finally understands that what it seeks to know is itself. As a result, “self-consciousness,
in being an object, is just as much ‘I’ as ‘object’. With this, we already have before us the
Notion of Spirit” (110). In other words, the development of self-consciousness
necessarily leads to self-knowledge and eventually Absolute Knowledge, or the universal
consciousness of God contained within each of us.
This is no school yard philosophizing; indeed, Hegel is literally proposing a model
whereby the mind that achieves self-knowledge also achieves knowledge of reality, Truth,
and even God (or at least the nature of God and Truth). Moreover, all such knowledge is
contained within each individual mind.3 This proposal has seen its share of detractors, of
course, and without question Hegel’s idealism and absolutism are problematic even today:
to suggest that the mind can genuinely “know” God is optimistic and inspirational at best,
naive and absurd at worst. Likewise, as the existentialists knew all too well, if the
development of consciousness is reduced, as Hegel admits in his “Preface,” to a sort of
science, to formula, all volition goes out the window—the system becomes terminal and
even oppressive (resulting in notions that history and philosophy had reached an end, and
perhaps sowing the seeds of fascism and/or totalitarianism at the State level). At the very
least, depending on one’s point of view the master-slave dialectic can easily be read as
justifying slavery and the division between ruler and ruled. Thus the contemporary
reader cannot help but read Hegel with a grimace at points: much in the way his
description of the ideal State conspicuously resembles the Prussian monarchy under
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which he wrote, his system is conveniently sell-referential, validating his own historical
moment as the end of history, and perhaps even Hegel (the) one to have reached Absolute
Knowledge. None of this detracts from the theological and historical insights offered by
Phenomenology, however, and the operational use of the dialectic, which has been
employed by countless subsequent thinkers—including Marx who himself “stood Hegel
on his head” by stressing the role material conditions (as opposed to mind/spirit) play in
the development of consciousness. This phrase from Marx’s preface to Capital is a direct
reference to Hegel’s Phenomenology “Preface,” which explains that Science (and at this
point “Science” [der Wissenschaft] is for Hegel a metonym for philosophy) is necessarily
dialectical and allows “natural consciousness...to walk on its head” (15).
“Pure self-recognition in absolute otherness...is the ground and soil of Science or
knowledge in general” (14), Hegel continues, and it is this understanding of negation as
consciousness walking on its head in order to know itself that grounds the current reading
of the punk and Christian rock negations described below. Rather, the individuals who
constitute the punk and Christian rock subcultures (which see themselves as marginalized
bondsmen still working on the world) represent, as Marcus says, the dissatisfied selfconsciousnesses who, desiring desperately the transformation of “mainstream selfconsciousness,” have inverted the lord’s culture. (Here “mainstream” popular culture is
being treated as an abstract self-consciousness which presents itself to the punk or
Christian rock self-consciousness as both the negation of them and the independent
master—popular culture is “in charge” and is not avant-garde, Christian, socialist, nihilist,
feminist, and so on.) These groups’ desire (staved off by their artistic labor) manifests
itself as multiple types of negation, each of which correspond directly to one of Hegel’s
successive stages of a self-consciousness following the dialectical path toward Spirit. The
Hegelian reading of the dependent rock and roll slave self-consciousness begins with
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punk, which finds itself exhibiting the Stoic, Skeptic, and Unhappy Consciousness stages
of self-consciousnes: before bowing out of the dialectical system and theoretically (and
often literally) nullifying itself.
“Oh Bondage, Up Yours!”
Dick Hebdige described first the negationist foundations of punk subculture with
Subculture: The Meaning o f Style (1979). In the empirical Subculture, Hebdige classifies
punk as one of several British youth subcultures (including the mods, hipsters, and teddy
boys) borne out of the stagnant socioeconomic conditions of postwar England. For
Hebdige, a Birmingham School Marxist whose method is both homology and semiosis,
punks were defined not only by their music, but by their “conspicuous consumption,”
which included a bricolage or pastiche couture or antistyle—safety pins, bondage gear,
hair dye, and soiled/torn clothing—carefully designed to signify their rejection of the
cultural dominant. Citing punks’ “white translation of black ‘ethnicity’” (64), Hebdige
suggests that the punk movement in Britain (which, differing from American punk, was
largely a working class phenomenon) represented a voluntarily assumed exile from
mainstream culture wherein punks’ refusals of both musical and stylistic harmony
signified their ideological tearing of social order. Hebdige calls this rupture a type of
“noise” and suggests that punks were “loud” not only in musical terms, but in the context
of couture and ideology as well.
Writing ten years after Hebdige, Greil Marcus makes punks’ restless self-exile and
aesthetic negation of culture the centerpiece of his Lipstick Traces, a more theoretical
piece which argues that, beyond mere style, punk rock was the latest in a century -long
series of related “negationist” art movements—Surrealism, Dadaism, Lettrism, and, most
importantly, Fiench Situationism—goaded into action by a dissatisfaction with culture and
desire to assert the self and, in so doing, turn culture upside-down. Marcus’s focus is the
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Sex Pistols, a short-lived (yet notorious) British punk band that he suggests epitomized
the entire punk movement through their terrible performances, uninhibited antisocial
behavior, coarse records, shoddy and offensive clothing, and loud hairstyles. “This book
is about a single, serpentine fact,” Marcus writes in his prologue,
late in 1976 a record called “Anarchy in the U.K.” was issued in London,
and this event launched a transformation of pop music all over the world.
Made by a four man rock ’n’ roll band called the Sex Pistols, and written
by singer Johnny Rotten, the song distilled, in crudely poetic form, a
critique of modern society once set out by a small group of Paris-based
intellectuals. (18)
Using the “Anarchy in the U.K.” single and their terminal San Francisco 1978
concert as his points of departure, that is, Marcus picks up where Hebdige left off and
waxes poetic on the Sex Pistols to establish punk’s “gnostic” roots and argues that far
from the nihilistic movement it had been heretofore characterized as in popular media,
punk can be directly linked to not only the aforementioned avant-garde art movements,
but second century gnosticism—alluding to its “secret society” status and millenarian
sound (83, 5)—and various Christian heretics from both the recent and not-so-recent past.
Rather, punk is and always was a negationist movement which, Marcus argues, is a selfconscious philosophical stance that precedes the move to nihilism:
Nihilism means to close the world around its own self-consuming impulse;
negation is the act that would make it self-evident to everyone that the
world is not as it seems—but only when the act is so implicitly complete it
leaves open the possibility that the world may be nothing, that nihilism as
well as creation may occupy the suddenly cleared ground. (9)
In this way the Sex Pistols—and punk itself—represented more than mere nihilism, which,
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while visible within punk, was certainly not the dominant attitude in the 1970s, nor is it
today. Nihilism is an apolitical posture in that it is implicitly antisocial, solipsistic, says
Marcus; the Sex Pistols’ far more subversive and frightening (to the status quo) negation
of culture was inherently political (and historical) in that it resurrected the anticultural
ghosts of Europe’s tumultuous past and again reified the feelings of desire and
dissatisfaction (which certainly were not to be discussed openly in a mannerly British
culture) humans throughout the world have harbored for centuries. As a political
statement, negation challenges and critiques the status quo or mainstream world—negation
acknowledges the existence of the other, demanding recognition from the other before
overtly nullifying it. Or, as Marcus explained to Paul Taylor shortly before the
publication of his book,
My favorite description of May 1968 in Paris...was somebody saying, ‘It
was a month of talking.’ For a month, everybody spoke to everybody
else. [...] People who had never stood up in front of more than two
people, were standing up in front of thousands; fifteen-year-old girls,
seventy-year-old men were trying to talk, haltingly, but in sometimes very
eloquent ways, about how they wanted to lme. Well, this was a terrifying
moment for a lot of people; and it ended. [...] I think punk recapitulated
that. (“Punk and History”)
Punk recapitulated May 1968 if not in practice, at least in theory: through one
pockmarked teenager’s brazen, angry claim to thousands that he was the antichrist,
dissatisfied youth on both sides of the Atlantic suddenly realized that they were no
longer mere objects of history-that anything was suddenly possible-and all they had tc
do to invalidate the status quo, to negate their objectivity, was start talking. Or, in the
case of punk, shouting.
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Unsurprisingly, Marcus has received much criticism, especially from punks
themselves, for what many consider a rambling, generalized, and overly academic,
argument in which he too adopts the role of cultural bricoleur. “All the talk about the
French Situationists being associated with punk is bollocks. It’s nonsense!” sneers
former Sex Pistol singer John Lydon in reference to Marcus. “Now that really is coffeetable book stuff’ (3); British musician and author Stewart Home likewise refuses to give
Marcus the time of day: “Since I’m more interested in punk records than erroneous
commentaries upon them, I’ll skip going over books by the likes of Greil Marcus” (11).
These criticisms are not unfounded. For instance, despite Marcus’s romantic suggestion
that the Sex Pistols were theoretically negationist in their desire—“Johnny Rotten sang to
change the world” (2)—they were often affirmative in practice and thus no different from
the status quo. Shouts of “anarchy” to the contrary, that is, the band actually contributed
to the capitalist system any sincere anarchist would reject by releasing their albums on
multiple major commercial recording labels, including EMI and Warner Brothers. Artist,
fashion designer, and former Sex Pistols manager Malcolm McLaren admits as much in his
1980 “documentary” film about the band The Great Rock ‘n ’Roll Swindle: the Sex Pistols
were a sham. Speaking to Paul Taylor, McLaren later noted, “I realized fashion could
make you look completely out of step with everything else that people were terming
good” (emphasis added). In other words, through style “you became an outsider,”
McLaren explains. “I launched [this] idea in the form of a band of kids who could be
perceived as being bad” (“Punk and History”). It is then hardly a stretch, the critic might
suggest, to call the Sex Pistols (who were instantly, intentionally commodified by
McLaren) little more than an act manufactured to look negationist by a stylist. Marcus
acknowledges as much, admitting that punk began as simulacrum, as “fake culture” (69),
but fails to fess up to the fact that the band was largely disinterested in any authentic
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revolution or “secret" knowledge and thus scarcely negationist in the same sense as
Marcus describes the ideologically astute Situationists (through their Marxian critique of
the commodity) and Surrealists as negationist, aii of which leads to his largest theoretical
hiccup.
What makes Marcus’ argument most problematic is his failure to contextualize
both gnosticism and negation’s philosophical origins and denouement. Using “negation”
and “gnosticism” ahistorically and without actually saying what he means (save
references to various Situationist leaflets and a vague “gnostic myth”) when he cites the
terms, for instance, Marcus provides only a circumstantial account of punk’s relation to
famous negationists and gnostic heretics in history-Thomas Meuntzer, George Grosz,
Saint-Just, Isadore Isou. In so doing, Marcus, whose definition of gnosticism (a complex
term as we shall see) is never specified, mistakenly perceives the gnostic tradition in, to
borrow from Chris Lehmann, “every avant-garde impulse, beginning with the Reformation
and the French Revolution and culminating (for now) with the snarling heresies of the Sex
Pistols.” Although the dialectic may be read in the context of “every avant-garde
impulse,” that is, gnosticism cannot; but for all his reliance on Marx and several
“Marxists” (Bakhtin, Lefebvre, Adorno, Debord, and Marx himself), in nearly five
hundred pages Marcus cites Hegel but a handful of times, failing to acknowledge Marx’s
aforementioned inversion of Hegel and wrenching negation out of its dialectical context.
As a result, Marcus also conflates “negation” into a generic, and thus almost meaningless,
category and abandons Hegel’s rendering of the dialectic as a chronological phenomenon.
Certainly not all self-conscious negations of specific theses are comparable; as Hegel
himself said, desire manifests itself in several ways and follows an historical, evolutionary
path. To suggest that punk negationism is an esoteric “secret history of the twentieth
century” and that the negations of Thomas Meuntzer and John Lydon are equitable is
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overdetermined and buries the ineliminabl* negation of the negation.
In his defense, however, Marcus is clearly an insightful thinker, and his point is,
when reduced to its most rudimentary level, tenable: many bands/artists past and present
who consider themselves members of punk rock subculture—whether they were writing
and performing in 1968 or 1998-can be read as responding to popular culture (the thesis
or starting point in this context) in negationist terms or as representing the antithesis in
Hegel’s dialectic. Even if, for instance, the Sex Pistols were manufactured, this does not
detract from their negation of pop culture and gaudy rock culture in terms of aesthetics,
style, and their awful live performances. And as we shall see, the link can be made
between genuine second centur - gne; ic theolrv- and Hegel. Finally, the more charitable
critic, and punk fan, might read Marcus’s inspired document-pastiche, ahistorical,
perhaps incoherent at points, and composed in small bursts of jargon despite its overall
length (a trick he borrows from Adorno’s Minima Moralia)—as a self-conscious
representation of the punk aesthetic. This is quite clever, as is his finding in punk Guy
Debord’s spectacle. However, in specifically Hegelian terms (and with the inclusion of
Christian rock), then, this present essay elaborates on how and why punk is
appropriately called negationist and fills in the blanks left by Marcus. Thus to expand
Marcus’ unacknowledged Hegelian position, three specific categories of negation (or three
stops along the path self-consciousness takes in pursuit of Absolute Knowledge), each
the result of different desires, are proposed: aesthetic, socioeconomic/commercial, and
individual/subjective negation. These three dialectically ascending stages of negative selfconsciousness, each framed in the context of the master-slave dialectic, represent Hegel’s
description of Stoicism, Skepticism, and the Unhappy Consciousness, respectively, and
culminate with the punks’ selection of nothingness when forced to choose between
nihilism or a perpetual Stoic slavery described by Hegel as the Christian choice.
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Aesthetic Negation
Aesthetic negation is no less than a desire to topple the conventions of art, style,
and taste in popular culture. Such negation manifests itself in terms of punk’s traditional
antistyle—torn, collage, or dingy clothing; chains and leather; and polychromatic,
“mohawked,” or perhaps shaved heads of hair—and in terms of art and performance as
horribly spectacular, grating, and often offensive and alienating antiart: aggressive, radio
hostile music; violent performances; and two-tone, cut-up album covers. In an effort to
avoid duplicating Hebdige and Marcus’ treatment of the Sex Pistols, then, two seminal
post-Pistols (and American) examples of punk’s aesthetic negation, and their relation to
Hegel’s development of consciousness, are now outlined: Black Flag and the Dead
Kennedys. Textually speaking, special attention will be paid to Black Flag performances
and albums, and Dead Kennedys lyrics.
*

“Black Flag,” says the bedraggled teen quickly into the dented microphone shell as
the band behind him begins to play the first song of what will be a very short set; guitar,
bass, and drums all erupt at a blazing 250, maybe 300, beats per minute—excessive for
even a punk song. A mere sixty seconds later the song (“White Minority”) ends with a
shout of “We’re all gonna die!” and the hoarse-voiced singer finds himself on the venue’s
floor, mauled by an audience which is on the same level as the band—there is no stage.
Regaining his composure, the singer does not say “thank you.” Rather, he stands as the
band quickly starts the next song, “Depression,” which is equally loud, fast, lyrically
incoherent, and bereft of the traditional rock and roll guitar solo. The audience again
responds immediately to the utterly undancable track by simply crashing into one
another, jumping maladroitly around the poorly lit room, and otherwise “slam-dancing.”
Ron Reyes, the second of who would become several Black Flag singers, is no rock star.
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In contrast with the supposedly glamorous celebrity lifestyle afforded even the Sex
Pistols on occasion, Reyes lives in a walk-in closet in an abandoned Baptist church in Los
Angeles and boasts a criminal record, as do the other members of Black Flag. “Pretty
much nothing,” Reyes answers documentary filmmaker Penelope Snheeris’ question of
how much money the band takes in on a typical night. He reconsiders: “Negative.”4
Black Flag came bursting out of Southern California in 1977 shortly after guitarist
Greg Ginn met the first Black Flag singer, Keith Morris, at a Hermosa Beach record store.
Although its lineup was fluid (the band’s final singer was singer/actor/spoken word artist
Henry Rollins), the music was consistent, and the band is often credited with inventing at
least California’s version of “hardcore” (if not the sub-genre itself), a cast of punk
described by one writer as not only faster but “louder, darker, and more desperate than
the sounds blasting over from Britain, New York, and San Francisco” (Sinker, We Owe
You Nothing 77). After recording the band’s initial “antialbum,” the four song, five
minute Nervous Breakdown EP, Ginn forged SST Records to distribute Black Flag’s
material; the label soon became the mercantile home to a number of legerdary punk bands
from across the country, including the Minutemen and the Descendants. The label’s
official stamp ot ;pproval reads “Harder, Faster & Louder since 1978”
(“SSTsuperstore ’). The band separated in 1986.
As the description of its performance suggests, Black Flag’s particular version of
negation is best understood not through its lyrics or political ideology, but in the context
of its compreher sive, and quite deliberate, antiaesthetic. As Ginn puts it, thinking not
just in performative terms, but of style, album art, and the songs themselves, “We were
very much at odds with any structure” (qtd. in Sinker, We Owe You Nothing 82). This
opposition was nowhere more evident than when the band played live. Precipitous songs
aside, Black ! sg played as if each furious performance were its last, which was, because
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the band was so loathed by the civil authorities and blamed for instigating violence at their
shows, perpetually plausible (the police often shut the band’s concerts down before they
began and reportedly assaulted the band’s fans with regularity). As a result Black Flag
concerts were less performance than hasty, feverish expurgation representing the band’s
.uhartic exorcising of both pop music and the parent culture: as the opening narrative
illustrates, the band rarely even acknowledged the audience (often a mishmash of drug
addicts, petty criminals, and homeless youth) or itself, simply announcing the band’s
name at the start of a set and playing the loudest, bleakest, and fastest “pop” music
anyone at the time had heard.
There was, of course, a method to this madness. From their lightning-quick songs;
violent, short, and often canceled sets; aggressive, darx lyrics; and rough, antiprofessional
album covers and concert flyers (the Nervous Breakdown cover is the amateurish twotone sketching of a Caucasian youth—a student perhaps—in jeans and t-shirt, fists raised,
backed into a corner by an advancing, chair-wielding opponent/teacher/parent). Black
Flag’s antiaesthetic reads as a calculated attempt to invert the mainstream definitions of
music, dance, art, and performance. In a late-1970s American culture dominated by both
disco music and kitschy “arena rock,” Black Flag composed songs that made rhythmic
dance impossible and rendered rock stars, self-indulgent instrument solos, and
performance itself obsolete (playing on the floors of basements and warehouses rather
than elevated club stages as even the Sex Pistols, Clash, and Ramones did).5 Rather than
treating their performances as entertainment, or even art, the horribly antiprofessional
band turned their music into an exercise in violence and velocity, blazing through their sets
and inciting in audiences a riotous contempt for the mainstream.
The message, almost Futurist in tone, was clear: popular culture is to be stood on
its head; the band is the audience and vice versa; the music industry is irrelevant; violence
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is dance is freedom; we are all artists. There was to be no distinction between musician
and fan, prodigy and hack, free man and slave. Above all, Black Flag performances
advocated a certain inwardness, a refusal to allow material obstacles to obfuscate the
individual’s (or band’s) freedom to create and enjoy art and culture. The slave’s chains
were not so much a symbol of defeat as couture, Black Flag suggested; in fact, those who
have traditionally been cast as bondsmen need not be dismayed by their chains of poverty
or aesthetic impotence: if the skinny, inexperienced individual fancies himself a drummer,
artist, thug, or even politician (as we shall see), who is to counter? Or, as British punks
X-Ray Spex put it a few years earlier in a very catchy punk song, “Oh bondage, up
yours!” Welcome to Hegel’s description of Stoicism.
The first of several stages upon which the slave self-consciousness dwells
following its defeat at the hands of the master is Stoicism, writes Hegel, a philosophical
school that surfaced during Greece’s Hellenistic era (ca. 300 BCE) and taught, among
other virtues, indifference the physical world. Two of the school’s later apologists were
Roman philosophers Marcus Aurelius, Emperor from CE 161 to 180, and Epictetus (CE
55-135), a slave. Writing with these thinkers in mind, Hegel calls Stoicism the first stage
of consciousness to bridge the gap between master and slave, dependent and independent
consciousness. Through this frame of mind, self-consciousness attains a version of
freedom and knowledge of self through “being-in-itself ’ or inwardness of thought. The
slave may remain a slave in the physical realm, Hegel explains, but if he is free in his
mind, self-consciousness feels himself truly free: “The freedom of self-consciousness is
indifferent to natural existence and has therefore let this equally go free” (122). Even in
chains, that is, the slave for whom binding is immaterial is no bondsman. Black Flag
agreed: as Morris, the band’s original singer, explains, “we were the most horrible thing
[people] had ever heard—which didn’t bother us because we were young and were going
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to do what we wanted anyway” (Sinker, We Owe You Nothing 83). Despite the countless
material (and even emotional) factors impeding one’s entrance into the world of rock and
roll in the 1970s—including but not limited to humility and bashfulness, the lack of talent
and financial wherewithal, and an aesthetic at odds with the record industry—Black Flag
simply behaved as if such binding mattered not. This Stoic approach to music,
performance, and popular culture has influenced and inspired countless other American
bands, including Black Flag’s California contemporaries the Dead Kennedys.6
Sounding like a cross between the Sex Pistols and early surf-rock instrumentalists
the Ventures (“Walk Don’t Run”), the Dead Kennedys began in 1978 when singer “Jello
Biafra” (born Eric Boucher) answered an advertisement in a music paper posted by
guitarist “East Bay Ray” (Ray Pepperell). The two founding members of the group were
joined by guitarist “Klaus Flouride,” drummer Ted, and a rotating cast of additional
musicians, and soon began playing frenetic, confrontational live shows described by the
band as “a combination of chaos and theatrics” (“History”). After recording six albums
for its own Alternative Tentacles record label, the Dead Kennedys too disbanded in 1986.
The Dead Kennedys’ sense of irony was unrivaled and its jocular, biting criticism-on stage or record—of American culture relentless. For Biafra, who wrote most of the
band’s lyrics, no subject or group was sacrosanct; as songs such as “Kill the Poor,”
“MTV —Get Off the Air,” “California Uber Alles” (a directed attack on then-California
Governor Jerry Brown), “Terminal Preppie,” and “Goons of Hazzard” suggest, every
album attacked and rejected all aspects of American culture: politicians, intellectual and
cultural elitism, organized religion, social cliques, and even other punks (“Nazi Punks
Fuck Oft”). As a result, the Dead Kennedys’ negation-of mainstream culture,"of political
and religious authority, of art and punk itself—was never in doubt. In addition to its
twenty second antipop song “I Like Short Songs,” every Dead Kennedys album exhibits
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the broad aesthetic negation Biafra’s band encapsulated: short, fast songs; controversial,
cut-up album art; critical and spiteful lyrics. And although most of his lyrics target
specific groups, politicians, and issues, the gritty, eighty-two second “Forward to Death’
(the second track from the band’s inaugural 1980 album Fresh Fruit for Rotting
Vegetables) generalizes its self-conscious negationist desire and is particularly worthy of
attention in the Hegelian context:
I don’t need your way of life
1 can’t stand your attitude
I can do without your strife
I don’t need this fucking world (x2)
This world brings me down
Gag with every breath
This world brings me down
I’m looking forward to death
It seems so unreal to me
So much hate and so much pity
I can’t take another day
It’s such a bore
It gets me really sore...
On the surface, it’s an unremarkable song, really: blazing beat, bitter vocal
delivery, grating guitars, and no shorter than the shortest of hardcore songs. But what
sets this song apart from both the rest of the songs on the album and the majority of rote,
angry, and even Stoic punk songs of its era is its subtle, yet momentous, shift from
rejecting a specific, anonymous “you”—the master?—to eschewing the world in its
entirety as phony and interminably boring. This is an enormous, desperate step for the
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punk self-consciousness; and despite the song’s brevity, the shift makes for a difficult
listen. Rather, as the song begins, the hearer, having just finished giggling along to the
album’s ironic and Swiftian initial track “Kill the Poor,” is in something of a punchy,
buoyant, even self-congratulatory mood: “Behold the sparkle of champagne / The crime
rate’s gone—feel free again...So let’s get dressed and dance away the night / While they kill
kill kill kill kill the poor.”7 “The government just doesn’t get it...” the incredulous listener,
laughing, wants to shout in solidarity with the band, “but /do!” Mere seconds into the
album’s follow-up song, however, all liberal conceit and shrewd smirks have vanished:
“So much hate and so much pity...l don’t need this fucking world...I’m looking forward to
death.” The turn comes as a shock. And this, too, serves a dialectical purpose, for in one
fell swoop Biafra has gone from comic irony to detached inwardness as the singer strains
to convince the hearer that he needs not the master’s material world; instead Biafra the
bondsman can find a Stoic freedom within himself. This is the meaning of a four song,
five minute record; this is the meaning of a frothy “I don’t need this fucking world.”
Still, Biafra’s desire to assert himself, to know and change the external other (Left
or Right) so foreign to him, is unmistakable, as is his realization that despite a claim to the
contrary he does need—or at least cannot simply ignore—this world. As Hegel continues,
“freedom in thought...is only the Notion of freedom, not the living reality of freedom
itself’ (122). One can literally hear this realization, which is perhaps most depressing, in
Biafra’s voice. Indeed, the Dead Kennedys’ humor is but thinly veiled; behind the puns
and irony lies a far more serious tone and desire for real change; the song is not a joke.
“This world brings me down”: it’s a pithy, sad statement, ripe with verity and an almost
sublime, matter-of-fact clarity. Embedded in these words is both the bulk of Biafra’s
aesthetic negation of culture and the unfortunate irony of Biafra’s interminable desire.
Nevertheless, for as much as Biafra is dependent on the master’s world, this world cannot
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escape Biafra the singer seems to realize as he growls, and another unexpected dialectical
turn ensues as the song ends. What began as an articulate, Stoic snarl culminates in an
erratic, uncertain jumble; not resigned, but understanding, self-reflective:
“Lookingforwardtodeath” Biafra now mumbles rather than sneers, the words thick and
torpid on his tongue. The music behind him stops—“lookinforwardtodeeeeaaattthh!” At
this point the listener hears not an aggressive and grating negation, but the sound of a
singer who is no longer so confident in his own aggrandizing or even his thinking on the
subject. The sneer has become a fidgety cover; Biafra is not looking forward to death.
And while free in his mind, Biafra is still a slave in the material world. This sits not well
with the punk; action must be taken.
With this second quick epiphany, Biafra-now relishing in his desire, his
paradoxical dependence on the culture he so wishes to alter—seems to accept his fate and
even decides to capitalize on what is really a symbiotic relationship. “I’m down with
radical resistance and trying to do what can be done within the system,” Biafra would
later tell Punk Planet magazine (qtd. in Sinker, We Owe You Nothing 46). Rather than
merely singing about negation, that is, Biafra now chooses to act, perhaps in vain, on this
desire in genuine material terms. Two tracks later, he has decided that something can and
must be done in this world. His first independent material act is to negate, literally, one
particular master. “Let’s lynch the landlord,” Biafra suggests candidly and almost
instinctivly on the song of the same name: “There’s rats chewing up the kitchen / Roaches
up to my knees / Turn on the oven, it smells like Dachau / ’Til the rain pours through the
ceiling.” This tenant has had enough. No longer will he cower in dependence to the
landlord, or, for that matter, pretend to be free in his mind with shackles binding his
corporeal self; he intends to act. A landlord is still a lord, after all. And Biafra the
bondsman is about to remind the lord of their mutuality.8

Socioeconomic/Commercial Negation
As Hegel suggests is inevitable, and Biafra too eventually seems to recognize, selfconsciousness realizes that Stoicism is inadequate in that “abstract freedom is thus only
the incomplete negation of otherness. Withdrawn from existence into itself, [selfconsciousness] has not there achieved its consummation as absolute negation of that
existence” (122). One response to Stoicism’s failure, as Biafra suggests, is conflict. But
as the master-slave dialectic has shown, this particular action, while tangible, is hardly
productive; another approach to negation must be taken. That approach, other punks
nave decided, is a more concrete, external negation here described in more material terms
as Socioeconomic/Commercial Negation. Socioeconomic/Commercial Negation is the
negation of consumer culture and the corporate music industry, and is represented by
artists who are rejecting what they see as a disconcerting capitalist/consumer culture
generally, and a corrupt, profit driven, artistically vapid music industry specifically. Not
surprisingly, these groups often align themselves with various socialist philosophies
and/or make unambiguously critical statements regarding the evils of global capitalism—
and their intense desire for if not capitalism’s abolition, the elimination of the very real
material problems the free market creates—from stage and in song lyrics. While related to
aesthetic negation (indeed, it is often hard to separate criticism of popular culture from
the criticism of consumerism), commercial negation demands its own category' by virtue
of its emphasis on political economy. In other words, it is the reification of what in
aesthetic negation (Stoicism) is but a notion—making freedom a reality through the
negation of the system that has resulted in the slave’s bondage and creating one's own
system. Rather, understanding that the Sex Pistols’ et al aesthetic negation was more
spectacle than sincerity and resulted in both political failure and ideological contradiction
(again, the band consorted with corporate record labels for the distribution of their music,
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and maintained a lethargic political inactivism or unwillingness to act on its Stoic desire
outside ot its performances—this latter critique is true of the likes of Black Flag as well),
several post-Pistols punks have made self-conscious moves to invert not American
culture in broad aesthetic terms, but specifically what Adorno and Horkheimer call the
“culture industry” by actively promoting anticonsumerism and resistance to the
mainstream’s commodification of art, and rejecting major record label contract offers (this,
in addition to establishing their own record labels and dispensing with managers—a
symbol of the commercial record industry). Not surprisingly, this resistance to
commodification and alienation from one’s art/work often results in a sort of Marxian
posture on the part of such groups where the means of artistic production and
distribution are retained by the bands themselves, a retention the earliest punks—
American or English—could never claim. Acknowledging the aforementioned hardcore
bands’ commercial independence, this Marxian resistance to the bourgeoisie is best
exemplified by Crass and Fugazi, whose albums and performances tend to lack the
violence, chaos, and theatrics of the aforementioned aesthetic groups in favor of
principled opposition to big business and the cult of commodity. In the case of
socioeconomic negation, the bands’ commercial behavior and extra-performative practices
will too be read as a sort of “text” for they are inseparable from the music and its
performance. First Crass.
*
The “anarcho-punk” group Crass formed in 1977 when Penny Rimbaud (Jeremy
Ratter) and Steve Ignorant (Oscar Thompson) organized a punk band with a rotating cast
of musicians and singers at a farm just north of London.'1 Inspired both by a 1976 Sex
Pistols concert and that band’s expeditious passing, Rimbaud and Ignorant meticulously
designed Crass to recover punk from its “Sold out, sanitised and strangled” state of
66

commodif ication and again make it a “force for change” (Rimbaud, 74). They did so by
creating not simply Crass the punk band, but an entire anarchist commune dedicated to
opposing the commodification of culture in all its forms. In the employment of their
resistance, band members performed in all black clothing under “domestic lighting” to
avoid the celebrity/“rock star” commodification of self; played rowdy songs with ranting
anticonsumerist lyrics far too long to accommodate radio airplay, no choral refrain or
“hook,” and no instrument solos; founded Crass Records in 1978 to produce and
distribute their price-controlled music (having declined a 50,000 pound EMI Records
contract that same year); managed all of their own concerts/tours; housed many homeless
punks at their Essex commune; and produced and freely dispensed dozens of anarchist
brochures on topics as varied as industrial sabotage, breadmaking, and Britain’s Falkland
Islands conflict (Rimbaud, 102).
The result of this anticonsumer approach to each of their productions was a band
that claimed to be interested not in profit, but in “the dissemination of information”
(Rimbaud, 241) and the musical equivalent of subsistence farming. Adds Stacy
Thompson:
The members of Crass...attempted to mediate between the two poles of
the commodity, use-value and exchange-value, by deemphasizing their
commodities’ exchangeability expressed as a price. [...] In sum, the
commodity [whether an album, performance, political protest, or anarchist
leaflet] served the band members not as a method for translating the
surplus labor of others into surplus value for themselves but as a method
for sustaining tv*

.es as a small enterprise. (Punk Productions, 87-88)

This small enterprise ended in 1984, however; for as Rimbaud explains in his Crass
memoir Shibboleth: My Revolting Life (1998), “fajfter seven years on the road, we had
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become the very thing that we were attacking” (254). In other words, the band’s breakup
was, rather ironically as Rimbaud admits, the result of its own commodification, its
elevation to the status of both legend and leader within an anarchist movement that
refused both. Nonetheless, Crass was the first punk band to make explicit and
foundational to their very' existence the full economic negation of Western consumer
culture. No event better symbolizes their commitment to this type of negation (and their
recognition of its inadequacy) than Crass’ breakup; rather, in contrast with the Sex
Pistols, Crass (which was not arranged by a fashion designer and “impresario”) clearly
“meant it.”10
There are few better textual examples of the band’s negation of capitalism than
“Buy Now Pay As You Go” (from the band’s 1982 record Christ - The Album), the
analysis of which begins before Crass plays a single note. As the track commences, the
listener is provided with what by 1982 had become a Crass trademark: several brief,
interspliced audio samples taken from various television programs and advertisements.
“She’s going for the jackpot”; “freshness and value under one roof...and the reassurance of
an effective deodorant”; “there’s no better safeguard against decay”; “this twelve inch
black and white portable television set....” More than one scheme is at work with these
clips. On one level, the commercial bits preface, almost pettily, the song, whose overall
anticonsumerist message is unambiguous. On an entirely deeper level, however, the
band’s appropriation of advertisements used to sell commodities to television viewers
inverts the culture of consumption not only by using corporations’ marketing strategies
against them (mocking the ads by taking them out of context and showing their
fragmented absurdity ), but by calling into question the value of television itself (the
program clips, too, sound terribly banal, and even nauseating in their doltishness). This,
then, sequesters not so much advertisers as the multinational media giants who are
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themselves seeking both viewers and profits.
Then comes the band’s explicit negation of pop music. Thirty seconds into the
track the advertisement collage gives way to random drums and squelching guitars, which
erupt both suddenly and arrhythmically. So awkward and casual is the music, in fact,
that the band’s rehearsal regimen is called into question. But the aural disorder is
intentional, as is the poor sound quality of the song which decidedly lacks the sheen and
snap of a professionally produced recording; even after the rumbling, tribal drums and
bass find each other and a consistent beat develops (a beat which, in a dialectical twist,
reverses during the song’s final few seconds). The “one-off’ connotation is the same for
Rimbaud’s impatient drill sergeant vocals which seem to come, unrehearsed, out of
nowhere: “Buy now, pay as you go,” he barks in a fit. “Buy now, say hello,”
You can put a mortgage on your life
To enter Shoppers’ Paradise
A trade-in for your dignity
A lovely colour console T.V.
To watch and cherish as the days slip by
And dream of the things that money can buy
The lyrics leave little room for interpretation: clearly Crass abhors consumer culture and,
at least on this particular cut, television. And the consumer who buys now, pays for the
rest of his life, exchanging not money for the fancy new commodity, but intelligence,
experience, dignity, and time—indeed, life itself. Rimbaud’s most poignant lines, however,
come near the end of the song where he slobbers out an uncannily Hegelian series of
terms, invoking, in all of eight seconds, bondage, freedom, and the opposition of

oject

and object: “Thirty years with one foot in the grave / Possession junkie, consumer slave /
If money buys freedom it’s already spent/ Your object’s the subject of ,\y contempt.”
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Remembering Stoicism’s inadequacy, then, the savvy punk slave selfconsciousness will not be surprised by these lines since he too is busy attempting to
supersede the mere thought of freedom and make freedom a physical reality. He does so
through the turn to Skepticism. Skepticism, writes Hegel, is a moment where selfconsciousness “in the certainty of its freedom, makes this ‘other’ which claims to be real,
vanish” (124):
What Scepticism causes to vanish is not only objective reality as such, but
its own relationship to it, in which the ‘other’ is held to be objective and is
established as such, and hence, too, its perceiving, along with firmly
securing what it is in danger of losing [e.g. freedom], and the truth it has
itself determined and established. Through this self-conscious negation it
procures for its own self the certainty of its freedom, generates the
experience of that freedom, and thereby raises it to truth. (124)
In other words, Stoicism’s mere thought of freedom attains a sort of material reality for
the Skeptic who is able to more concretely render the Other invisible and obsoleteapropos the band’s refusal of the EMI contract and “free” communal lifestyle, for
instance.
Crass was not the only punk band to have taken this approach to freedom. Not
long after Crass’ 1984 demise, Washington D.C. native Ian MacKaye invited bassist Joe
Lally over to jam at MacKaye’s Arlington, Virginia, house. MacKaye, whose seminal
(and one might suggest Stoic) hardcore group Minor Threat was infamous in punk circles
in the early eighties," had recently witnessed the sudden dissolution of his latest act
Embrace, and he wfas looking to begin a new group similar to Crass ideologically that,
according to writer and punk activist Mark Andersen, was “strongly united around
certain shared ideas” and could “inspire a new and more inclusive communal release”
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below the mainstream music industry radar (232, 233). Joined by drummer Brendan
Canty and second singer/guitarist Guy Picciotto (whose seminal “emo-core” group Rites
of Spring had also recently ceased to exist), this group surfaced in 1986 as Fugazi,
perhaps the best contemporary example of punk’s continued socioeconomic negation of
both the mainstream record industry and American consumer culture.
Acting almost as an American Crass facsimile, Fugazi has for nearly twenty years
actively shunned the commercial music industry, press, and MTV (having never made a
music video) and-one-upping each of the aforementioned punk negationists—refused to
sell any non-musical merchandise: no t-shirts, stickers, buttons, or posters. The selfmanaged band also insists on straight-white stage lighting while performing exclusively all
ages (and often benefit) shows, charging concertgoers only five dollars for admittance.
Each of the band’s eight studio albums, two singles, and documentary film are distributed
by Dischord Records, a label founded by Fugazi singer/guitarist Ian MacKaye and Jeff
Nelson (also of Minor Threat fame) in 1980, and can be purchased via mail-order for well
below the industry’s suggested retail price ($10 for vinyl and compact disc albums) and
delivered postage-paid by Dischord. Taken together, each of these material elements read
as an obvious attempt to invert the corporate music industry’s economic model, the
results of which unavoidably resemble the Marx of 1848: the proletarians are the owners
and retain the means of production and distribution, eliminating any alienation from their
work; their artifacts (or commodities) are sold at or just above cost; and each individual
involved in the enterprise bears equal use value.12
Like Crass, Fugazi even gained notoriety in mainstream music industry circles for
their staunch dismissal of more than one lucrative major label contract offer. This early
period in the band’s life was captured by Picciotto in verse: “I’m not playing with you.”
he moans on “Blueprint” (Repeater, 1990), a song directed at the record industry,
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We'll draw a blueprint, it must be easy
It’s just a matter of knowing when to say no or yes
Frustrating, frustrating, always waiting for the bigger axe to fall
A patient game that I can’t find my way to play
Nevermind what’s been selling
It’s what you’re buying and leceiving undefiled
The keen irony of the song is perhaps its pop simplicity; the f ur-chord melody,
four-four beat, and vocal chorus are themselves a parody of the more mainstream tunes
off which corporate record labels profit. Indeed, the song sticks out like a swollen thumb
on an album of screaming, radio-hostile punk tracks and avant-garde, high-volume
instrumental jams for its almost embarrassing prosaicism. On later records, the band’s
criticism of big business, and their desire to diversify the record industry in particular, is
less delicate. “This one’s ours-let’s take another,” MacKaye barks contemptuously on
“Five Corporations,” referring to major record labels’ sudden interest in independent
labels following of the explosion of “grunge” and “alternative” rock in the 1990s:
Buy them up and shut them down
Then repeat in every town
Every town will be the same
Five corporations! (x3)
There’s a pattern13
This track is shorter, louder, and much angrier than “Blueprint”; however it is also, in line
with the fingemails-on-chalkboard guitars, punishing drums, and late-1990s booming
economic climate, more urgent in its delivery.14 When “Blueprint” was written, that is,
the nation was seized with recession as free market capitalism stumbled for a time. But
by the time of “Five Corporations,” American corporate enterprise, fueled largely by the
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so-called “new economy,” was on virtual autopilot as the stock market grew daily.
Thus more is at work here. Although MacKaye’s context is the music industry,
his language suggests a much broader scenario where corporations from every industry,
unfettered by regulation, both envelop each other at breakneck speed and move into
communities across the nation resulting eventually their loss of individuating local
enterprise, put out of business by conglomerations with far more capital at their disposal.
And MacKaye is right, there is a pattern, a frighteningly efficient pattern which can be
discerned still. Perhaps more unnerving, however, is his matter-of-fact, mid-song
observation that “It’s as if they belong / And they’ve been here all along.” Here
MacKaye implies far more than record label quibbles: from the entertainment industry to
agriculture, healthcare, ana education, “the market” has permeated every facet of not only
American life, but the world. With the collapse of Soviet communism, so steeped are we
in the ubiquity of multinational capitalism that its dominance is finally taken for granted,
overlooked, forgotten. (Or as Picciotto adds in “Oh” from the band’s 2001 record The
Argument, “There is no foreign soil.”) MacKaye has at this point transformed himself
from aging punk icon into an itinerant socialist doomsayer reminding anyone who will
listen of a bygone era and pontificating on the coming end—not of the world, but of
economic diversity, competition, the middle class, egalitarianism, and meaningful work.
“Brothers and sisters: globalization-a New World Order—is nigh!” he might as well be
shouting, wide-eyed and unkempt. “And it will be our ruin\" The world is again flat, to
borrow from Thomas Friedman, and too many of us cannot even remember a time when
our downtowns and main streets were not lined by Starbucks, Wal-Mart, and
McDonalds. There is definitely a pattern at work and MacKaye wants no part of it.
To return to Hegel, however, MacKaye is only partially right, of course, for there
is another pattern at work: dialectic. It is through his work, that is, that MacKaye is able
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to stave off desire, one record at a time, and it is these very artifacts that reify the
negative attitude the slave self-consciousness maintains toward the lord-other. Bypassing
the detached inwardness of Stoicism, the socioeconomic negationists represented by
Crass and Fugazi become Hegelian Skeptics. In other words, the above bands’ refusals of
recognition (their dismissal of MTV and numerous gainful contracts from the mainstream
self-consciousness) objectify, in a dialectical reversal, the lord, and result in an active
snatching freedom and self-certainty at his expense, trivializing him. Or as MacKaye
once put it, “It’s not that I’m out to smash the state. I’m just interested in building my
own damn state” (Stephen Thompson). The objectified mainstream other thus
“vanishes” for the punk self-consciousness which becomes its own master, firmly
establishing its own self-certainty and freedom.
Nevertheless, the Skeptic lives a life of contradiction, Hegel writes. Even as
MacKaye, in a trivial exercise in profundity, prefaces the performance of “Five
Corporations” with a deliberate, symbolic raising of each of the fingers on his left hand, he
is still unable to escape his object of critique, the international free market, which both
conditions MacKaye’s protest and grants MacKaye the freedom to operate his own
record label. Crass discovered as much in 1984 and it was their ;uin. Thus selfconsciousness finds Skepticism equally inadequate and soon finds itself alienated from
both itself, its work, and its freedom, as we shall see momentarily.
Briefly, however, we must acknowledge that much in the way socioeconomic/
commercial negation can be seen in the work and behavior of Black Flag and the Dead
Kennedys (each of which managed their own record labels), elements of aesthetic negation
are certainly evident in the music and performance of Fugazi and Crass. What
distinguishes these latter bands from the former is not just their focus, but their intent and
desire: in contrast with their hardcore colleagues. Crass and Fugazi’s skeptical desire was
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economic first and aesthetic as a result. The aforementioned bands’ desire and antithetical
response to culture was expressed primarily in terms of aesthetics; it just so happens that
this violent, antiprofessional, talentless aesthetic resulted, understandably, in a
commercial desert. Thus, as Thompson continues, “Black Flag did not need to avoid
commercialization [as Crass and Fugazi self-consciously did]; commercialization avoided
the band” (33), meaning the scopious aesthetic negationists (Sex Pistols aside) who were
forced to found their own labels have no opportunity to advance to the level of
Skepticism as defined by Hegel, remaining at the Stoic stage of self-consciousness (at least
until their dissolution). But as we have seen, even Skepticism, by virtue of its inherent
contradictions, fails self-consciousness; another form of negation must make itself
present. That final form, Individual/Subjective Negation or the negation of a pained and
alienated soul, is best understood through a brief glance at the thoughts and words of
trailblazing nihilist punk and unhappy consciousness Richard Hell.
Individual/Subjective Negation
The skeptical self-consciousness leads a life of contradiction: Crass and Fugazi
cannot negate the market and partake in it, if peripherally, even if in so doing they are
smiting, literally, the record industry The moment self-consciousness realizes this
contradiction it abandons Skepticism only to become what Hegel calls an “Unhappy
Consciousness,” or, a self-consciousness in which the independent but useless master and
unrecognized, dependent slave consciousnesses are forced uneasily together only to
remain estranged despite their “union”—as in the case of the awkward, coerced coupling of
oppositely charged metals in one’s fist. The result of this schismatic, contradictory
forced union is an “alienated soul,” where self-consciousness concludes that it can neither
simply negate or “make vanish” another negative self-consciousness nor achieve
independence in the world. This conclusion occasions what S'avoj Zizek calls a “Hegelian
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forced choice'" (Ticklish, 90), where consciousness confronts one of two options: it must
either give up the attempt to attain Spirit or “being-for-self” entirely and live a life of pure
nothingness (and perhaps simply cease to live period); or, it must be “thrown back to the
beginning of the struggle” (128), recapitulating the Stoic attitude by imagining itself as the
eternal slave to the Absolute Master and “free” in its dependence. The first of these two
options is the punk option, and with this choice we have reached the final category of
punk desire this writer is labeling Individual or Subjective Negation. Beyond rejecting
pop art and consumer culture, subjective negationism (the category traditionally given the
most mainstream-and negative—media attention and stereotyped pejoratively in popular
televisual or cinematic texts) follows its failed search for self/Spirit with the negation of
the subject through various means—self-hate or degradation, suicide, and substance abuse-and is best demonstrated by punk’s nihilistic side.
*
Punk’s negation of the individual subject is nothing new, of course; selfhate/violence, suicide, and various expressions of nihilism (authentic or posed) of the
traditionally Nietzschean Will to Power variety have permeated the subculture from
proto- to post-punk. For instance, Iggy Stooge (later Pop) was notorious for disregarding
his own well-being on stage and off, finding himself bloodied during or after several
Stooges concerts; between quoting lines of Nietzsche and deriding fans, Jim Morrison, a
Dionysian if there ever were one, essentially drank himself to death. Years later, Sex
Pistols bassist Sid Vicious performed bruised and bloodied and eventually took his own
life following the death of his girlfriend Nancy Spungen; Germs singer Darby Crash (Jan
Paul Beahm) died of an intentional heroin overdose; frantic Joy Division singer Ian Curtis
committed suicide supposedly while listening to Iggy Pop’s The Idiot; and the
aforementioned coprophague and misogynist G.G. Allin made a name for himself by
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performing naked, urinating/defecating on both his band and audience, flagellating himself
bloody with his microphone (when not lacerating himself with broken glass bottles),
attacking his audience, and even performing degrading sexual acts on stage. Allin too died
of a drug overdose in June 1993 (before, it should be noted, he could follow through on a
pledge to take his own life on stage Halloween night). This aggressive rejection of life was
described by Nietzsche in On the Genealogy>o f Morals (1887) not as the refusal to will,
but the assertive will to nothingness, “an aversion to life, a rebellion against the most
fundamental presuppositions of life; but it is and remains a w/7/!” (163). And perhaps no
willful punk negation of the life of bondage-Hegel’s recapitulated Stoic option--is more
self-conscious or philosophical than Richard Hell’s.
Born in Lexington, Kentucky, in 1949, Richard Meyers dropped out of high
school in 1966 following a difficult, itinerant childhood and moved to New York with
longtime friend Tom Miller to make his way as a poet. There Meyers and Miller
discovered music, formed a band (the Neon Boys), and changed their surnames to Hell
and Verlaine, respectively (Richard Hell...). Following a lineup change, the Neon Boys
became Television and began playing shows at a little-known club in New York’s Bowery
district called CBGB’s, later known as the birth*-' ice of New York punk. Hell’s time in
Television was short-lived, however, and following a brief stint with ex-New York Dolls
Johnny Thunders and Jerry Nolan in the Heartbreakers, Hell formed his own band, the
Voidoids, which released its only studio album Blank Generation in 1976.15
“I was saying let me out of here before I was even born / It’s such a gamble when
you get a face,” sings Hell discordantly on the record’s title track before suggesting
straightforwardly that he would rather look at a blank wall than himself. “It’s fascinating
to observe what the mirror does / But when I dine it’s for the wall tnat I set a place.”
Musically, the song begins “punk” enough-awkward and scratchy guitar, bass, and
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drums; however, the jerky introduction suddenly and sincerely gives way to a more
traditional, albeit quick, melody whose debt to the blues is blatant and the song, now a
descending collection of walking minor chords, becomes rhythmic and even catchy
(featuring background “oooos” and “ahhhhhs”) despite its general woe. And from the
moment it joins the tune, Hell’s wailing voice is a lamentation: “Eeaaiiiii was sayin’ let me
out of heerre....” his crackling voice weeps.
Perhaps the prototypical nihilist punk, having supposedly initiated the torn
clothing punk style and frequently wearing a t-shirt that read “please kill me,” Hell’s self
negation was evident in his early lyrics and interviews: “Basically I have one feeling...the
desire to get out o f here. And any other feelings I have come from trying to analyze, you
know, why I want to go away,” Hell told Punk magazine’s Legs McNeil in 1976, referring
directly to his aforementioned lyrics (emphasis added), “Are you glad you were born?”
replied McNeil. “I have my doubts,' concluded Hell. “Did you ever read Nietzsche?”
(qtd. in Bangs, 262). Accordingly, in 1978 deceased rock writer Lester Bangs called Hell
“a walking exile on main street, a wounded lover who aspires to be his own merciless
judge and jury” (261):
Why do you think somebody writes a song that says “1 could live with
you in another world”? It’s not because he cannot function in this world—
any idiot can do that—but because functioning with this world’s ideas of
communication is at best intolerable, at worst cause for a most extreme
form of violence, which in Richard’s case is implosive, where, say, the Sex
Pistols’ is explosive. (262)
As Bangs suggests, Skepticism will not-does not-suit Hell; this walking exile has
become aware of the contradiction that governs his inner self, dreadfully aware of what
Hegel described with his words on the “Unhappy Consciousness” as the paradox of
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Changeable and Unchangeable being: that which is Unchangeable is “essential Being,” or
Spirit; however, that which self-consciousness posits as changeable (its material self)
must, through a dialectical opposition, necessarily be unessential. Unfortunately, because
self-consciousness (already depressed due to its unessential status) is by this stage aware
that the Unchangeable Spirit is both its goal and “true essence," it recognizes not only
that Unchangeable is what it seeks to become, but that it cannot become one with the
Unchangeable for that would change the Unchangeable. Moreover, the changeable self
recognizes that it is trying to become what it, in a spiritual sense, already is and that it
cannot dialectically negate the Unchangeable if essentiality is its goal and t>

oil.

Realizing that any negation is theoretically impossible (save suicide) and that selfconsciousn-

' napped m paradox, it becomes alienated from itself (and Spirit) and

quite despondent. Thus, “Consciousness of life, of its existence and activity, is only an
agonizing over this existence and activity,” Hegel writes, “for therein it is conscious that
its essence is only its opposite, is conscious of only its own nothingness” (127).
This contradiction obviously unsettles self-consciousness who still desires, if
nothing else, contradiction’s removal. But how does self-consciousness abolish this latest
paradox? This is the question Hegel ultimately had in mind when he added that the
Unhappy Consciousness becomes aware of a general concept of individuality:
“Consciousness becomes aware of individuality in general in the Unchangeable, and at the
same time of its own individuality in the latter. For the truth of this movement is just the
oneness of this dual [unhappy] consciousness” (128). Consciousness removes
contradiction, that is, through individual action, which theoretically unites the split
master-slave consciousness. As a result the aforementioned either-or choice is made
manifest: nothingness or a reaffirmed Stoicism in relation to the Unchangeable.
“1 belong to the blank generation, and I can take it or leave it each time,” the
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depressed Hell responds nearly two centuries after Hegel. “1 belong to the... [silence]
generation, and 1 can take it or leave it each time.” Hell’s apathetic, negative response is
imperative in that it both crystallizes Hegel’s forced choice and hints at Hell’s own
choice. On one hand, self-consciousness, aware of its alienation from Spirit and its
perpetual self-contradiction and material nullity, affirms its nothingness. This is the
choice of Hell, and the blank space, the literal sound of nothingness, signals this choice.
Having shrugged off Stoicism and Skepticism, that is, the dearth of Hell’s voice—his
refusal to speak—at that moment symbolizes his nonentity. “I can take it or leave it each
time”: Hell is indifferent in his nothingness, in fact, and one cannot help but wonder why
he sought an executioner other than himself apropos his famous t-shirt.
On the other hand, while the sound of nothingness is crushing, it is also
invigorating. Despite Hell’s nihilism, his words suggest that self-consciousness still has
the opportunity to fill in the blank, to answer the void left by Hell with its own voice, to
choose somethingness. It is this second choice, which he describes as a return to the Stoic
consciousness, that Hegel saw as the historically established, necessary action selfconsciousness must take in order to negate the contradiction of Unhappy Consciousness
(and remain both living and not depressed). In other words, the slave consciousness is
“thrown back to the beginning of the [dialectical] struggle which is throughout the element
in which the whole relationship subsists” in order that it may realize and accept that its
own individuality “belongs to the Unchangeable itself, so that it assumes the form of
individuality into which the entire mode of of existence passes.” In this way
consciousness “finds its own self as this particular individual in the Unchangeable” (128).
At this point, it is clear that the philosopher is advocating an unmistakably JudeoChristian metaphysic in which humankind recognizes and accepts its alienation from the
Unchangeable God, becoming a “slave” for the duration of its material existence, but
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thinking—knowing—that it is truly ‘Tree” in its dependence to Spirit.16 As the reader may
have guessed, this move will become important in the discussion of Christian rock below.
However, in his framing of the evolutionary unfolding of Spirit, Hegel fails to account not
only for religious traditions outside of Judeo-Christianity, but the individual
consciousness on the ground who opts out of the Stoic option, as several later thinkers—
existentialists all—pointed out. These individuals are of particular interest in the punk
context here.
So what becomes of the individual who, when presented with the Hell’s blank
nothingness, chooses, as does Hell, not the regression into Stoic bondage, but, in the
perceived absence of any other viable option, silence: the negation of self, the negation of
life, the will to nothingness? If Hell’s words are any indication , suicide, substance abusecum-addiction, self-hate, and violence becomes him. We have seen this already; we will
continue to see it in punk. “To hold the TV to my lips, the air so packed with cash /
Then carry it up flights of stairs and drop it in the vacant lot,” Hell continues. “To lose
my train of thought and fall into your arms’ tracks / And watch beneath the eyelids every
passing dot.” We cannot all be Christians, Hell contends as he probes his arm for a vein.
We cannot all be Stoic slaves—will not. Still, even Hell’s negation of life serves as a
recapitulation of the dialectic, albeit a listless, and perhaps terminal, recapitulation. But
Hegel’s Christian option, the obsequious option, is too terminal; it only takes much
longer. Thus the impatient Hell, the despondent and contradictory nihilist punk, settles
for the hasty runner’s-up alternative: “The doctor grabbed my throat,” Hell sings of his
day of birth, “and yelled, ‘God’s consolation prize!”’17
*
Thus concludes the Hegelian reading of punk’s heuristic categorization of
negation. Of course, this highly nuanced "typology” is not without controversy and
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raises at least three initial complaints. First, not every individual band in the history of
punk, the critic might suggest, fits neatly into one of these categories or stages of
consciousness. And what about those punks left out; that is, where do punk derivatives
like “Riot Grrrl” and “Queercore” fit? Finally, how does the “pop punk” glossed in the
introduction relate to this heuristic?
To answer the first question, the writer acknowledges that no heuristic unfailingly
accommodates each potential type that shows affinity to the subculture in question.
Nevertheless, this is a Hegelian reading of negationist music subculture, requiring three
core dialectical types. Certainly each category could be, as Niebuhr writes in the context
of his Christian typology below, “interminably and fruitfully continued by multiplying
types and subtypes, motifs and countermotifs” (Christ and Culture, 231). But the further
cultivation of this heuristic could proceed ad infinitum and would never yield a terminal
shape. Furthermore, the vast majority of traditional punk bands—from the Velvet
Underground to today’s “crust” punk-can be demonstrated as theoretically dwelling,
perhaps impermanently, in at least one of these three general negationist types (if not
several at different points in the life of the band) quite clearly, or falling into what are
really only sub-categoreis of these major types. As such, the three core Flegelian types
stand.
Relatedly, and turning to the second criticism, the writer admits that several
important groups of punks are being overlooked: those who constitute punk’s ethnic,
“Riot Grrrl,” and “Queercore” scenes (bands such as Bad Brains, Bikini Kill, Team
Dresch, et al). This category presents an interesting and difficult analysis in that they
have, prior to their discovery of punk, been marginalized by the dominant culture. In
contrast with the aforementioned punk self-consciousnesses, which consist
predominantly of middle-class Caucasian males that have themselves negated the
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mainstream, these bands serve, in Hegelian terms, as synthe sists—they are the negation of
the negation that has been heretofore forced upon them by the parent culture. Their
synthesis notwithstanding, this collective category of “reclaimant” negationists, while
significant, is here treated as a sub-category of the Socioeconomic/Commercial category of
Hegelian Skeptics. In other words, these particular “slaves.” although important, are
operating under the assumption that the master is simply absent and of no consequence;
they shall not be dwelled upon for the time being.
Finally, the critic might add, obviously not every “punk” band, especially the
more commercially successful pop-punk acts (e.g. Green Day, Good Charlotte, and all of
1980s-era “New Wave”), would or should consider themselves negationist in the “punk”
sense. Also true; as such these acts are here ignored: “pop-punk,” as the final chapter
shall explain, cannot (or can no longer) be defined as “punk” proper apropos the
negationist definition provided in the introduction. Staying within the realm of dialectic,
however, these acts have themselves negated the punk community, and also are an
altogether different (synthetic) beast not to be considered part of the traditional
negationist subculture as defined above, even if their music has a “punk” sound and the
members project a loosely punk attitude and style (all of which have evolved over the
years). Therefore, with the Hegelian reading of punk negation in place, this essay moves
to a similar reading of Christian rock music. As with punk, however, Christian rock’s
negation of culture must be established theoretically; for this, we turn to Christian
theologian H.R. Niebuhr’s typological, ethical analysis of the relationship Christians have
maintained with culture for over two millennia.
“Not of This World”
This essay now moves from punk’s self-injurious selection of nothingness in
response to Hegel’s forced choice apropos their inescapable material bondage to the
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second, and historically endorsed says Hegel, option. This option, the Christian (rock)
option, the reader v i 11 remember as the reproduction of Stoicism whereby the unhappy
consciousness, fearing both the life of nothingness and death, remains committed to its
reach for Spirit and accepts, as Niebuhr would later put it, a certain “freedom in
dependence” (249). Self-consciousness finds this freedom through a series of three
dialectical “relationships” to the Unchangeable (each of which resemble the
aforementioned Stoic, Skeptical, and Unhappy Consciousness stages of punk selfconsciousness). In the first relationship self-consciousness imagines an ecstatic internal
relationship of pure consciousness with Absolute; following this, self-consciousness
frames its relation to Spirit in terms of material desires and works; finally, rejecting both
inner ecstasy and materialism, self-consciousness relates to Spirit through the surrender of
self will and a mediated conscious being-for-self. Before turning to Hegel and Christian
rock music more specifically, however, we must first trace the origins of “Christian
negation” and elaborate on Niebuhr, whose heuristic grounds this portion of the thesis.
*
Cultural negationism by Christians is nothing new; in fact, one might argue that
the Christian religion was borne of negation. Christ, challenged mainstream Jewish and
Roman cultures of his era, passing time with not the cultural and religious elite, but
sinners, the infirm, and those otherwise marginalized. Different versions of this negation
of the social, cultural, and religious establishment were furthered by various early
Christian sects (such as the Gnostics and Manichaeans) and canonized, theologically
speaking, by some of the reiigion’s early apologists, specifically Clement of Rome and
Tertullian. Updating these theologians for a contemporary society, and developing an
historical typology of the varied Christian response to culture (which evolved beyond a
strict negationist stance rather quickly), wa« H.R. Niebuhr who in Christ and Culture
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(1951) acknowledges that the debate over the appropriate ethical Christian response to
culture is an ongoing one and will remain on the table long after even his own lifetime.
Indeed, George W. Bush, American President and born-again evangelical, acknowledged
his faith’s traditional and continuing struggle as recently as 2004: “All of us-parents and
schools and government-must work together to counter the negative influence of the
culture, and to send the right messages to our children.”18 But why are Christ and culture
so often seen as binary opposites? Niebuhr submits three explanations.'" First, and
perhaps most obviously, Christ advocated the renunciation of this world in favor of
another-the Kingdom of God. In so doing he simultaneously challenged any human
achievement in the context of the true grace of God (e.g., all three Synoptic gospels
suggest, in the context of the Jewish Temple, that with the coming of the Kingdom of
God “not one stone will be left upon another; they will all be thrown down”). Finally,
and not at all flippantly, Niebuhr suggests that Christianity and non-Christian culture see
each other as a threat quite simply because both are often intolerant (7).20
Niebuhr appropriately begins his polemic by articulating his definitions of both
Christ and culture. The former he defines in the context of “Sonship,” which rather than
offering interpretations of Christ as synonymous with an ethics of hope, love, faith, or
obedience, can only be understood in relation to God. In other words, Christ, and
Christianity as a religious movement, cannot be conceived apart from the relationship
Christ held with God. Christ thus becomes a mediator between the world of God and the
world of men, where, for instance, “Because he is obedient to the Father’s will, therefore
he exercises authority' over men, commanding obedience not to his own will but to God’s”
(28). This is, in a sense, what Hegel had in mind when he defended Christianity as
unmistakably “complete” in form (if not content as well): the unessential, changeable selfconsciousness is brought into union with the Unchangeable Universal consciousness
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through the synthesis of Christ—the Unchangeable made Changeable, the divine human.
I bus the “power and attraction” of Jesus Christ, adds Niebuhr, “comes from him in his
Sonship in a double way, as man living to God and God living with men” (29).
Following this dualistic construction of Christ, important to his conclusion,
Niebuhr describes culture in general terms, calling it the “social heritage [humans] receive
and transmit...the work of men’s minds and hands” (33). In other words, culture is to be
understood simply as that which is not natural, as “human achievement” or the “artificial,
secondary environment” humans superimpose on the natural world (32-33).
Acknowledging the imperfect and inadequate status of each of these definitions, Niebuhr
suggests that the tenns Christ and culture will be forever in dialogue. The ever-evolving
Christian response to this dialogue is represented by three suspiciously Hegelian ethical
types, the dialectical development of which constitutes the remainder of Niebuhr’s
volume: the Christ against culture type, those who feel that Christ “confronts men with
the challenge of an ‘either-or’ decision” (40); Christ o f culture, a more accommodating
position opposed to the separational group wherein believers see no tension between
Christ and the world into which he, as God, willingly came, and interpret culture through
Christ and vise versa; and Christ above culture, the majority type which refuses the
bifurcation, often answering the Christ and culture question by affirming both in different
contexts. Niebuhr further divides this final type into “synthesists,” “dualists,” and
“conversionists.” Due to its relation to negation, this thesis focuses on Niebuhr’s first
category—that of the “radical” Christians who consider Christ “anticultural” and live their
lives in accord with this opposition.
To speak critically first, however, one must acknowledge that Niebuhr’s typology
is both historically insufficient and typologically limited, as both Marsden and Yoder
insinuate in their reviews of Niebuhr. (The writer acknowledges this limitation and
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considers it his own in the punk heuristic above.) Nevertheless, Niebuhr is savvy enough
to recognize that his heuristic is a problematic construction, commenting on its
imperfection himself. But the typological method, he counters, “though historically
inadequate, has the advantage of calling to attention the continuity and significance of the
great motifs that appear and reappear in the long wrestling of Christians with their
enduring problem” (43-44). As such, his examination is necessarily terminated at an
“unconcluded and inconclusive” stage in that it could be multiplied endlessly in an effort
to net as many Christian ethical responses to culture as possible. He settles for three (or
more specifically five) major types because “neither extension nor refinement of study
could bring us to the conclusive result that would enable us to say, ‘This is the Christian
answer’” (231). He is correct; and quibbles by the likes of Marsden (who considers
Niebuhr’s analysis “near the end of its usefulness”) and Yoder et al. are here negligible.
More problematic in the context of this thesis, however, is Niebuhr’s placement
of gnosticism (which he defines specifically in the second century or “Gentile
Christianity” context) in his “Christ of culture” category. This placement is problematic
because even if his particular Gnostics sought to “accomodate Christianity to the culture
of their day” in order to facilitate Christ’s “naturalization in the whole civilization” (87)
as Niebuhr states, he ultimately fails to deal with even this brand of gnosticism’s sulking
dualism and denial of the world. In other words, in framing gnosticism as a religion which
interpreted culture through Christ, he ignores the Gnostic refusal of culture. And
although Niebuhr might be excused due to the precedence of his scholarship,21 in his
attempt to rationalize the Gnostics as “Christ of culture,” focusing only on their
predilection for spiritual enlightenment and knowledge (which, it is true, was certainly a
defining part of their system), he ignores their core beliefs and theology. The Gnostics,
Niebuhr writes, “sought to disentangle the gospel from its involvement with barbaric and
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outmoded Jewish notions about God and history; to raise Christianity from the level of
belief to that of intelligent knowledge” (86). This is not altogether incorrect; however, it
is something of a gloss, and indeed for a thinker concerned primarily with faith, Niebuhr
fails to treat gnosticism as the coherent Christian theological belief system it was and the
faith of its devotees in the message of Christ and the saving power of the “Word of God.”
Very briefly, the paragon of gnostic thought, writes Hans Jonas who defines the
term more broadly in describing the religion’s various sects, was a “radical dualism” in
which the transmundane deity existed in complete antithesis to the world.
Cosmologically, Earth is the centermost, darkest dungeon of a bleak stockade universe
which is arranged as a series of concentric spheres, each of which is guarded by an
“Archon”; the entirety of this universe is darkness and remains segregated from the great
beyond—the realm of light in which God resides. “The religious significance of this
cosmic architecture,” says Jonas in The Gnostic Religion (1958), “lies in the idea that
everything which intervenes between here and the beyond serves to separate man from
God” (43). The leader of the Archons is a being known as the demiurge', this being, the
“Yahweh” of the Tanakh, created the world and humankind in an effort to collect and
restrain the bits of “pneuma” (soul or divine substance) that escaped from the beyond and
fell into the darkness at some time in the prehistoric past. Acknowledging their alienation
from God, humans endeavor to reunite their pneuma with the realm of light.
Unfortunately, the knowledge of how exactly to do so is kept from humans by the
Archons/demiurge, and this is where Christ enters the picture. A semi-divine bearer of
Knowledge appears on the prison-planet Earth, explains Jonas, and this bearer,
is a messenger from the world of light who penetrates the barriers of the
spheres, outwits the Archons, awakens the spirit from its earthly slumber,
and imparts to it the saving knowledge “from without.” The mission of
88

this transcendent savior begins even before the creation of the world (since
the fall of the divine element preceded the creation) and runs parallel to
history. (45)
This savior is Christ-the literal scion of God--and the knowledge he brought to Earth was
the Knowledge of God. Equipped with this knowledge or gnosis, the pneumatic soul is
able to make its way through the darkness, past the Archons, and back to the true Infinite
at its moment of death, no longer enslaved in human form.
Acknowledging the debate on whether one should define “gnosticism” specifically
or broadly, then, comparative religious studies scholar J.W. Drane adds that despite the
bumps that preclude any comprehensive understanding of the complex term, “The
foundation-stone of this belief was a radical cosmological dualism, i.e. the belief that the
created world was evil, and was totally separate from and in opposition to the world of
spirit.” If one at least acknowledges Diane’s pithy notion, not to mention gnosticism’s
historical context as the amalgamation (not unlike Christianity) of Hebrew, Zoroastrian,
and Hellenic religious thought, it becomes clear that “gnosticism” could easily be
interpreted, depending on one’s theological focus, as falling into either the separational
“Christ against culture” or the dualistic version of the “Christ above culture” groups by
virtue of its rejection of this world. Assuming there were Gnostic Christians, in the
second century and beyond, who refused the world in its entirety, especially curious
becomes Niebuhr’s placement of the group in light of his description of Church Fathers
Clement and Tertullian as advocates of the “Christ against culture” motif. Just because
Christian anticulturalist Church Fathers denounced the gnosticism of their day as heretical
likely for the above cosmological reasons-Archons and spheres), that is, does not mean
hat second century gnosticism was not yoked with these Fathers in their fondness for
he message of Christ, their belief in his teaching and Wisdom, and their rejection of the
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created material world in favor the world of Spirit.
Moreover, already we can see in gnosticism bits of Hegel’s Phenomenology.
alienation from Spirit (of which consciousness is truly a reflection) and the desire to
return, the individual and (linear) historical development of Absolute Knowledge,
Christianity as “true” in form—Christ as the synthesis of segregated worlds.22 This is not
to say, of course, that Hegel was a Gnostic thinker in the cosmological sense, but that his
system, based predominantly on the notions of alienation and negation, retains several
elements of not only Greek, Hebrew, and Christian thought, but second century Gnostic
thought as well. Thus, Niebuhr’s placement of gnosticism is also curious in the context of
his argument’s aforementioned Hegelian form: three main ethical types and several subtypes, each of which develop historically and arise only in relation to, or as the negation
o f the preceding types. (Niebuhr’s treatment becomes especially difficult to reconcile in
this thesis when we remember Marcus’s melding of negationist punk and gnosticism, even
given his aforementioned difficulties. But more on this in chapter three.)
Gnosticism and Hegel aside, however, certainly Niebuhr’s work was, and is,
largely accepted for what it can do; his text is today considered a “classic” in the realm of
Christian ethics, leading another more charitable critic to admit that Christ and Culture is
a text “one can barely escape reading on the way to earning a seminary degree” (Gathje).
As such Niebuhr’s rubric remains useful and sets the stage for the Hegelian reading of
Christian rock.
Returning to the first of three types, then, according to Niebuhr the Christ against
culture position w'as, logically, the attitude of the earliest Christians and remains a “more
consistent” (although admittedly not majority today) position than any of the others he
later outlines. Second and third century examples of Christian sects (again, many of
which were later repudiated emphatically by the Church Fathers such as Tertullian)
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founded on this notion of complete separation include the Marcionites, Manichaeans, and
countless “millenarians and mystics” (64). For these initial believers, the physical world
is “evil,” and will ever remain so, in that it is alienated from God; thus, the affirmation of
Christ cannot coincide with an affirmation of the world: “This succinct statement of the
positive meaning of Christianity is, however, accompanied by an equally emphatic
negation,” Niebuhr writes (emphasis added). “The counterpart of loyalty to Christ.. .is
the rejection of cultural society; a clear line of separation is drawn between the
brotherhood of the children of God and the world” (47-48). In addition to the writing of
Tertullian, Niebuhr cites several Biblical texts as initiating this attitude, including the
Gospel of Matthew and Revelation. Niebuhr’s most solid scriptural evidence, however,
is the First Letter of John which warns (note the emphasis on desire):
Do not love the world or the things in the world. The love of the Father is
not in those who love the world; for all that is in the world—the desire of
the flesh, the desire of the eyes, the pride in riches—comes not from the
Father but from the world. And the world and the desire for it are passing
away, but those who do the will of God live forever. (I John, 2:15-17)
But while separation may have been the dominant Christian ideology in the early
centuries, this position quickly became the minority following Constantine’s early fourth
century adoption of Christianity as Roman State religion. Uneasy with their faith’s
continued elevation (and perhaps dilution) in culture, several Christian groups over the
centuries have opted to remain separate from secular culture, taking their faith with
them.23 This position was not only limited to the West, however, as Niebuhr even calls
Leo Tolstoy’s fiction “a clear-cut example of anticultural Christianity” (64).
Remembering Howard and Streck, who use Niebuhr’s heuristic as a model for their threepart analysis of Christian rock, it was this negationist approach to culture that was also
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adopted by the earliest Jesus movement adherents, including its “separational” musicians,
in the late-1960s and early-1970s: “In [this] separational view [of CCMJ, the Christian
and the secular are locked in opposition--God versus the world—and accepting the one
necessarily entails rejecting the other” (49). And although the bulk of Christendom is far
from separational or negationist today, there are many modem Christians for whom the
mainstream secular world is still to be actively eschewed or “negated”; according to
Howard and Streck, the majority of Contemporary Christian musicians have, for one
reason or another, fallen into this separational category.
But more on Christian rock momentarily; first this thesis must deal with
Niebuhr’s final chapter, which paves the theoretical way for Hegel’s return. The
theologian concludes his series of essays pragmatically, explaining that each individual
will respond to the Christ and culture dilemma relative to their own experience. At this
point Niebuhr’s reading of both Marx and Kierkegaard (he invokes the latter by
christening this final chapter “A ‘Concluding Unscientific Postscript’”), is evident. But
relativism is only part of the answer; Niebuhr thus distances himself from Kierkegaard,
who he feels neglects the social problem, by suggesting that belief unites individuals to
both one another and God despite their existential relativity in this world. Rather, it is
through belief or faith in Christ that the individual becomes aware of his or her relativity
and is able to respond to it in the affirmative (punks aside), accepting Hegel’s
metaphvsic. Niebuhr (who, it should be noted, once ran for political office as a member
of the Socialist Party) thus proposes a “social existentialism” where the “I” of
existentialism becomes a “we” through faith. We must decide how to respond to culture
Niebuhr suggests of the Christian community; we must decide as members of a particular
faith community in a particular historical context: “We must make our individual
decisions in our existential situation; but we do not make then individualistically in

confrontation by a solitary Christ as solitary selves” (246). The faith community is
necessary, that is, for without the active community of believers to help interpret,
explain, and point to Christ in culture, the individual is “at the mercy of [his or her]
imaginations” (245).
From here Niebuhr offers his final argument by turning to the notion of freedom:
“In our historical present we make our individual decisions with freedom and in faith; but
we do not make them in independence and without reason” (249). “[T]hough we choose
in freedom, we are not independent; for we exercise our freedom in the midst of values
and powers we have not chosen but to which we are bound” (250). That is, as a
“Christian existentialist” Niebuhr recognizes that humans are bound by the realities of
existence and dependent in our relative freedom; we did not choose this historical
moment, reason, or even existence itself. Acknowledging this dependent relativity,
however, he adds that we are still free to choose what to do with our material lives. And
through the active selection of faith, as opposed to the listless, nihilistic acceptance of
bondage or the violent punk rejection of a life of bondage, the individual is united not with
institutions (Niebuhr’s dig at denominationalism), but with fellow believers, with God,
and even with non-believers who, in their freedom to choose, reject dependence and
bondage. This, says Niebuhr somewhat conflating the three subdivisions of his “Christ
above culture” category, is how the Christian must approach culture: “To make our
decisions in faith is to make them., .in view of the fact that the world of culture—man’s
achievement—exists within the world of grace—God’s Kingdom” (256). Niebuhr’s own
“both-and” response suggests not only his recognition of a certain dualism, but, through
his emphasis on “social existentialism,” the conversionist attitude of Christ as the
potential “transformer of culture.”
Again, already we can see Hegel at work in Niebuhr’s typology. Returning to the

former, then, Hegel explains that once the unessential, unhappy self-consciousness-still
aware of its individuality-accepts bondage, it still desires unification with the
Unchangeable to which it now both recognizes as its Absolute Master and fears (but fears
less so than nothingness). It thus strives to achieve oneness with God in three similarly
typological, dialectically fluid ways: through pure self-consciousness, through desires and
works, and through the mediated, conscious being-for-self (130) that comes from the
ceding of one’s will to the Absolute (or at least a representative of the Absolute).
In this first dependent stage of the relationship of unessential and Essential, selfconsciousness fancies itself as “incarnate Unchangeable” or as linked by “pure
consciousness” with Spirit, which self-consciousness recognizes, rightly, as its nature.
This notion, Hegel seems to be suggesting in reference to the choice of unhappy
consciousness to remain bound for the remainder of its life, might be imagined as the
result of a conversion experience or religious epiphany (discussed more in the following
chapter) where the individual encounters the Absolute inwardly or through feeling. Thus
self-consciousness sees itself, at least momentarily, as the embodiment of Absolute,
which consciousness feels internally and inexplicably. Or, having advanced beyond the
“abstract thinking” of Stoicism and the “unsettled thinking” of Skepticism—imperfect
stages both—the unhappy self-consciousness occupies an intermediate position whereby
it cognitively feels its changeable self connected to the Unchangeable. In this way sellconsciousness “is the unity of pure thinking and individuality; also it knows itself to be
this thinking individuality or pure thinking, and knows the Unchangeable itself essentially
as an individuality” (130-31). Ironically, for all its assurance self-consciousness does not
yet know that it has not yet joined the Absolute, but only feels its presence and thus sees
itself as the link between the Essential and unessential; as a result, its relation to the
Unchangeable is not one of explicit thought, but an implicit miasmatic thought which

Hegel describes as devotion, suggesting poetically that, “Its thinking is no more than the
chaotic jingling of bells, or a mist of warm incense, a musical thinking that does not get as
far as the [actual] Notion, which would be the sole immanent objecti ve mode of thought”
(131). That is, this implicit thought is not yet pure consciousness, but only the
movement toward pure consciousness. Thus self-consciousness, as yet unaware of its
failing, conceives of the Unchangeable as an “actual existence” (that is,
anthropomorphized or linked with the physical body of self-consciousness itself) to
which it must devote its life. Few Christian rock bands represent this devotional,
“musical” thought and self-centered first relationship of changeable and Unchangeable
than Petra.
Petra
While its worldwide popularity, endurance, and multiple Grammy nominations
might appear to cast its oppositional status in doubt, few Christian rock bands better
epitomize both the negation of culture and Hegel’s initial ecstatic, devotional relation of
self-consciousness and Absolute than Fort Wayne, Indiana’s, Petra. Founded in 1972 by
Bob Hartman, Petra has released over 20 albums (including a live album, two hymn
collections, and two Spanish-language records), each of which are equal parts
ecstatic/experiential (“All Fired Up!,” “Get On Your Knees and Fight Like a Man,”
“Stand Up”), devotional (“Lord I Lift Your Name On High,” “Praise Ye The Lord,” “The
Floliest Name”), and negationist (“Not of This World,” “Beat the System,” “This Means
War!”).
Beginning with its negation of culture, then, while Petra began as an evangelistic
outfit (apropos the evangelical cultural context of the early-1970s described in the
introduction) w'hich actively sought the conversion of non-believers to Christ during or
after its concerts, Petra easily became one of the most recognized names in Christian rock

by making a career out of negating the secular world. For instance, as the band sings
deliberately on the cavalier, yet madrigal, title track to its 1983 record Not o f this World
We’re not welcome in this world of wrong
We are foreigners who don’t belong
We are strangers, we are aliens
We are not of this world

Jesus told us men would hate us
But we must be of good cheer
He has overcome this world of darkness
And soon we will depart from here
The words lack subtlety: the “we” here are Christians, including the members of Petra,
who have been born-again, who have experienced the power and vigor of Christ in their
hearts. Their “saved” status distinguishes them from the rest of the material world, to
which they feel no affinity and hope to abandon (or as later albums suggest are destined
to engage in battle), perhaps at the moment of Rapture. Indeed, one might go so far as to
suggest that a finer lyrical defense of gnosticism could not have been composed: alienated
from the one true God, Petra longs for the day when its fallen divine matter might depart
from the flawed world of darkness and reunite with the light. “We are envoys, we must
tarry / With this message we must carry,” continues the band, perhaps alluding to its
collective pneuma and the Word of God. The gnostic reading is inexact, however, in that
Petra is less concerned, theologically speaking, with spiritual knowledge (in the nonHegelian sense) than simply basking in what it considers the glow of Christ and
encouraging existing believers to keep “fighting the good fight.” Literally.
Realizing the ministerial potential of its music, that is, the group abandoned

evangelism and the secular realm in favor of directing its efforts at the converted,
passionately exhorting those who have already come to Christ and reminding fellow
believers of the either-or reality of existence: “We know our music is aimed at the
*
church,” the devout Hartman continues. “Our lyrics seek to edify the body of Christ, and
we’re not writing songs that are...directed to nonbelievers” (qtd. in Howard and Streck,
65-66). Hartman here is referring specifically to songs from his band’s 1987 album This
Means War!, a record that reifies the us-versus-them “spiritual warfare” metaphor many
Christians see being waged daily between the Christian and secular cultures. Accordingly,
the cover art for This Means War! (which again invokes in the reader Hegel’s description
of the bout between master and slave) is the artistic rendering of a muscular Caucasian man
reaching for the sky from his knees; he is outdoors and a thick beam of yellow light pours
over him from above. In the background a row of houses and perhaps a church are set
amidst an ominous looking sky; in the foreground a golden shield, helmet, red sash, and
doubled-edged sword with golden hilt await retrieval.
Like the “Not of this World” title of this portion of the thesis (also the title of a
Petra song), the suggestion here is immodest: no longer will the forces of Good be pushed
around by the godless culture in which they live. “With God as my witness,” the
stalwart man on the album perhaps shouts, his eyes cast heavenward, “I will singlehandedly vanquish this world of sin.” This believer, we can assume, is on the side of
light, the side of God—which is also his source of strength (that his would-be armaments
resemble first century Roman military garb is of no consequence to this twentieth century
suburban Christian militiaman). One can only guess what the “this” is that has resulted in
the brawny Christian’s decision to forgo coexistence or the turning of cheeks and instead
take up arms against the enemy. In any case, here Petra invokes the coming battle
between the forces of light and darkness as prophesied in scripture. Or as Howard and

Streck put it, “Petra’s message to Christians can perhaps be understood as a musical
reading of [the Biblical books of] Joshua or Revelation, the armies of God rising up to
conquer evil” (69). This bellicose theme (unsurprisingly at its peak during the Cold War
Reagan years) continued with the band’s 1988 album On Fire!, whose cover is, simply,
the colorful rendering of a broadsword, again golden -hiked, bursting forth through a
nebulous darkness. In the “background”—on the other side of the sword-induced rupture
in the space-time continuum—an all-consuming fire envelops a pale arm to the wrist.
Here, too, Petra is bold in its connotation, which leaves precious little room for
interpretation: the sword of the (Caucasian) Absolute has broken through the darkness,
bringing with it light, force, and perhaps salvation—at least for the converted. But less
interesting is the album’s aggressive aesthetic than its elated lead track “All Fired Up!,” to
which we now turn for the analysis of Petra’s perceived relation to Spirit through pure
consciousness.
It is impossible to separate fully the album’s cover from the lead track, of course;
but what makes “All Fired Up!” noteworthy in the Hegelian context is not its
belligerence, but the unmistakable, heartfelt feelings singer John Schlitt retains for Christ.
“I’m all fired up!” he shrieks giddily. “There’s a flame burning in my soul / And my heart
is a burning coal / I’m all fired up!” After the song’s refrain Schlitt continues,
I have this feeling burning deep within my heart
Won’t wait to let this heavenly celebration start
When the Spirit gives me the nod
I’ll get excited about the things of God
I feel my faith renewing-I feel revival brewing
All over the world there’s a burning desire
I feel the Church is stirring and it’s gonna keep occurring
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Till we’re all baptized in Mis Holy Fire!
With the zeal of a convert, Sehlitt has experienced Spirit in his innermost being; he knows
not how to describe the feeling other than to liken it to fire, a “burning coal.” As such,
Sehlitt, having been saved from suicide and “a secular system that was destroying me
through drug and alcohol abuse,” devotes his entire existence to Christ: “[I vow] To
encourage the Christian to grasp the reality that we are on the winning team,” explains
Sehlitt. “Jesus Christ is alive and through Him we are to be victorious in His perfect plan
for us—a plan that was designed for us from the beginning of time.” So confident in his
victory is Sehlitt, in fact, that he goes so far, on On Firel's following track “Hit You
Where You Live,” to suggest that Christ himself desires to convert non-believers: “It’s
His delight to give you your desire / It’s His desire to set your life on fire.”
Such statements are not unique to Schlitt’s time with the band, however, for as
guitarist Hartman adds on “Walkin’ in the Light” from the band’s eponymous 1974 debut
album, “I’m giving love to all of my brothers / And I wish you could see all the joy it
brings / 1 know you’ve given me Your Spirit / Peace in my heart, a new song to sing.” In
each of the above statements, written in very different political and historical contexts,
the singers recall their original moment of conversion (a subject also treated in more
theoretical detail in chapter three) and sense that Spirit is in them still—that they maintain
a relationship of pure consciousness with God to this day and. feeling the presence of
Spirit, devote their lives to the maintenance of this relationship. “[I’m] Walking in the
light every day and night,” concludes Hartman. “Living in the Spirit is really out of
sight.”
One does not doubt Petra’s sincerity. But ironically it is this sincerity that Hegel
considers problematic. In true Stoic fashion, of course, feeling that self-consciousness is
one with the Absolute and being one with it are two different things. Rather, self
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consciousness feels, inwardly, both connection to and recognition from the Unchangeable,
but cannot give voice or shape to this paradoxically anthropomorphized feeling, to this
pure consciousness or Absolute save seeing itself—the unessential Changeable—in the
mirror. As a result self-consciousness ultimately does not enjoy the perceived presence
of Absolute and, in fact, remains separated from it. Devout though they may be, that is,
Petra’s ecstasy and fervent reinforcement of the Christian experience leaves them
incomplete, Hegel might say, for in its intermediate, passionate position the devout selfconsciousness has, through an “infinite yearning,” mistaken its “pure thinking” for
recognition from and connection to the Unchangeable essence. But in this movement of
pure thought, says Hegel,
this essence is the unattainable beyond which, in being laid hold of...has
already flown. It has already flown; for it is in part the Unchangeable
which thinks of itself as an individuality, and consciousness therefore
directly attains in [the Unchangeable] its own self...but as the antithesis of
the Unchangeable; instead of laying hold of the essence, it only feels it and
has fallen back into itself. Since, in attaining itself, consciousness is unable
to get away from itself as this antithesis to the Unchangeable, it has,
instead of laying hold of the essence, only laid hold of what is unessential.
(131)
In other words, self-consciousness, as a consequence of its fervent devotion, has turned
Absolute consciousness into an embodied individuality, objectified it, and thus rendered it
unessential and impure—the antithesis of what it seeks.
Still, through this pure thinking, or “the return of the feeling heart into itself,” says
Hegel, self-consciousness realizes that the object of its feeling is itself, recognizes itself as
an individual living an “actual existence.” Self-consciousness thus recognizes the

Unchangeable as having no actuality (because it has vanished or “flown”) and must stop
trying to hold onto the effluvia of both Unchangeable and inner self. Self-consciousness
thus realizes that only through work and desire in the actual world can it. as an actual
individual, disembody the Unchangeable-remove it from its state of antithesis or
perceived union with self-consciousness—and bring it into the “world of actuality.” In so
doing self-consciousness is better able to enjoy “in the form of independent things” (132)
the spiritual existence it concedes is alien to it. Thus desire and work in the material
world take on new meaning: no longer are they obsolete for consciousness or “something
to be set aside and consumed,” but the actualization of a “sanctified world” (133) where
the Christian’s “Christian” activity helps marry him or her to the Universal Unchangeable
which has “the significance of all actuality” (133). This notion is perhaps what Christian
theologian Watchman Nee had in mind when he resolved in the early part of the twentieth
century (in his collection of essays entitled Love Not the World) that everything we do,
“be it in field or highway, in shop, factory, kitchen, hospital or school, has spiritual value
in terms of the kingdom of Christ” (72). The reach for pure consciousness is thus
negated; and from this rejection of inner self comes the second relationship of unessential
self-consciousness with Unchangeable. For a better understanding of this active second
relationship we abandon Petra, who it seems never made the leap from pure
consciousness to actuality before their dissolution in 2005, and look instead to “practical”
Christian rockers Resurrection Band.
Resurrection Band
Resurrection Band—or “Rez Band”—began ministering to music fans via rock and
roll in and around Chicago, Illinois, in the early 1970s. What separated Rez Band—whose
members included wed vocalists Glenn and Wendi Kaiser, guitarist/keyboardist Stu Ueiss.
bassist Roy Montroy, and drummer John Herrin—from the rest of CCM and makes it the

most appropriate representation of Hegel’s next relationship of self-consciousness and
Absolute, was its affiliation with Jesus People USA (JPUSA), a Chicago-based, nondenominational evangelical Christian outreach community and direct descendent of the
Jesus movement. Rez Band cofounder Glenn Kaiser is actually one of the 500-member
Christian commune’s “deacons,” and in the group's promotional material JPUSA cite two
specific texts as grounding its theology: Dietrich Bonhoeffer’s 1937 theological treatise
The Cost o f Discipleship (and specifically his “cheap grace” polemic which suggests that
Christianity without the costly work of discipleship or community is Christianity
without Christ), and the Biblical “Acts of the Apostles,” whose second and fourth
chapters describe a model Christian community.2,1 Taking these documents to heart,
JPUSA works daily to improve the lives of those living in Chicago’s poorer North Side
(where the group’s commune is located) through various endeavors, including Cornerstone
Community Outreach, a women’s and children’s shelter; “Friendly Towers,” a senior
living center; and a neighborhood outreach organization called “Brothas and Sistas United”
(“Meet Our Family”). In addition to housing Rez Band. JPUSA's North Side commune
is also home to Cornerstone magazine (coordinator of the Cornerstone Festival—CCM's
longest running festival concert) and Grrr Records, a not-for-profit record label which
produces and distributes Rez Band material and other JPUSA bands/artists. As Jesus
People explains,
Jesus People USA never started out to be a Christian community; our
roots were in the early Jesus movement of the late sixties and the early
seventies. When Jesus called, many of us were social rejects in search of
something worth living for. You might say community living simply
evolved as the practical expression of Christianity in our everyday lives,
the working out of agape love. (“Meet our Family,” emphasis added)2'

This notion of “practical Christianity” is key to distinguishing Rez Band, which
unofficially disbanded its musical ministry in the late-1990s, from the cheerleading,
experiential, and inwardly devotional likes of Petra. Thus the band might appear less
“Christ against culture,” to return to Niebuhr, than as the dualist or conversionist versions
of his “Christ above culture” type. On the one hand, as believers in the inerrancy of the
Bible and Second Coming of Christ they reject the material, secular world. In addition to
the band’s communal lifestyle and establishment of its own record label apart from the
industry, that is, singer Wendi Kaiser cites the aforementioned second chapter of the First
Epistle of John as the message she wishes most to convey to fans: “My message to
supporters is Live For Eternity. So often we only fill our lives with trivial things, never
considering eternal principles and truths. Like St. John wrote to us, ‘Do not love the
world or anything in the world’” (“Wendi Kaiser”). On the other hand, band members
likewise reject the validity of absolute separation and have made evangelism and ministry
two of their commune’s membership requirements. This uncomfortable paradox, detailed
further below, is one considerable reason for the band’s inclusion in this thesis: it shows
the negationist Christians’ struggle to separate themselves from the world but
simultaneously speak its language and work in it. Or as Howard and Streck explain, “In
their fervent desire to preach the gospel...the separational artists...are frequently the first
to incorporate new cultural trends into their work in an effort to make their message
‘relevant’” (51). To better illustrate the verity of this conundrum, both in the context of
negation and Hegel’s secondary work/desire movement of Christian self-consciousness,
Resurrection Band’s performance on Live Bootleg is now examined.
A large black leather motorcycle boot, graphically rendered, replete with studs and
buckles and perhaps a steel toe, graces the cover Live Bootleg, the band’s first official live
album (recorded over the course of two days in Chicago in 1983). Trailing away from the
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boot are several curved “motion lines” which suggest that the foot to whom the boot
belongs is being swung with both speed and force; surrounding the boot are several jagged
red and orange spikes—illustrator cant connoting “contact” with an object. “Ladies and
gentlemen: please give a warm welcome to Chicago’s own Resurrection Band!” shouts an
emcee at the beginning of the record. Audience cheers give way to the introductory guitar
riff of “Military Man,” the band’s tone-setting opening song and ambiguously utopian
prophecy that the Second Coming of Christ will result in the end of all war. “Military
man got his demons laughing,” yelps Glenn Kaiser:
Pushing him over the sanity brink
Horizons changing, train derailing
His iron ship’s begun to sink
For this is the end of the military man
What is clear barely a minute into the record is that Kaiser, the song’s author, foresees,
not only the Second Coming, but in it the imminent end of the “military man.” The
eschatological nature of the song already speaks volumes about the band’s theology:
millenarian, evangelical, anticultural, and Biblically based. But what is unclear in the song
is whether the military man’s “end” has been brought about by his own actions or those
of Christ: “[He] Saw the light from the man above / His heart pierced by a sword of love.”
But did the man convert, suffer a Cold War-era nuclear assault, or was he, the hapless
representative of all petty corporeal armies, killed by the Absolute General, the
resurrected Lord? A sword of love is still a sword, after all. “He caught sight of the
future shock / Defenses crushed beneath the Risen Rock,” Kaiser continues as the song
adopts a more assertive tone, becoming a sort of postmodern, heavy metal “Battle Hymn
of the Republic”-lhe resurrected Lord pressing the grapes of wrath and extinguishing
soldiers blue and gray alike with a world-cleansing, falsetto juice. Indeed, the squealing

Kaiser eventually makes such a vintner’s reference himself: “No more doing time / He
tasted the new wine...No more military man.” Thus the significance of the album’s plied
boot becomes clearer: this premillennial rock group waits expectantly for the Lord. And
when he comes, they feel, he shall do so with the swiftness and force of one thousand
leathered feet, knocking the wind out of all armies, verily, of all humanity—or at least the
unsaved—as would a kick to the abdomen. His truth is marching on.
The band segues into their next song and the record/performance seems to go along
in a similar vein: aggressive, critical of culture (e.g. disparaging video games and other
popular media), but weirdly hopeful. That is, the band is not hopeful for humanity of its
own accord, but hopeful that Christ will soon return to correct humanity. Keeping the
theme of hope alive, then, after the second song tails off the music is momentarily shelved
for a track entitled “Wendi’s Rap,” a spoken word piece. “I remember a time about
twelve years ago,” Glenn Kaiser’s wife begins with what becomes her recollection of a
past life of partying, sex, and drugs. “1 started to wonder what I was going to do with my
life...I wondered if there was such a thing called love," she relates with emotion in her
voice. And before the “rap” is over the listener recognizes that what she is listening to is
less inter-song rock banter than religious sermon. “No matter what I’d done,” Wendi
concludes referring to her discovery of Christ, “1 learned that you could be pure again and
be new.” And although Wendi never makes a single explicit reference to Christ or even
religion, the context in which her words are delivered (nevermind her band’s music) belie
her vague diction: one can be saved through Christ—even one as defiled as was Wendi-and
one must refuse the world to do so. Or as Glenn puts it more emphatically at the end of
the performance in his own sermon “Glenn’s Rap,” at one point referring specifically to
the First letter of John:
fWJhat about people in the gay scene? What about dope and sex and rock

and roll? There are a lot of people in hell tonight because of these things.
[...] Some of you don’t know [eternal life] because you’re not sure that
you know God. Others of you have said “yes” but you’ve lived “no.”
One foot in the Lord; one foot in the world. You’re the prodigal son, the
double-minded man, and you need to ask forgiveness and shake yourself
loose from your sins and come up and ask forgiveness tonight and pray.
Such calls for the audience to ask forgiveness for their sins and accept Christ on
the spot are the hallmark of separational Christian rock performances; Petra and countless
others have done the same. But, returning to Hegel and JPUSA, Kaiser does not stop
there, launching posthaste into a call for a Bonhoefferian active Christianity. “We can’t
say we’re followers of Jesus unless we’re followers of Jesus,” he continues, now almost
ranting, and explaining how one must do more in the world than feel Christ in his or her
heart:
For with the heart man believes...but with the mouth confession is made
unto salvation. [...] God put you here for a purpose, and until you fulfill
the purpose for which he created you, you’re never going to find peace and
fulfillment inside—not even as a Christian, for you can say the words and
not live the life and what good is it? It’s empty! It’s empty.
As Hegel has already explained, this notion on Kaiser’s behalf is his repudiation of
maintaining a false (Petran) relationship with Absolute where consciousness presents
itself to the Unchangeable as pure consciousness only; Kaiser, the JPUSA deacon,
desires—requires—an active working on one’s relationship with God while on earth. He
asks as much from his audience.
Naturally, however, Kaiser’s desire too poses a theoretical problem: how can a
band like Rez Band be negationist but simultaneously preach engagement with the world?

How does one “shake himself loose” from the world, as Kaiser says, but continue to
work on and in it? Even Resurrection Band’s heavy metal songs and the intra-song
sermons seem entirely conundrous when juxtaposed (e.g. the wrathful God of “Military
Man” and the merciful God of Wendi Kaiser’s sermon); indeed, Kaiser’s theology
suggests a double -mindedness of its own. Niebuhr answers these questions by admitting
the similarity between the negationist and dualist camps but pointing to one key
difference: the dualist knows that he belongs to culture and cannot escape it, though he
may wish it; “that God indeed sustains him in it and by it; for if God in His grace did not
sustain die world in its sin it would not exist for a moment” (156). In the crucifixion the
dualist sees a Christ who was not only the victim of human depravity and violence but
was “delivered to death by the power that presides over all things,” continues Niebuhr.
“Yet from this cross there comes the knowledge of a Mercy which freely gives itself and
its best loved for the redemption of men” (158). As such, the dualist sees wrath and
mercy, sin and redemption interminably, paradoxically linked (159). The dualist cannot
escape this intermingling; it is his theology, and he cannot therefore help but speak and
act in ways that to outsiders appear inconsistent and contradictory. And Niebuhr’s
invocation of both dualism and sin thus returns us once again to Hegel.
An active (but Christian) Unhappy Consciousness, working and desiring in the
world of actuality, says Hegel, “appears as the power in which actuality is dissolved”
(133-134). In this way self-consciousness proves itself independent of the Unchangeable
through its deeds and desire in the world of actuality. But in its recognition of
independence, the unessential self-consciousness still knows that as an embodied soul it
cannot possibly be “independent” in that same way as the true disembodied Spirit. Filled
with the self-certainty of actual independence, however, consciousness is now able to
reflect, once again, back into itself. In this self-reflection, it elects to renounce its own

body through a sort of mimetic ascetic act of thanks and praise for the disembodied Spirit.
Thus self-consciousness “denies itself the satisfaction of being conscious of its
independence” whereby it is able to “gain a sense of its unity with the Lmchangeable”
(134). “Dear Father: 1 believe, by faith, that your son Jesus died on the cross in my place
to pay the price for every sin in my life,” prays Glenn Kaiser at the album’s close,
attempting to link himself to Spirit by both denying himself his independence (living the
communal, possessionless life) and gushing with gratitude for Christ’s sacrifice. “Remind
me again and again what it cost you to purchase and to forgive me.” Kaiser is eternally
grateful to Christ, whom he frames as a willing surrogate offering for his own sins, and
this gratitude is made concrete through the paradoxical combination of a pseudomonastic/communal lifestyle, eternal thanks, and work.
Still, this “sense” of unity, continues Hegel, is incomplete and governed by
division, a fact that for the entirety of their career escaped Rez Band. The desire, work,
and even monastic renunciation of self are all a form of actual (worldly) satisfaction, in
other words, which still alienate self-consciousness from the abstract Unchangeable, as do
consciousness’s giving of praise and thanks to the Absolute. Nevertheless, this alienating
work, desire, and praise allow self-consciousness now to acknowledge “the [only]
actuality which it knows to be true” (135)—material existence—leading the self to Hegel’s
third relationship. In this third relationship of changeable and Unchangeable, selfconsciousness affirms its nullity or nothingness in relation to Spirit (e.g. confesses
“Original Sin” in the Christian context), recognizing that unto death will it reside in this
defiled, finite world of actuality. As a result work and desire “lose all universal content
and significance” and “actual doing thus becomes a doing of nothing...a feeling
of...wretchedness” (135). Thus self-consciousness is reduced to a being brooding over its
sinful self, sordid in its physical poverty. To their detriment, this even more costly route

to salvation was the one not traveled by Rez Band in their reified, comfortable (almost
self-righteous) second Hegelian relation between consciousness to Spirit. And it is this
more costly route that announces Hegel’s final relationship of unessential and Absolute.
In an appropriately dialectical twist, it is self-consciousness’s very nullity, its
negative existence as a sinful being, that unites consciousness with Unchangeable; sin is
the mediating link between the two. Sin serves as this link in two ways: having
abandoned both ecstatic inner feelings of pure consciousness and work in the actual world
in the attempt to join Spirit, self-consciousness accepts its deficiency, realizing that the
self-knowledge of its actual imperfection connects it to the Unchangeable, albeit
abstractly: “The mediated relation constitutes the essence of the negative movement in
which consciousness turns against its particular individuality, but which, qua relation, is
in itselfp o s itiv e writes Hegel, “and will bring consciousness itself to an awareness of its
unity with the Unchangeable” (136). An abstract union thus exists as a result of Original
Sin. For those interested in attaining a more perfect union with Spirit, however, selfconsciousness must surrender all will and deed to a mediating or priestly consciousness,
whose role it is to present the two extremes to each other (136) and absolve the UnhappyConsciousness of its sin, theoretically remove the alienating chasm separating unessential
consciousness and Spirit. Through this mediated union, self-consciousness finally
achieves union with the Unchangeable and a relief from corporeal misery, at least “in
prin fiple” (other translations substitute “implicitly” for this phrase), allowing
consciousness to finally wrestle with the notion of “Reason,” the third and final portion
of Hegel’s Phenomenology. This final self-consciousness is best represented by Larry
Norman.
Larry Norman
Finally, then, to examine Hegel’s third relationship of unessential consciousness
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and Absolute, we turn to the “Father of Christian Rock” covered in brief in chapter one.
Like Rez Band, Larry Norman straddles the fence between Niebuhr’s “Christ against
culture” and “Christ above culture” types. That is, although he positions himself as a
separational Christian rocker in terms of his negation of culture and his rejection of the
music industry and both Christian and secular media, he remains steadfast in his efforts to
bring the Knowledge of Christ to “the disenfranchised,” whom Norman calls the primary
target of his music (Rumberg). Norman supersedes Rez Band, and certainly Petra,
however through his gnostic rejection of the faulty preceding relationships to Spirit (those
based on pure consciousness or material work) in lieu of a perpetual pondering of
abstract, complicated notions of sin, grace, wisdom, and discipleship. As a result
Norman’s music represents less an exercise in praise, exhortation, or the giving of thanks
than an intellectual, mediated, and obedient surrender of will to Spirit and the Absolute
Knowledge of Christ.
*

To establish first his rejection of the world, Norman has shown signs not just of a
general negation of culture as the transparent Only Visiting This Planet, In Another World,
and Trapped in Babylon record titles might suggest, but of aesthetic, socioeconomic, and
even subjective negationism apropos their description above in the punk context. For
example, on “Baroquen Spirits” (So Long Ago The Garden, 1973) Norman heralds a sort
of subjective negationism when he sings, “What will I do if you tell me that you love me
not at all? / I’ll charter a ship to the edge of the world and sail off.” The song’s subject
matter is itself ambiguous in that the anonymous “you” is never clarified; the song might
as easily be Norman’s lament to an estranged lover as to Spirit, for as Norman continues.
“How can you respect a man who needs you more than you need him? / Baroquen spirits:
do you love me? / Baroquen spirits: 1 can’t say.” As we shall see, however, whether this

surrender of self is directed at a human or God is consequential. For the moment,
however, suffice it to say the song’s narrator is despondent over what he perceives as
having fully surrendered his will, his love, to another who may or may not love him back.
So disconsolate is he, in fact, that the speaker has contemplated “going away” in a manner
not unlike that of Richard Hell.
Regarding socioeconomic and aesthetic negationism, then, not only was side two
of Norman’s 1968 / Love You album a side-long (and entirely unfit for commerical radio
airplay) religious operetta called “The Epic” (beating the Who’s Tommy and the offBroadway “rock operas” Jesus Christ Superstar and Godspell by years), but after
disenchanting experiences with both the secular and Christian record industries, Norman
abandoned them both by 1974 and established his own label Solid Rock Records. This
mailorder-only label reflects Norman’s radical attitude toward the commodity, his stance
of being “only vaguely interested in making his albums available to the stores” (“2
Biographies”), and his dismissal of American consumer culture. This attitude eventually
broadened into the refusal to consort with secular and even Christian television and print
media (granting very few interviews) and the negation of America itself as Norman
adopted the expatriate’s life: in an effort to “not try to push his ministry as a commercial
business,” the songwriter took up residence in Europe for several years before poor health
necessitated his return to the United States (“2 Biographies”).
To keep this negationism in context, however, one must acknowledge that the
founding of his own label and the refusal of Christian media may have been related to the
fact that Norman’s records were banned from most Christian retail stores for what
Norman calls a failure to back the standard conservative evangelical Christian line; the ban
continues to this day. For instance, on “Letters to the Church” Norman quips
unironically: “You speak of compassion, but you don’t really care / You can talk of

heaven, but are you going the

>” “I had no time for the church matrix,” Norman explains

of his anti-institutional songs and granting a rare interview to CCM magazine:
When non-U \ evers used to criticize the church I would say, ‘Yeah, 1 agree
and 1 think that God is disappointed in what people have done with
Jesus.’ And then I would go on to talk about what Christ personally said
and did. It worked. I wasn’t there to argue against people’s beliefs. I was
there to talk about what God’s taith is. (Rumberg)
Herein lies the core of Norman’s negation and contemporary “gnosticism,” and his
applicability to Hegel’s final pre-Reason movement of self-consciousness. We begin, as
did Hegel, with the notion of sin.
Much in the way gnosticism, generally speaking, felt that all of existence was
inescapably corrupt and sinful—that is, eternally alienated from its true essence—Hegel
too suggests that the self-consciousness cultivating a tertiary relationship to the
Unchangeable acknowledges that to be alive is to exist, thanks to Original Sin, in a defiled
state. And where Rez Band implores its audience to repent and believe, Norman knows
that such a repentant soul is, in the long run, not obsolete, but still dependent on the
grace of God and helplessly wretched. Thus rejecting petty material notions of sin and
the supposed requisite repentance of bad deeds, Norman sticks to the abstract gnostic—
Hegelian-definition of sin as alienation from God: “1 didn’t have any great sins to repent
of,” explains Norman of his official “conversion” at the hands of a traveling evangelist as a
youngster (Norman was raised in a Christian home), “but 1 knew I had a sinful nature”
(“Learning a Little...”). Norman still knows it: humans have an ineluctable sinful nature
and are thus forever alienated from Spirit and trapped in darkness. Believing this
strongly, Norman repeatedly describes sin as not right or wrong moral action, but the
metaphysical separation from Spirit, or, simply, indifference: "I worry about falling into a

sinful state where I lose interest in talking to people about Jesus.” As a result Norman
has no illusions of repenting of his sinful nature, explaining that in order to “hear” God
one must “die daily to self' (“Learning a Little...”) and continue to learn about God and
seek to understand, in faith, his Word as professed by Christ.
This is not to suggest, or course, that Norman feels that such material sins as
theft, murder, or adultery are not immoral or do not also estrange one from Absolute
(especially if one believes, as Hegel seemed to, that Spirit is in every self-consciousness);
however, he seems to be arguing that even the most repentant soul remains alienated from
Spirit, and that the likes of Rez Band who feel themselves “saved” or doing “God’s
work” on Earth through their outreach commune are still mired in their material nullity,
are in fact both abstractly united to and forever alienated from Spirit by virtue of the very
notion of sin they encourage listeners to overcome. Such Christians must do more than
simply work in the actual world; they must understand the nature of sin and seek further
the Knowledge of God that Christ brought into the darkness.
Thus, calling his songs “self-contained arguments” that listeners can “get an
emotional and intellectual buzz off o f’ (Rumberg), Norman explains that in “dying daily”
to self he constantly seeks to apprehend the wisdom of Christ through intellectual means.
Norman admits, for instance, to reading (repeatedly) the cerebral likes of English
theologian and poet G. K. Chesterton, who in 1909 published Orthodoxy, a “slovenly
autobiography” (19) and companion piece to his collection of essays entitled Heretics
(1905). Claiming to have been a “complete agnostic by the age of sixteen” (151),
Chesterton frames his memoir as an “intellectual journey” (25) whereby the author,
whose spiritual inclinations increase with age, recalls his lifelong search for Truth and
meaning in life. Orthodoxy closes when the author admits that the personal Truth to
which he has come, through knowledge (and perhaps dialectically), resembles, much to his

surprise, Christianity: “If I am asked, as a purely intellectual question, why 1 [now]
believe in Christianity, I can only answer, ' For the same reason that an intelligent agnostic
disbelieves in Christianity.’ 1 believe in it quite rationally upon the evidence” (262-63).
1his evidence, for Chesterton, is the simple paradox of Christianity: “That whatever 1
am, I am not myself’ (292).
“1 love G.K. Chesterton,” Norman gushes in response to this notion. “I like to
read Orthodoxy...We read it several times. [...] It’s just so overwhelming” (“Learning a
Little...”). Indeed, further reading of Chesterton provides clues to Norman’s own
“orthodox”—or gnostic—version of Christianity, specifically, Chesterton’s defense of
Original Sin. “The primary paradox of Christianity is that the ordinary condition of man
is not his sane or sensible condition,” Chesterton writes, “that the normal itself is an
abnormality. That is the innermost philosophy of the Fall” (291-92). Norman appears
to have adopted this reading of everyday existence as an aberration, and with this
apprehension of sin and knowledge grounding his theology we can see how Norman
typifies the self-consciousness Hegel describes as a wretched personality “brooding over
itself’ (136).
No longer finding enjoyment in his actual musical work, Norman’s performances,
in almost punk fashion, became an aloof and even confrontational negation of musical
performance, leading one writer to muse that when on stage Norman “rarely smiled and
often appeared to be almost daring an audience to like him” (anonymous qtd. in “2
Biographies”). Indeed, as Norman grew more nuanced and mature theologically he seemed
to have almost drop the musical element of his performances altogether, explaining to one
interviewer that the more he attempted to relay the Knowledge of God to his audience
(and thus perform fewer and fewer songs) the smaller his crowds progressively became:
“I would go into a city and it would be a big concert, and I’d come back the next year and

it’d be a small concert,” Norman explains. “Every time 1 went to someplace new [I’d
hear] ‘Let’s go hear Larry Norman...Yeah, I have his albums. Let’s go hear him.’ And
then they’d hear me and they’re like, ‘Yeah, I’ve heard Larry Norman...but he talks too
much’” (“Learning a Little...”). “I do it intentionally,” Norman adds. “I try and respond
to what I feel the Spirit wants me to do. [...] It might be audacious to say that we try to
follow the Spirit, because who are we that God should be mindful of us, but God wants
us to follow the Spirit so we should try” (“Learning a Little...”).
In Hegelian terms, then, the divided self-consciousness known as Larry Norman
has realized that his musical work has lost “all universal content and significance,” and,
consequently, is “no longer performed naturally and without embarrassment, as matters
trifling in themselves which cannot possess any importance or essential significance for
Spirit” (135). Thus the invariably defiled Norman reduces both the content and import of
his music during his appearances, giving up his own will to write and perform rock musicin obedience to Spirit, whom he feels commands him to share the Word of God, the
message of Jesus: “I don’t talk intentionally,” he adds, “I obey intentionally” (“Learning a
Little...”). Or as Norman puts it in “Father of All” from Collaborator (2002), the fourth
release in a seven-record “best o f’ set appropriately entitled “The Essential” series,
When I’m tired from the journey and the road seems long
And I fear that I’m losing my way
Let my heart keep turning toward your love so strong
Help me walk from the darkness in to day
Hey, hey, I stop and pray:
Father of love, Savior of love, Spirit of love: I give my love to thee!
Father of all, Savior of all, Spirit of all: I give my ali to thee!
As with each of the above Christian rock songs the musical construction of “Father of

All” is unremarkable in that it is similar to the popular music of its era; what characterizes
this track as Christian is its negationism and lyrical focus: Christ. But where so many
separational Christian rockers use their lyrics to praise Jesus/God, exhort believers, or
evangelize non-believers, Norman goes out of his way to acknowledge his nothingness in
the face of the Unchangeable, dwelling on his sinful nature and vowing to give his “all” to
God in an effort to unite with Spirit. Indeed, the song is but a trifling, as Hegel puts it, a
vessel for Norman’s obedience and sinful surrender of will. Song after song, verse after
gravelly verse he moans and wails in disgrace, lamenting his squalor, his alienation from
the Father, Savior, and Spirit as he travels what Hegel knew all too well as a long and
contradictory path toward the Absolute. “I am a servant, I am waiting for the call,”
Norman continues on “I Am A Servant” (In Another Land, 1975), “And I’m worthless
now / But I’ve made a vow / 1 will humbly bo” before thee / O please use me, I am
lonely.” Norman’s life is a perpetual life of nothingness. But he nas both recognized and
accepted this fact, and in so doing realized that his only hope of achieving unification with
the Trinity is to relinquish his entire self, appropriately making the Unchangeable his
raison d’etre in a manner that surpasses the mere thought of unification and devotion of
Petra. This abdication of self and will (“I only want to serve You...I want to give myself
up without a fight”) results, sings Norman on “Center of my Heart” (Tourniquet, 2001),
in the Unchangeable’s theoretical freeing of unessential self-consciousness from bondage:
“You broke my chains apart,” sings Norman, “You showed me love’s true freedom / And
laid your soul in the center of my heart.” Thus does Norman's dialectical quest reach an
end as he achieves a theoretical oneness with Spirit and is permitted now to explore the
notion of Reason.
One would like to end the discussion here. Unfortunately, as Hegel suggests, this
particular unification (although positive) is imperfect in that it does not allow self-

consciousness to remove, in principle, the misery of nothingness through the absolution
of sin; a mediating consciousness is necessary;
In the mediator, then, this consciousness frees itself from action and
enjoyment so far as they are regarded as its own. [...] This mediator,
having a direct relationship with the unchangeable Being, ministers by
giving advice on what is right. This action, since it follows upon the
decision of someone else, ceases, as regards the doing or the willing of it, to
be its own. (136-37)
Self-consciousness surrenders its will to the mediator, that is, and is absolved of the
wretchedness it feels as a consequence of sin. The alienation of changeable from
Unchangeable is elided, and self-consciousness is relieved of its misery. For Hegel, this
mediating consciousness is described only as the cleric: “As a separate, independent
extreme, [self-consciousness] rejects the essence of its will, and casts upon the mediator
or minister its own freedom of decision, and herewith the responsibility for its own
action” (136).
But, again, because Hegel provides no detail regarding the appearance or authority
of the mediator (e.g. exactly how does the cleric establish “a direct relationship with the
unchangeable being” and whence this mediator’s authority?), one is free to make of the
mediator what one will. To fill in, at least partially, the blanks left by Hegel, then, the
self-consciousness that has conceded to the mediating ability of Original Sin obtains that
direct (albeit abstract) relationship with the unchangeable Being. Still, self-consciousness
is miserable in that it is not itself relieved of the misery of sin without the aid of a more
concrete second mediator described by Hegel as the minister. But given Norman’s
rejection of institutional Christianity, it is unlikely that he has relied upon a ministerial
mediating consciousness over the course of his belief (save his conversion at the hands of
1)7

an evangelical preacher as a child). Nevertheless, what is clear is that in his obedience to
Spirit and “imperfect” recognition of his own wretchedness, Norman has, as “Father of
AH” suggests, made Christ this second mediator. And although Hegel stops short of
calling Christ-the synthetic link between changeable and Unchangeable-this mediator
(instead suggesting that a live mediating consciousness is required), one gets the :nse this
was something he wanted to say (or at the very least had considered) but for one reason
or another (perhaps his own seminary training or sociopolitical context) dared not.26 In
any case, it is at this point that both Hegel’s and Norman’s late “gnosticism” is cast into
stark relief: Christ is the metaphorical mediator or bearer of Absolute Knowledge in this
world of darkness. The “priest” is perhaps not obsolete—or “as useless as a cat” as
Chesterton writes (288)—but his import is diminished; the self-consciousness that has
surrendered its will, in faith, to Christ and committed itself, for the entirety of its forever
corrupt existence, to seeking the Knowledge of God needs no mediating consciousness.
Rather, the reified Word of Christ serves as this mediator and theoretical escape (come
death) from Original Sin. In this context, then, Norman, who has already achieved a form
of union with Spirit by acknowledging his bondage to Original Sin, is relieved of his
misery and comes into joyous contact with Spirit more officially via Christ to whom
Norman has surrendered his v. . again in a manner more authentic than the likes of Petra
who only feel contact in themselves but have not, in their uncritical ecstasy, gone the
dialectical distance.
Thus does Norman, whether associated with a mediator or not, theoretically (or,
to borrow from Hegel, “in principle”) achieve what Hegel calls “being-for-self’ where
self-consciousness has joined the consciousness of Universal or Absolute Being:
“Through these moments of surrender, [self-consciousness] truly and completely
deprives itself of the consciousness of inner and outer freedom, of the actuality in which

consciousness exists for itself’ (137). For Hegel, that is, the Christian metaphysic allows
the self-consciousness, which has been to this point walking on its head, to correct itself
and walk upright in confidence and union with Spirit. Or as Chesterton puts it while
discussing the “modem agnostic” predilection for pessimism and desolation:
The sceptic may truly be said to be topsy-turvy; for his feet are dancing
’’"'wards in idle ecstasies, while his brain is in the abyss. To the modern
man the heavens are actually below the earth. The explanation is simple;
he is standing on his head; which is a very weak pedestal to stand on. But
when he has found his feet again he knows it. Christianity satisfies
suddenly and perfectly man’s ancestral instinct, for being the right way up;
satisfies it supremely in this; that by its creed joy becomes something
gigantic and sadness something special and small. (295)
In his “orthodox” defense of the faith, so important to Norman, Chesterton has become
an uncannily Hegelian Christian apologetic, referring directly to Hegel’s description of
Phenomenology as the attempt to make consciousness walk on its head and likewise
suggesting that Christianity alone allows consciousness to walk again upright.27
*

To conclude, remembering Jameson’s suggestion that periodization and the
tracking of levels can help verify certain “regularities” among seemingly dissimilar cultural
events during a particular era, it is now clear that despite their opposite ideological and
theological natures, the genres in question resemble each other theoretically (if not
practically) when given a dialectical/Hegelian reading. Put another way, despite the clear
separation of the ultimate “punk” and “Christian” choices--nothingness versus
recapitulated bondage-the two groups’ distinct dialectical blossomings of selfconsciousness (again, each of which began in the context of a larger dialectical break or

negation of culture in the late-1960s) resemble each other both in form and content; both
lemain unhappy consciousness. For instance, the aesthetic punk negationists’ Stoic
disregard for material obstacles in creating art (their fancying of themselves as
musicians/artists in spite o f their lack of talent, training, and quality equipment) resembles
the Christian rocker’s uninhibited internal feelings of pure union with self-consciousness.
Rejecting Stoicism, then, Fugazi’s skeptical building of its own state and simple
whitewashing of the commercial record industry (making the lord “vanish” in Hegel’s
words) relates to Rez Band’s dismissal of Petra’s inner ecstasy in lieu of an “actual”
relationship of self-consciousness and Spirit via material works, praise, and thanksgiving
(making vanish the actual alienation of unessential and Absolute). Finally, Richard Hell’s
life of unhappy consciousness and material nothingness resembles Larry Norman’s
Flegelian “brooding over his own wretchedness” and dwelling upon Original Sin/Gnostic
alienation from Spirit.28
Thus despite the absence of any characteristic or empirical (i.e., more Marxian)
comparison of the two subcultures, it is clear that when these opposing negationist
movements are read concomitantly in theoretical terms their self-separation from each
other, as described in the first chapter, appears certainly ironic and perhaps
unsustainable. The difficulty of the groups’ opposition to each other is only
compounded when punk is described in religious terms. In other words, what has to this
point been ignored (naturally, it would seem, as the movement was just described as
having collectively opted out of Hegel’s search for Spirit) is the religiosity of punk rock.
But punk, this writer suggests, can be read in explicit religious terms; this preliminary
“synthesis”-punk form and Christian content-is the focus of the following chapter.

Ill
“WE DUG THIS NOISE FROM THE GOSPEL SOIL AT JONESTOWN”1
“Sometimes I feel like we’re the Shakers or the Amish or something.”
~ Ian MacKaye2
“I like the word fuck," announces the tom-shirted, spike-haired lead singer of A
Story Untold sardonically from the concrete floor that serves as his band’s stage, the last
notes of a recently finished song still fading out behind him. An audience of teenage
punks laughs, cheers, and shouts back at the singer. “This next song is about beer.”
More laughter and shouting. The irony of the situation is not lost on anyone: smirking
and gesturing toward the frameless portrait of Pope John Paul II hung mockingly on the
otherwise bare stone wall behind the band these fans acknowledge they are witnessing a
punk rock show in the dusty, unfinished basement of their small midwestern city’s
Knights of Columbus club, by day a brick-walled Roman Catholic fraternal organizationcum-tavern. As such, any gratuitous profanity and/or irreverence is applauded with great
vigor. The loud, fast, and mostly incoherent guitar music begins again suddenly, sending
the crowd, whose couture (and apparently attitude) mirrors that of the band, into a
chaotic and intense frenzy of movement and noise. Merely an instant from the first note
they are in another world, one ignorant of parents, teachers, or other representations of
authority; liberated of the boredom and banality that, to them at least, characterizes their
twenty first century American consumer culture. Ecstatic and free, the “moshing,”
saltating crowd becomes a sea of human pinballs. they are, to use something of a stale
shibboleth, in heaven.3
Its brief set complete: A Story Untold dismantles its amplifiers and cymbals only
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to see these implements replaced quickly by those of the ensuing act, If I Die, which
requests that all room lights be dimmed in lieu of the single blue-bulbed lantern it has
brought to play beneath. The five members of the young band, mop-haired and tornjeaned., pace apprehensively as a mostly (but not entirely) new crowd of teens slowly
files in past the first band’s fans, many of who are busy indulging in a collective smoke
outside the club. The new audience in place, a staccato drum beat begins as the If I Die
lead singer speaks: “Everyone in this room tonight: release yourself. Release yourself
from the crap that goes on in the world today,” he encourages the song builds. “Free
yourselves tonight!” The singer’s words get louder, slowly evolving into unintelligible
streams—the opening lyrics to “One World Contradiction,” the second track on the
band’s self-released They Hated Me Without Reason CD single. Deafening, caustic guitars
erupt and the train wreck is complete: ‘ I won’t take this world!” shouts the singer. From
the first chord to the last, each of the musicians flails and stomps aimlessly, pounding on
broken instruments and crashing, obliviously, into each other and the audience, which
seems to grow only more energized with each collision. The rapt crowd, now a blue
silhouette, is in another place as well. Some fans shout lyrics along with the singer; others
flail and dance; the rest simply watch and listen intently with the occasional bobbed head
or closed eyes. The music stops abruptly and the If I Die singer thanks the crowd
politely, announcing a few of the stops on his band’s forthcoming summer tour which
includes a July appearance at the Cornerstone Festival, an annual music event held in
Illinois, Florida, and North Carolina, respectively, and administered by Cornerstone
Magazine: although the casual listener could not have known based solely on the band s
music, If I Die, its name a less-than-subtle reference to the childrens’ bedtime prayer
containing the same words, is an evangelical Christian rock band.
The aesthetic description of these punk and Christian rock performances is

intended neither as gratuity nor irony. Rather, it helps establish the material context
under which these negationist musicians typically operate—a context, this chapter argues,
which cannot be fully understood apart from a discussion of religion and its related
phenomena. Indeed, from the songs of praise and communal prayer to the customary
end-of-set sermon, missionary call for the audience to “accept Jesus into their hearts,”
and even (as above) the ecstatic physical response of both musician and fan, the
religiosity of a Christian rock concert is obvious; that of punk is less so. Therefore,
beginning with both Alasdair MacIntyre’s early definition of religion and his suggestion
that Marxism can be understood as a secular movement that fills the role of not only
religion but Christianity for its adherents, a preliminary synthesis of the two genres is
offered below as the exploration of punk as a sort of “Christian” phenomenon is made.
That is, although its followers chose nothingness as opposed to Stoic Christian bondage
when confronted with Hegel’s forced choice, this chapter suggests that punk can be
interpreted as a subculture that still resembles Christianity, at least in terms of its
content, for the “secular” unhappy consciousness that has supposedly abandoned the
Hegelian reach for Spirit. Having established punk’s theoretical Christian religiosity, this
essay then investigates several performance-related “texts” that flesh out the suggestion
that punk rock operates not only in Christian terms, but specifically evangelical (and
loosely Pentecostal/Charismatic) Christian terms. Especially remarkable concerning punk
subculture in such terms is not only its attempt at the interpretation and transcendence of
material existence, but its treatment of performance as a type of religious service or
revival (replete with ecstatic dance, glossolalia, and sermonizing), its often dogmatic
devotion to specific ceremonial rules and traditions, its relation to the sublime or
“elevation of soul” originally described by Roman writer Longinus in the first century,
and (related to all of the above) even its ability to coerce the “conversion” experience from

audience members—all of which we have also seen in the Christian rock subculture.
A Working Definition of Religion
Like “punk,” there is no dearth of definitions for the word “religion.” Returning
to the OED we see but a few of the term’s myriad meanings: “A particular monastic or
religious order of rule”; “Action or conduct indicating a belief in, reverence for, and desire
to please a divine ruling power”; “A particular system of faith and worship”; and
“Devotion to some principle; strict fidelity or faithfulness; conscientiousness; pious
affection or attachment.” Of course, a glance through most any text dealing with religion
suggests that even Oxford’s many denotative definitions are inadequate—for centuries
countless philosophers, theologians, and anthropologists, have all articulated the term
distinctly. Freud called religion both an illusion and a neurosis;'1and William James, in his
seminal treatment of religious experience, considered religion “the feelings, acts, and
experiences o f individual men in their solitude, so far as they apprehend themselves to
stand in relation to whatever they may consider divine'" (31).
Given the term’s ambiguity' perhaps one decides which definition of religion to
adopt contextually. In keeping with this document’s dialectical superstructure, then, we
look first to Hegel. In general, Hegel, a trained theologian, saw his entire system as
theological in that it dealt with the historical development of Absolute. And because both
are concerned primarily with the search for Absolute, philosophy and religion are closely
related (in fact a chapter simply entitled “Religion” makes up a large portion of
Phenomenology' and is followed only by “Absolute Knowing” in the text). What
separates religion from philosophy, Hegel explained in his Philosophy o f Religion (lectures
first published in 1895), is not its content and function but its form. Whereas philosophy
reaches its conclusions through conceptual thought and reason, religion reaches similar
conclusions through more “primitive” forms such as faith, authority, and/or revelation.
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Consequently, philosophy largely (but not automatically) follows religion, historically
speaking, in any given culture or epoch: “The wealth of appearances of spirit,” writes
Hegel in Phenomenology, reaches “the ultimate truth initially in religion, and then in
science [again, Hegel's metonym for philosophy which is], the result of the whole” (qtd.
in Inwood, 218).
But even as philosophy “sublates” religion through the dialectical process, says
Hegel, religion is indispensable in that it it presents to masses of people certain truths, or
at least interpretations, about the universe and their place in it in an attractive, communal,
comprehensible form while philosophy is largely esoteric, cryptic, and individualistic.
Already in this notion of religion, which is admittedly nondescript (antediluvian
philosophy?), we can see Hegel’s phenomenological depiction of self-consciousness as
“desire in general.” Rather, for Hegel religion is a tool (in fact the only tool accessible to
the majority of people estranged from philosophy) to be employed toward fulfilling a
specific series of metaphysical desires (e.g., the desire to reach conclusions about
themselves and the nature if being, and the desire to transcend the corporeal realm and
unite with Absolute).
Standing Hegel on his head and reclaiming religion for the world of material rather
than of mind/spirit, of course, was Karl Marx, whose comments on religion are infamous:
“the opium of the people” (27). This specific pharmacological metaphor (from the 1844
introduction to his “Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right”) retains
Hegel’s description of the aim of religion (to fulfill desire), but rejects his romantic and
heady abstractions, asserting “man makes religion; religion does not make man” (26). As
a result, Marx’s comments are usually inteipreted as his full condemnation of religious
belief—his derision of faith as a red herring-conjured up to appease those confined to a
dismal material existence. Too often, however, those who casually cite this line in either

print or speech fail to quote the lines that immediately precede it: “Religious suffering is
at the same time an expression of real suffering and a protest against real suffering.
Religion is the sigh of the oppressed creature, the sentiment of a heartless world, and the
soul of soulless conditions” (26-27). With these words Marx sounds almost
sympathetic—if still critical, which he certainly was, calling the criticism of religion the
beginning of all criticism and intentionally invoking the above anaesthetic analogy-toward
those who are driven to religion for the alleviation of earthly poverty and pain. What he
lacks in belief, rather, he makes up for with a definite, empathic regard for the
psychological need for religion “on the ground.” Indeed, Hegel and Marx are united at
least in that they understand religion as a phenomenon that fills a human need—helps
satisfy desire-for masses of unhappy people; one simply speaks in abstract cognitive
terms while the other in material terms.
Recognizing this and synthesizing Hegel and Marx, then, was MacIntyre, who in
Marxism and Christianity (1953) too describes religion primarily in material terms as that
which provides for humankind “an interpretation of human existence by means of which
men may situate themselves in the world and direct their actions to ends that transcend
those offered by their immediate situation” (2). MacIntyre makes this statement,
however, as a thinker who at the time of the text’s composition “aspired to be both a
Christian and a Marxist” (vii). Thus Marx’s critical, but nuanced, position was important
to MacIntyre, in other words, who, having accepted Hegel’s Christian metaphysic,
attempts to reconcile with Christianity Marx’s critical and material apperception of
religion as necessary given the abysmal nature of existence and Marxism’s potential for
positive social change. He thus links Marx’s sympathy for the oppressed and
predilection for material with Hegel’s more abstract notion of desire and Spirit (not to
mention his historicism) to suggest that religion, and specifically Christianity, is neither
126

mere opiate nor simply a superstitious and primitive version of philosophy that reaches
conclusions through revelation and faith, but a living system that actively works toward
the transformation of a bleak material existence.
Since the Enlightenment, however, Christianity has been in decline, notes
MacIntyre. But instead of replacing Christianity with Reason as was its goal, the
Enlightenment—reified in the French Revolution—replaced Christianity with nothing for
the hulk of Europe. The scratchy residue of this hollow transaction can be seen even
today, having been quite literally set in stone: there is, for instance, a building along Rue
Saint-Severin in Paris where an eighteenth century thoroughfare marker carved into the
building’s exterior has been modified by zealous French revolutionaries to read simply
Rue Severin, the “Saint” bluntly chiseled away and leaving behind a literal cavity, a
conspicuous emptiness, where Christianity used to be. This artifact, this crude forced
removal of religion from French culture, which writer Sarah Vowell accurately calls a
“breathtaking metaphorical jackpot” (32), paves the way for MacIntyre’s suggestion that
with the waning of Christianity in the West secular movements have increasingly been
called upon to fill the jagged void, to perform the role of religion for both individuals and
groups. And according to MacIntyre, one specific “secular theology,” not surprisingly
given the subject and title of his text, has filled the void left by the Enlightenment:
Marxism.
At this point a caveat is in order. As MacIntyre admits, advancing “Marxism,”
especially a Christian Marxism, was not easy in the 1950s, a decade dominated by Cold
War paranoia at home and abroad and Senator Joseph McCarthy’s anticommunist
zealotry.5 Indeed, whether the political communisms of Lenin or Mao (the basis of which
were Marxian philosophy) or the more academic “Marxisms” of the likes of Lukacs,
Bakhtin, Adorno, Althusser, and the early Sidney Hook, the bulk of twentieth century
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America has looked with disdain upon any social or political philosophy that advocates
any vaguely Marxian (anticapitalist) sentiment. But despite egregious, and often
mischaracterizing, attacks upon Marxism in the West, the social philosophy that began
with Karl Marx is still—even in the twenty first century-defended with vigor by a diverse
cabal of social and economic equity advocates and those who recognize that, as Marx once
wrote, in direct response to Hegel, “It is not the consciousness of men that determines
their being, but, on the contrary, their social being determines their consciousness” (51).
MacIntyre’s own Marxism in the text in question, then, must not be reduced to and
(mis)understood in terms of “communism,” but grasped as a social and historical theory
that emphasizes the role conditions, contingency, and experience have on the
development of one’s consciousness (and is ineluctably linked, frustratingly for Marx, to
Hegel’s dialectical method). Such is the position of this thesis.
Thus MacIntyre proposes two theses by which Marxism may be understood as
filling the role of not only religion in general, but Christianity specifically in the West.
The broader or “weaker” thesis, that Marxism “inherited some of the functions of
religion, without inheriting any of the content” (6), was the traditional Marxist’s take c n
his own movement. What weakens this thesis is that it is typically advanced by those
whose understanding of Feuerbach and Hegel, to whom Marx is often responding either
directly or indirectly, is incomplete. Rather, both Feuerbach and Hegel saw Christianity
as “correct in content, mistaken in its form” (27), says MacIntyre; this is Marx reversed.
“The stronger thesis is that Marxism just is a religion or at least a theology, even if an
atheistic one” (5), which, perceiving the poverty and despair of humankind, too strives
vociferously both to interpret and improve its material existence and social being. In
other words, from its ultimate concern, to borrow from Paul Tillich, with human
alienation and objectification to its refusal of existing material conditions and its

utopian/eschatological predilections, Christianity served as a paradigm for Marx: “Both
Marxism and Christianity rescue individual lives from the insignificance of finitude (to use
an Hegelian expression) by showing the individual that he has or can have some role in a
world-historical drama” (112). Or, as Weinstein explains, “For MacIntyre, Marxism fills
die same human needs as religion. In addition to relying upon Christian themes, it seeks
to provide the same meaning and the same soothing promise” (20).6 As a result, says
MacIntyre, Marxism serves as the historical successor of Christianity in that as an
interpretation of existence it—despite its secularism—recapitulates “both the content and
the functions of Christianity” (6).
MacIntyre’s thesis is provocative, but his reading of Hegel, with whom he begins,
is curious. Indeed, as we have seen, reading Phenomenology in isolation it would appear
that Hegel was in fact sympathetic to Christianity in both form (e.g., triadic) and content,
advocating such a “mediated” and “bound” metaphysic (despite MacIntyre’s suggestion
of the reverse above) and joining the Lutheran church. To be fair, however, one suspects
that as a committed self-critic MacIntyre would reject in full his early hypothesis today
(written at the tender age of twenty-tliree); in his ongoing struggle against dominant
philosophical trends he has revised his position more than once, and as early as the 1968
edition of Marxism and Christianity admits to being at that time “skeptical of both” (vii).7
Thus the accuracy of MacIntyre’s scholarship in 1953 is less important here than his
dialectical treatment of the subjects in question and his chief suggestion that secular social
or philosophical movements, and Marxism in particular, fill, for masses of people, the
space once occupied by religion (by which he means Christianity) but left void by the
Enlightenment.
Restoring punk to the debate, then, the earlier Hegelian reading has already
described how adherents of this subculture, in contrast with their Christian rock
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counterparts, have abandoned Hegel’s Christian metaphysic and the search for Spirit. As
a result of this rejection, however, punks’ various metaphysical desires remain unfulfilled:
punks are still dissatisfied with their material existence and seek placation in the face of
universal human needs, including recognition of self and a sense of “freedom” (e.g., from
bondage, despair, or alienation). Thus the author of this paper now suggests, following
Marx and MacIntyre, that even those who have supposedly abandoned Spirit are still
searching for meaning, freedom, and the transcendence of their immediate situation; they
only do so through secular (and in this case musical) means. After all, as even the
unhappiest of unhappy punk consciousnesses Richard Hell admits, “rock ’n’ roll is the
frontier of consciousness” (qtd. in Bangs, 265). And for the individuals in question who
have refused Hegel, then, it is punk subculture itself that has “replaced” religion, and
specifically Christianity, for its post-Enlightenment adherents while performing the same
role.8 In other words, the traditionally atheist/agnostic punk subculture has become a
place where the unhappy consciousness can reify its refusal of the master and find a sort
of abstract freedom through the interpretation of its existence and direction of its actions
to ends that transcend those offered by its material conditions (perhaps even catching, as
we shall see, a glimpse of the Infinite), all in remarkably “Christian” ways.
This is not to suggest that punk must be inevitably seen as “Marxist.” After all,
as the first chapter noted, punk and anticommercialism do not coincide inexorably. For
instance, cynical nihilist punks are not necessarily, perhaps rarely, anticapitalist
ideologues. Likewise, materialist exploitation is observable in many “punk” versions of
American culture; for instance, there is “punk” pornography. However, it should be
noted that both Greil Marcus and Stacy Thompson have already interpreted punk in
Marxian terms. In Punk Productions (2004) Thompson offers a “materialist investigation
of punk economics” (2), which frames punk as a movement which, beyond mere cultural
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negation, takes Marx’s Eleventh Thesis on Feuerbach as a sober, foundational cal! to
action: “Punks want to change the world, and many believe that what most needs to be
changed is capitalism” (3).’ And although Thompson is perhaps overdetermined in his
rendering of all punk as Marxian, his point is well made if we remember MacIntyre and
the fact that from its origins to the present, punk subculture—whether negationist, nihilist,
Marxian, or any combination of these—typically maintains a documented awareness of
and opposition to human alienation (from self, Spirit, and/or other self-consciousness)
and objectification (as expressed in lyrics, “zines,” behavior, and ideology); tends both to
reject existing material conditions (hence their negation of culture) and consider experience
the source of social being and the grounds for their punk affiliation; often makes
eschatological comments in lyrics and interviews (e.g., Johnny Rotten’s screams of “no
future”); and, as Thompson argues, often rejects consumer (capitalist) culture.
Moreover. Marcus has already linked punk, Christianity, and Marxism, calling
punk (which he says descended from the typically—if not predominantly—Marxian
Dadaists and Situationists) a “secret society” akin to Christian gnosticism and tracing Sex
Pistols singer John Lydon to not only sixteenth century “heretics” Thomas Meuntzer (of
whom Friedrich Engels was reportedly a fan10) and Jotin of Leyden, but Dadaism (“a
religion...spawn of ancient heresies,” 238), Lettrism (“systematized dada,” 256), and “the
false dominican” Michel Mourre who on 9 April 1950 crashed the Notre-Dame Easter
mass pronouncing the death of God."
For Marcus, the “gnostic myth” (reified by the Marxian Dadaists, Lettrists,
Situationists, and punks) was “the conviction that there was something in the twentieth
century that could never be understood or controlled” (242). Chapter two already
critiqued Marcus’ reading of gnosticism, of course, and, indeed, it is hardly an
exaggeration to call Marcus’ vague and conflationary description of gnosticism
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“preposterous" as doe^ Lehmann; Marcus is likewise wan in his application of Marxism.
But throughout his lengthy argument Marcus too is thinking in terms of dialectical
materialism, and his references to Marx (and precious few references to Hegel) and even
gnosticism serve his purpose of punctuating the role alienation—which chapter two has
also discussed and Weinstein (20) too labels a form of original sin-played in Dada/punk’s
“gnostic” constitution. As Marcus adds in the context of Dada/'punk but clearly thinking
of Marx,
The ultimate justification of social control in the modem world was
ancient: human beings were sinners, and that was why there was *vil and
suffering on earth. Human beings were sinners because Original Sin had
separated them from God; in that separation was the ubiquity and
permanence of sin, its guarantee as the first principle of human life. This
was the source of all other separations: patriarchy, authority, hierarchy,
the division of humanity into rulers and ruled, owners and workers, the
separation of every individual from everyone else, of oneself from oneself.
But gnosticism, in its countless forms, over thousands of years, had
always denied that any of this was so. There was no necessary separation
of human beings from God, the gnostics said, because even as God created
human beings, human beings created God, and whoever achieved this
knowledge became ‘not a Christian, but a Christ.’ (Marcus 242-43).
Such a conflation of Marx, punk, Dada, and gnosticism is problematic, and
Lehmann is correct is criticizing this definition of gnosticism and Marcus’ casual
application of gnosticism to “every avant-garde impulse, beginning with the [Protestant]
Reformation and the French Revolution” and even Marxism. Nevertheless, remembering
Drane’s generalized description of gnosticism as dualistic at its core, as “the belief that
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the created world was evil, and was totally separate from and in opposition to the world
of spirit/’ the connection of gnosticism and world-negat'ng punk (and Marx by proxy) is
tenable. For like MacIntyre, Marcus is asserting that secular movement?—Dada,
Situationism, Marxism, and especially punk—can and often do resemble religious
institutions such as Gnostic Christianity at least in content (if not form) in that they help
the “irreligious’’ (i.e., those who have abandoned Hegel at the stage of unhappy
consciousness) understand and/or transcend the nothingness of material existence and
become active subjects of history as opposed 10 remaining inert objects. In this sense
Marcus is interpreting punk in predominantly Marxian terms as a sort of secular,
materialist’s gnosticism, as a “religion” for those who have refused alienation, a vapid
consumer culture, and Hegel’s slavish Christian metaphysic.
Thus can punk subculture be read as “religious” or as replacing religion in general
theoretical terms in that it provides the unhappy punk consciousness an interpretation of
its existence and allows consciousness to direct its actions (whether suicide, sociopolitical
protest, or the general aesthetic negation of one’s despised parent culture) in a way that
helps it transcend its immediate situation. It does this in ways both empirical and
theoretical. Thinking first empirically, like traditional religion, punk subculture provides
for the unhappy consciousness not only a like-minded community of peers with which to
commiserate, but and an entire set of identifiable traditions, rituals, codes, and even
“origin myths” designed to help the adherent navigate and interpret existence, distinguish
insider from outsider, and overcome the prosaicism of everyday being. We thus return to
Hebdige who as early as 1979 suggested, “The punk subculture, then, signified chaos at
every level, but this was only possible because the style itself was so thoroughly
ordered” (113). Hebdige is referring specifically to the homological unity of late-1970s
British punk subculture: the exotic hair (or lack of it), tom clothes, obscenity, artless
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dancing (discussed in detail below), violence, and “self-consciously profane” aesthetic all
contributed to the subculture's almost dogmatic orthodoxy—despite its repeated claims of
disorder and calls for anarchy.
Indeed, so serious are the more zealous members of punk subculture about their
various codes today that bands and fans must acknowledge “punk dogma,” as it were, to
remain part of the community—for whether the rule in question involves style, politics,
economics, or sound, any transgression is often met with excommunication (as in the case
of Berkeley punk band Green Day). Even punk space is considered sacred as various
legendary—and usually tiny—concert venues (e.g., CBGB’s in New York or 924 Gilman in
Berkeley) have developed a Graceland quality of sorts and have been enshrined by fans,
countless numbers of who pilgrimage to these sites each year to simply see or enter these
“holiest of holies.”
One especially extreme example of punk dogmatism is “Straight Edge,” a sect
within hardcore that began in Washington D.C. the early-1980s and takes its negationism
to a literal monastic extreme, encouraging (and occasionally violently enforcing)
teetotalism and the avoidance of stimulants of any kind (e.g., cigarettes, narcotics, and
even caffeine). Their bodies a Temple, some Straight Edge communities—which, in
contrast with other punk communities, consist predominantly of males—have stiffened
the code to stress a vegan diet and sexual abstinence, leading punk and author Craig
O’Hara to call Straight Edge a “Puritan” movement that has resulted in punk bands and
fans becoming “increasingly reactionary” (146). Such asceticism alarms former Dead
Kennedys singer Jello Biafra too, who puts Straight Edge punks’ “sectarian purity” in
brazenly religious terms: “It’s the same kind of fundamentalist mind-set that makes
fundamentalist Christians so dangerous” (Sinker, We Owe You Nothing 44). So zealous
about “clean living”—some might call this orthodoxy—are some Straight Edge advocates, in
134

fact, that they eventually join more traditional religious movements. For instance, John
Porcelly and Ray Cappo, founders of New York Straight Edge band Youth of Today
(whose record label, it should be noted was Revelation Records), became Hare Krishna
and changed their names to Paramananda and Raghunath, respectively, following the slow
dissolution of their band in the early-1990s.
It is hardly useful, however, to speak of punk as simply “religious” in vague,
generalized, and even qualitative terms, for the same association could be made, as Frith
suggests, to any music genre (or even non-musical subculture, e.g., Boston Red Sox fans)
with a robust fan base, sacred spaces, and set of ideological and behavioral rules.
Following MacIntyre’s treatment of Marxism, then, this thesis theorizes punk less as
“religious” in general than as having found a specific paradigm in the Christian metaphysic
of Hegel (at least in terms of content) despite their ultimate rejection of his form. To
qualify this theory we turn specifically to a reading of the punk concert and its relation to
the Christian worship service. Of course Christian denominations vary greatly in their
specific services and rites; therefore this author means not to suggest that punk concerts
follow any particular service identically (e.g., the Roman Catholic mass), but that punk
performances resemble a sort of generalized evangelical Pentecostal or Charismatic service
or “revival,” characterized not only by songs, sermons, and Biblical orthodoxy, but
glossolalia (the “speaking in tongues” that comes with spiritual seizure), an ecstatic
corporeal fervency (and occasionally the loss of consciousness), and a metaphorical and
redemptive employment of Violence.12
The Performance Ritual
The comparison of rock concert and religious event is nothing new, of course.
Speaking in general terms, noted comparative religion scholar William McLoug’nlin in 1979
suggested, “rock concerts...deserve comparisons to the old camp meetings, where people
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entered into a special arena of religious enthusiasm with like-minded souls seeking release
from confusion and ready to ie t loose’ in orgies of emotional enthusiasm” (208). And as
the first chapter has already shown, the religiosity of secular (and especially music-based)
groups comes as no surprise to many Christians—Catholic and Protestant alike—who were
concerned with the effect rock concerts in particular were having on youth as early as the
1950s; the secular religiosity of a rock and roll concert was apparent from the genre’s
beginning as the late Reverend David Noebel, among others, repeatedly suggested, ergo his
rejection of rock as idolatrous and antiChristian. In fact rock concerts moved beyond
simple idolatry and the usurpation of Christian authority in postwar America,
conservative Christians such as Noebel feared, in that they promoted aberrant sorts of
behavior in heretofore Christian concertgoers that might easily evolve into psychological
neuroses, if not full-blown atheism:
Rock ‘n’ roll is...a cumulative, tension-producing stimulus. Teenagers are
thrown into a tremendous frenzy as the tension is built up through the
beat of the drum and other instruments, and it is just such ?, stimulation of
tension that is causing many teenagers to -offer artificial!;

!

neurosis. In pre-Freudian terminology, the disease would be termed
neurasthenia and hysteria. [...] From this description there seems to be
little doubt that...rock ‘n’ roll “concerts” are producing this behavior!
{Rhythm, Riots and Revolution, 87)
A more theoretical reading of this so-called neurotic response to rock music is made
below; for now, however, it must be noted Noebel—who later suggests that the Beatles
were “religiously capable of wreaking havoc” in America (95) by virtue of their
performances which resembled an “old, down-by-the-river religious pitch a thousand
times magnified” (108)—is valuable in that he considered Karl Marx the very source of
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this antiChristian music. Calling the Beatles, Rolling Stones, Fugs, Bob Dylan, and many
other 1960s rock acts communists out to hypnotize American teenagers to revolt against
authority, that is, Noebel cites the philosopher countless times in his writings and at one
tr

point refers to Marx as a “pseudo-savior” (24) whose communism was a cancerous threat
to the American way of life. Thus Noebel epitomizes the postwar conservative
evangelical Christian’s very frightened sense that rock concerts would bring about not
only the corruption of American youth in psychological terms, but also represented a
secular threat (proffered in the guise of religion) to the Christian faith and America itself.
Noebel’s worst fear of a “Soviet America” failed to materialize, of course; but for
all his political and religious zealotry, he was accurate in explaining rock concerts in
religious terms and finding in Marxism, as did MacIntyre, “secular religion.” At this
point, then, the punk performance is interpreted as a secular version of an evangelical
Pentecostal service (of which Noebel, too, was apparently suspicious) wherein the
sociopolitical (and often ethical) commentary so common to the punk stage reminds the
hearer of the bully pulpit; the enthusiastic movement and dancing of a Pentecostal revival
or Shaker service can be read as the punk’s “pogo-” or “slam-dancing”; the Christian's
redemptive, sacrificial violence (e.g., “the blood of Christ” or “Jesus died for your sins”)
takes the punk form of a necessary redemptive violence committed against oneself or
others during conceits; and the caterwauling, incoherent punk lyrics invoke glossolalia.
We begin the analysis of punk performance as religious service with a quote from
Village Voice columnist Tom Carson, who in l c>83 wrote of Minor Threat’s Ian MacKaye
and the Dead Kennedys’ Jello Biafra,
Because [punk’s] reason for being isn’t taste or even sensibility but first
and foremost no-way-out spiritual need, it’s less music as religion than
religion as music. Ian MacKaye respects hardcore liturgy because he
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believes in its necessity. Like his West Coast counterpart, Jello Biafra,
he’s not just the frontman for his band but the organizer and main
spokesperson for a whole community and he’s committed to his flock
above all. (qtd. in Andersen, 147)
Although MacKaye would reject the metaphor that casts him as any sort of cleric or
metonym for the punk whole (the jury is still out on Biafa), Carson’s reading is a
poignant assessment of punk subculture, and these two singers especially, whose verbose
nature, compassion 1'or both friends and enemies, and commitment to changing their
immediate social situation is evident both in album lyrics and on stage. We look
specifically to MacKaye.
“I read the paper the other day about some young men, some ‘boys,’ who were
beating up gay men in the park,” explains a dripping, shirtless MacKaye (making
quotation mark motions in the air with his fingers upon uttering “boys”) in between songs
at a 1988 Fugazi performance. “Let me tell you now: I don’t give a fuck what vou are,
but you do not beat up people ior Deing gay. You do not beat up people for being black.
You do not beat up people for being women. YOU DO NOT BEAT UP PEOPLE
period” (Instrument). The engaged crowd of perhaps fifty persons, hanging on
MacKaye’s every word and momentarily static, cheers and—having seen the direction
their leader was going—even shouts MacKaye’s final sentence along with him as the
reluctant preacher provides a sort of contemporary “Sermon Under the Mount” at what
appears a cramped basement concert. Indeed, much in the way a traveling evangelist,
Bible in hand, visits town after town spreading the good news, so too does the itinerant
punk performer, guitar in hand, spread the punk gospel to social misfits, exiles, and
alienated sinners in dilapidated warehouse clubs, smokey bars, and unfinished basements.
And although the songs performed at a punk concert retain their own meaning and
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message, they are nothing one cannot get at home listening to a record; therefore what
distinguishes the concert from an album is not only the communal nature of the event, an
atmosphere that allows the crowd to interact with hot' “the preacher” and like-minded
followers, but the “sermon” so common to many punk shows which often—certainly not
always-assumes an ethical posture: “Hey! Don’t fucking kick people and don’t punch
people. And I’m talking to you, all right?” MacKaye chides those in his own audience
and singling out two especially aggressive fans (during a different performance than the
one described above). “It sucks to have to tell people to behave themselves, but there’s
[sic] other people here too, all right? So try to be a little more kind” (Instrument). This
writer himself has in fact seen MacKaye pull a markedly belligerent “fan” from the
audience, put him in a headlock, and make a spectacle of forcing an apolog;
to those in the audience he was mistreating

. uic fan

e thy neighbor, indeed.

the comparison of MacKaye to Christian preacher is certainly ironic in that as a
lifelong critic of organized religion, he has done his best to avoid such institutions. But
religion, it would appear, is in his blood: MacKaye’s father, former religion editor for the
Washington Post, was, as MacKaye puts it, “a theological kind of fellow” (Sinker, We
Owe You Nothing 26), and attended seminary before dropping out to marry MacKaye’s
mother. Thus as Michael Azerrad quips, “His upbringing may be why although
MacKaye held a staunch antiestablishment stance, his most deeply held ideas had strong
connections to the best aspects of Christian morality” (135). Azerrad is referring to
MacKaye’s days with the Straight Edge band Minor Threat, which is credited with
starting the aforementioned movement; “Straight Edge” was originally the title of a Minor
Threat song wherein MacKaye, the song’s author, puts his foot down on the licentious
underground: “I’m a person just like you / but I’ve got better things to do / than sit
around and fuck my head / hang out with the living dead / snort white shit up my nose /
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pass out at shows / 1 don’t even think about speed / it something I just don’t need / I’ve
got straight edge."13 Or, as Washington D.C. punk Mark Sullivan once pul it, “Ian's not a
religious person, but he behaves like one” (qtd. in Azerrad, 135).
Such sociopolitical commentary and direct interaction with the crowd is not
unique to bands fronted by MacKaye as the punk audiences of any Bad Religion, Clash,
Dead ’

.icdys, Crass, Anti-Flag, or Bikini Kill concert (among many others) can attest;

as Sex Pistols manager Malcolm McLaren once put it, “The Clash could lecture you for
hours” (“Punk and History”). And while the topic in question may vary, what
distinguishes the punk concert from rock and roll proper (and links it with Christian rock
and the evangelical tent or convention hall service) is the direct, unfiltered interaction
between band and its “followers,” and the suggestion that change can and should occur in
a material sense. This is not to say that all punk preachers are offering positive, ethical
sermons to their audiences; some of Johnny Rotten’s final words to an audience as a Sex
Pistol during the band’s final show in San Francisco included: “Kill someone. Kill
yourself. Be a man: kill yourself....” (Great Rock ‘n ’Roll Swindle). But even in such
cases the audience is looking to the “spiritual leader” for advice and commentary on how
to interpret, transcend, or change their immediate material situation. Some preachers
simply, as the Branch Davidians and residents of Jonestown and knew all to well,
advocate suicide and/or violence as the most appropriate choice given the circumstances.
In between lectures, of course, bands do perform actual songs; and as has already
been discussed as typical to the punk style, these songs are traditionally performed at
deafening volumes with lyrics that are typically shouted, screamed, and barked with
impunity, leading now to a comparison of the punk’s shrieked incoherent lyrics to the
seized revival Christian’s glossolalia.
With all due respect to the distinct metaphysics of the t vo types of babbling, the
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union of punk screaming and glossolalia is appropriate in that the respective incoherencies
seem to come from a similar emotional place in the speaker. In other words, much in the
way the ecstatic Christian (or, more specifically, minister if the comparison is to be
parallel) is “seized by Spirit” during a service, so too the punk performer is seized by the
sound, volume, and speed of her music, and the sight of an eager (and perhaps agitated)
audience mere feet away. Both responses are specific to the event in question and occur
only in an especial context-during the emotionally charged communal event replete with
song, fervent dance, and a general air of elated anticipation and release.14 There is perhaps
no better and readily available example of this than several of the performances
(especially those of the Germs and Black Flag) captured on Penelope Spheeris’s
aforementioned documentary of the early Los Angeles punk scene The Decline o f Western
Civilization (1981) wherein the bands’ performances--which are utterly incoherent—are
subtitled for the viewer. And although one would be remiss not to acknowledge that in
the punk context such inarticulate singing is perhaps coaxed along by various illicit
substances (or at the very least alcohol), the comparison of punk screaming to speaking in
longues is suitable as far as it is also not unreasonable to suggest that those who are, in
their own minds, seized by Spirit during the Pentecostal revival are, as James Brown once
put it, “high on God.” In other words, whether induced by music, narcotics, or “Spirit”
the psychological or emotional boost given the fan can lead to a similar result:
incoherence. Moreover, remembering the Straight Edge punks, dozens of punk bands
over the decades have managed to make their impassioned, blazingly sung lyrics
completely inarticulate without the aid of mind-altering chemicals, seemingly “taken” by
the moment and the event itself.
Thinking in terms of punk music’s velocity and the performance context’s
heightened atmosphere, then, much as the committed evangelist is so certain of the truths
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he wishes to impart from the pulpit, so intoxicated by the opportunity to spread the
gospel to “the unsaved,” that he becomes a sort of Christian auctioneer in his delivery, the
punk too considers his negationist message unfailingly vital and in need of an efficient,
quick dissemination to her respective audience. As a result, the speed with which many
punk (or more specifically hardcore) songs are performed and the lyrics delivered
becomes requisite and turns the singer into an exhilarated, garruiuus messenger. Bad
Religion’s Greg Graffin, for instance, prattles off a paragraph’s worth of words (163 to be
exact) in all of fifty seven seconds on “The Positive Aspect of Negative Thinking” (from
the band’s 1990 album Against the Grain).'* Thus does the speed of the music and the
difficult-to-discern lyrics take on a more purposive and perhaps necessary meaning:
punks are transmitting what they consider their version of the “Word of God,” or,
remembering Tom Carson, “hardcore liturgy” to an absorbed flock of believers. To
deliver such a priceless, life-altering message casually, indifferently, or lethargically would
itself be a sacrilege.
Glossolalia aside, the reader will recall this chapter’s expository introduction,
specifically the description of the audience’s physical response to punk music.
Remembering, too, this chapter’s prefatory quotation it is hard not to read punk’s
ecstatic and chaotic “pogo-” or “slam-dancing”—energetic types of movement specific to
and/or induced by the concert event—as akin to the enthusiastic physical movement (or
seizure) and ritualized dancing so common at a tent revival or Shaker service, respectively.
As an unidentified punk suggests in the context of a punk performance: “It’s hardcore.
You dance at hardcore shows and fucking have fun, go off [the edge] and shit”
(Instrument). This punk is likely referring to the form of locomotion once described by
Washington Post writer Richard Harrington as a “ritual of resistance” (qtd. in Andersen,
92) wherein participants simply “mosh” around the venue floor, throwing arms and
142

elbows at will and smashing into each other in line with the music or bounce around
aimlessly as would a pogo stick (often the punks’ fervency of dance, it should be noted,
is related to the volume and speed of the song performed).
Such intense movement—a sort of external ization of what the music can be read as
doing to the listener internally—is certainly not limited to the audience, of course, for
punk bands themselves are often so active and maladroit in their movement, so absorbed
by the music, that their instrumentation suffers (see, among countless others, the likes of
Fugazi, Bad Brains, the Germs, Black Flag, and even the Stooges and Sex Pistols).16 Rites
of Spring, a legendary Washington D.C. band often credited with inventing “emo” (a
strand of punk that couples aggressive punk beats and shrieking guitars with “heartfelt”
lyrics and emotive, at times even tearful, performances) acknowledged the connection of
punk dance and religious rite in their cathartic song “End on End,” the album version of
which concludes with an audio clip, whose source is nowhere given, that invokes the
dance-ritual association: “...the wise elders, seated in a circle, watching a young girl dance
herself to death. They were sacrificing her to propitiate the god of spring.” This bit
concludes a restless and abrasive seven minute track that begins with singer Guy
Picciotto’s almost embarrassed admission of emotional—perhaps even spiritualdisorientation (“I’ve had days of end on end / When nothing changed because nothing ever
began / Restless movement in an empty room / Gathering shadows of a darkened blue /
And Oh! It feels so strange when it comes again”), but ends with his finding a sense of
peace and calm: “But I’ve got it now / I’ve got the rhythm down / Cycles of end on end.”
Picciotto finds peace of mind, this song’s salvific performance suggests though the music-and specifically dance-particular to his punk subculture. “The shows were always
‘events’ for us,” Picciotto, who was notorious for his hapless flailing on stage, later
remarked of his years with Rites of Spring. “We treated them almost like religious
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occasions’" (qtd. in Andersen, 166). Indeed, one need not have seen Piccotto perform to
get this sense; the suggestion that his performances recall religious dance and a sort of
ritualized expurgation conies through in his bands’ recordings: each track on their selftitled album (1985) suggests an almost palpable urgency and cathartic transcendenceeven in the recording studio. Simply listening to the album, that is, one can visualize
Picciotto’s sinewy frame bouncing off walls, amplifiers, and bandmates before collapsing
to the floor amid microphone cords, sweat, and debris, fully spent and purged of his
transgressions, pure again.
Not surprisingly, such fervent movement at punk concerts often results in
violence, as MacKaye has already shown us above; moreover, the violence itself is often
ineluctably linked to punks’ aggressive and cathartic style of dance. This we have already
seen in the descriptions of dance and analyses of Black Flag and other hardcore bands’
performances; Spheeris and Temple too show us repeated acts of punk-on-punk danceviolence in their films. But whence this aggression and what “higher purpose” or meaning
does it serve? To begin, it must be made clear that this violence is more than mindless
riot-mongering or tribal thuggery; rather it is, this author proposes, purposive in that it a
contains a certain redemptive value for both the individual and the g*oup not unlike the
Christian’s sacrificial violence wherein the contemporary belief community is “saved” or
redeemed of their sins by virtue of the ritualized offering of Christ, the slaughtered “lamb
of God.” Many Christian denominations both Protestant and Catholic, of course, even
take this ritual to the level of symbolized cannibalism via the consumption of the
representative “body and blood” of the sacrificed lamb.
Cannibalism aside, for punks violence “redeems” both the community of punks
and the individuals involved in a similar—yet much more literal—way as the Christian in
that the punk self-consciousness is “saved” of the life of material nothingness it has
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chosen through the regular, ritualized sacrifice of self that comes with putting one’s own
physical well-being on the line (specifically during the punk performance; this author
makes no claims for the redemptive value of violence that occurs outside of the sacred
event). Whereas the less charitable critic might read in the punk’s concert violence a sort
of careless nihilism or solipsism, a brute :mimalism, the Hegelian sees dialectically
significant-even necessary-engagements. Through slant-dancing as a group and more
localized contests between individual punks, in other words, reified is Hegel’s description
of the requisite physical battle between negative self-consciousnesses (the master-slave
dialectic) wherein self-consciousness stakes its physical life in order to prove its disregard
for its finite, material self. Through this physical conflict, the unhappy selfconsciousness is able to establish its independence of both the Other and the self in
material terms, and, as a result, theoretically sublate the nothingness of existence and
demonstrate its allegiance to Spirit autonomous of Hegel’s broader Christian metaphysic.
Thus the punk self-consciousness redeems itself of its nullity and establishes its
independence and selfhood—its theoretical “freedom”—validating the punk community’s
collective refusal of Hegel’s recapitulated Stoic bondage.17
These are but a few of the ways in which the punk performance in particular
recalls the content of the Pentecostal Christian’s service in general. To conclude the
reading of punk performance, then we linger briefly on the discussion of dance-violence.
As Francis Sparshott explains, “Dance, then, is a mode of behaviour in which people put
themselves rhythmically into motion in a way that transforms their sense of their own
existence” (qtd. in Frith, 220). And whether such a transformation is made in the context
of punk music or a Pentecostal service, the result is the same: the “movement” of the
listener not only in physical terms, but psychological terms as well (perhaps validating
Rev. Noebel’s fears). And given the theoretical similarities between punk concert and
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Christian religious service, it perhaps comes as no surprise to learn that many punk fans,
attending what we are calling religious revivals held in sanctified spaces, are moved
“outside of themselves” at punk concerts, moved to that desired transcendence of a
material world punks are so intent on negating, moved to the sublime. It is thus through a
reading of the sublime that MacIntyre’s description of religion as that which helps the
individual transcend his immediate situation is illuminated more fully and the
juxtaposition of punk and Christian rock, which now returns to this thesis for the sublime
concerns it as well, most appropriate.
The Sublime
Having described punk as a movement that performs the role of religion for its
adherents and seen how the punk concert in particular retains Christian content, modeling
specific aspects of an evangelical Pentecostal service, we can now see how although punk
and Christian rockers are traditionally theological opposites (and we are here still thinking
in Hegelian terms), their art also moves both the genres’ musicians and especially their
traditionally (self-) marginalized audiences, as the introductory anecdotes attempt to
illustrate, in a similar way: to that ineffable, mystical, and possibly spiritual moment of
sorts, an encounter with the sublime. It is their music and its performance, in other
words, that allows these teens (and occasional twenty-somethings) to transcend what
they perceive as a humdrum, marginalized, alienated, disposable, and maybe even
evil/contemptible mainstream existence, if only for a moment. Acknowledging ihe recent
work that has been done on the sublime in the context of popular music culture by
Toynbee et al, a finer understanding of the sublime is here required. Rather than applying
more traditional descriptions of the sublime (e.g., Kant and Burke) to popular music, that
is, following a brief genealogy of the sublime a less canonical—Hegelian-reading of the
“pop sublime” is proposed as exclusive to the punk and Christian rock music listeners.
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First the sublime’s critical origins.
With a suggested composition date of approximately 100 C.E., Longinus’ treatise
on the sublime, Peri Hupsos (On Sublimity), first detailed the effect that passion and
grandeur in oration and specifically poetry could have on the listener. “For grandeur
produces ecstasy rather than persuasion in the hearer;” says Longinus, explaining exactly
why sublimity differs from simple persuasion for both speaker and audience, “and the
combination of wonder and astonishment always proves superior to the merely
persuasive and pleasant” (138). After all, according to Longinus, sublimity “produced at
the right moment tears everything up like a whirlwind, and exhibits the orator’s whole
power in a single blow,” summoning in the listener “invincible” feelings of “amazement
and wonder” (138). For Longinus, the spoken word was enough, if arranged and
performed superlatively, to alter the emotional state of the listener. This alteration,
which Longinus stops short of calling religious, is both deep and memorable. Although he
does not say with what frequency such responses should or do occur, Longinus does
describe the rules a poet may follow to evoke the sublime response from a hearer; his
representatives of the sublime verse include Homer, Plato, and Demosthenes.
A lengthy account of the myriad theories on the sublime that postdate Longinus is
beyond this paper. It should be noted briefly, however, that following Longinus
interpretations and descriptions of the sublime have varied over the centuries and have
expanded to include acts of nature and war; indeed, the subject has been tackled by the
likes of Kant, Addison, Edmund Burke, T.S. Eliot, and Paul DeMan, among several
others, and appears to have experienced a renaissance of late.18 Where contemporary
aesthetic theory is concerned, Kant’s description of the sublime is considered requisite
reading.
In Critique o f Judgment (1790) Kant suggests that through rationality a sensus
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communis or universal human capability for judgment (not unlike Matthew Arnold’s later
touchstone theory of poetry) can be achieved toward the objective determination of both
the beautiful and the sublime. This argument must be understood in the context of Kant’s
broader system—outlined in his first two critiques, Critique o f Pure Reason (1781) and
Critique o f Practical Reason (1785)—where the philosopher attempts to sketch out,
respectively, universal foundations of human understanding (or “the True”) and morality
(or “the Good”). In the third critique, then, Kant sets out to establish a “subjective
universality” of aesthetic judgement, suggesting that a rational objective disinterestedness
in judgements of taste and beauty results logically in a broader a priori agreement among
reasonable observers of how to define and recognize beauty and sublimity. Kant is not, it
should be noted, suggesting a sweeping set of rules for determining (or creating) taste,
beauty, and sublimity, as did Longinus, but further establishing the universality of reason
and showing that rationality too can be applied to aesthetics.
Regarding the sublime specifically, it would appear that Kant addresses it, in the
wake of Edmund Burke’s Philosophical Enquiry into the Origins o f Our Ideas o f the
Sublime and Beautiful (1757), in order to contain it—because his vocation and the words
of his predecessors demand it. Calling his theory of the sublime a “mere appendix” (521),
that is, Kant considers the concept of the sublime in Nature far less important than the
concept of beauty. Treating the subject marginally, then, Kant’s description of the
sublime follows Burke in that the sublime is more the result of natural phenomena and the
mind’s response to the “supersensible” than to aesthetics. Very briefly, for Kant the
sublime is that “in comparison with which everything else is small” (522), or any notion
“what even to be able to think proves that the mind has a power surpassing any standard
o f sense" (522). Paraphrased, that which overwhelms one’s capacity to reason, natural
phenomena so infinitely great that they incite disharmony-whether awe or terror—in
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mind’s rationality, is sublime. Such phenomena allow mind to glimpse that which is
beyond comprehension, to experience the limits of what is sensible and filch but a taste of
what lies beyond the cosmic cusp. The sublime is thus a “negative pleasure,’’ says Kant,
adding “the feeling of the sublime is a feeling of displeasure that arises from the
imagination's inadequacy” (525). Examples of the sublime thus include ungraspable
phenomena found in “crude nature” and contain “magnitude” (523): the infinite black
cosmos, the earthquake, the snow-capped mountain.
It is this Kantian understanding of the sublime (with a dash of Edmund Burke
thrown in) that Jason Toynbee employs in his “Do You Believe? Notes on the Sublime in
Popular Music” (2004). Taking Cher’s 1998 hit song “Believe,” which featured her
electronically altered voice during the song’s chorus, as his case in point Toynbee
examines the sublime in popular music.19 According to Toynbee, for those whose
postmodern lives are punctuated by a sort of urban banality, the technologically modified
sound of Cher’s warbled woman-machine cyborg voice shocks the listener out of her
ennui much in the way Nature once awed Kant and Burke because the mind cannot
comprehend Cher's vocal inflection knowing it to be physically impossible. Explains
Toynbee,
If Burke helps us to identify how ‘Believe’ is sublime, it is through Kant
that we can approach the question of why it should be so. The key point
is that the mutation of Cher’s voice is ungraspable. Of course, ultimately
we know this is just another effect of the phonographic apparatus.
However, as ordinary listeners we are nonetheless dumbfounded, and not
merely at that sound, but also our reaction to it. In a double move whicn
Kant sketches out, we are awe-struck at our own incomprehension of this
woman machine.
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Toynbee is right in calling attention to the banality of the information age and the
listener’s desire to transcend the repetitions of postindustrial life, for this too is the
punks’ dilemma; but his conclusions are unsatisfactory. That is, he assumes that the
desired transcendence or “rational glitch” can occur, that a twenty-first century sublime
results for the hearer, from the electronic manipulation of a single syllable, the proverbial
push of a synthesizer button irrespective of listening context. But is this not the
opposite of Kant’s own conclusions regarding the Natural, magnanimous “source” of
sublimity (indeed, the actual source of the sublime response is truly the mind itself)? Can
Toynbee invoke Kant toward a reading of the sublime the source of which he suggests is
an electronic device (even if this device results in the thundering amplification of Cher’s
voice)? This writer is incredulous, as is Fredric Jameson who offers a more critical, and
Marxian, take on the role of technology in the postmodern sublime.
In his revision and elaboration of “Periodizing the 60’s,” Postmodernism (1991),
Jameson also describes the “waning of affect” that blankets our digital, postmodern
society and humankind’s increasing desire for impression. Rather than surmising
technology—the cellular telephone, vocoder, satellite, personal computer—sublimating in
itself, however, Jameson does Toynbee one better by asserting that the late technological
sublime results from the emergence of a new, disorienting space produced by postmodern
“texts” such as unfettered and invisible computer networks (the “virtual” size of which is
incomprehensible), decentralized architectural and digital structures, and, most
importantly, economic globalization:
I want to avoid the implication that technology is in any way the “ultimate
determining instance” either of our present-day social life or of our cultural
production: such a thesis is, of course, ultimately at one with the postMarxist notion of a postindustrial society. Rather, 1 want to suggest that
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our faulty representations of some immense communicational or computer
network are themselves but a distorted figuration of something even
deeper, namely, the whole world system of a present-day multinational
capitalism. (37)
The mind is moved, in other words, to the (Kantian) “technological sublime” not because
nanotechnology is befuddling, but as a result of its own inability to comprehend the
magnanimity of increasingly limitless digital networks that gird postmodern existence,
networks that were manufactured and are controlled by equally limitless, decentered
multinational corporations that, as MacKaye suggested the previous chapter with his
song “Five Corporations,” have become “naturalized” (to invoke Kant via semiotics).
“The technology of contemporary society is... mesmerizing and fascinating,” Jameson
continues sounding almost Foucauldian, “because it seems to offer some privileged
representational shorthand for grasping a network of power and control even more
difficult for our minds and imaginations to grasp” (37-38).
Still, Toynbee concludes by suggesting that “We are shocked by the technological
sublime of popular music, awed by our intuition of the good life which it heralds, but
which we have yet to make for ourselves in the here and now.” This statement leaves the
reader ungratified for two reasons. First, as we have seen, Toynbee’s reading of Kant is
spurious and perhaps abusive in that he completely disregards Kant’s insistence on the
Natural origins of sublimity and specifically the requisite inconceivable size of the object
in question, instead proposing an artificial/technological (and physically small) source.
Second, even if we give Toynbee the benefit of the doubt in his liberal rendering of Kant,
one cannot help but wonder what he means by “good life” and in what specific ways pop
music heralds it. After all, for punk and Christian rockers this is the central question: Can
there be a “good life” in the postmodern world? If the answer is no because “the whole
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world system of a present-day multinational capitalism,” as Jameson calls it, is to be
eschewed completely (bracketing for the moment whether or not segregation is even
possible), can adherents of these subcultures be moved to the Kantian sublime as
described by Toynbee via popular culture? Likely not; in fact, the corporate,
manufactured, technocratic, and, yes, banal pop music symbolized by “Believe” is but
one of the many disgusting examples of mainstream postmodern culture these subcultures
are seeking to negate—how can it move these particular listeners to the sublime of Kant,
or, for that matter, Jameson if it refused in full? Here an alternate chronicle of the sublime
is required.20
Revising Burke, and specifically Kant, then, was Hegel who, in his Lectures on the
Aesthetics (published posthumously in 1835), too considers the various forms of art and
their effect on an audience. Hegel’s reading of the sublime is appropriate in the context of
punk and Christian rock music for three reasons. First, more than a few of the
aforementioned authors’ definitions of the sublime, including Kant’s and Burke’s, treat
the subject in exclusive relation to “the beautiful” and/or stray too far from aesthetics for
our purposes, instead focusing on war, the cosmos, or other natural phenomena as
generators of the sublime in individuals. Kant specifically is less interested in readings of
the sublime in art than in Nature because for Kant the aesthetic sublime is “always
confined to the conditions that [art] must meet to be in harmony with nature” (520).
Moreover, Kant valued art, overall, much less than Nature and was especially
disinterested in music because it “plays merely with sensations” (qtd. in Scruton, 94),
which again calls Toynbee’s entire thesis into question. Second, allowing for the
connection of art with the sublime, then, Hegel distances himself from Longinus and Kant
by suggesting that the sublime is intrinsically—almost exclusively-tied to religious
expression in art and is an inherently spiritual phenomenon. For Kant the sublime was
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loosely theological as well, but only so far as it suggested something grander-a deity
perhaps-heyond this world and, accordingly, engaged the moral capacity of reason.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the Hegelian dialectic provides the most
appropriate model whereby negationist subcultures might best achieve the highly soughtafter union of changeable and Unchangeable, allowing self-consciousness a momentary
glimpse or perceived union with Spirit (before realizing that union and negation are
incompatible as we shall see), the result of which is better knowledge of both the self and
other, and perhaps even some version of Absolute Knowledge. In order to apprehend the
Hegelian sublime and its usefulness to pop negationism, however, his categorization of art
(which simultaneously serves as a concise demonstration of his entire dialectical system)
must first be described.
For Hegel, art begins with an eternally indeterminate and abstract Idea. The
material expression of this Idea (again, a term used interchangeably with Absolute, Spirit,
and even God) by a determinate and finite being is art. As such, the ultimate goal of art is
to represent Absolute, to “bring the spiritual before our eyes in a sensuous manner” (78).
Art that has not made the expression of Spirit its aim (for instance art that is created for
“moral betterment,” the beautification of one’s surroundings, or other mercenary/
utilitarian purposes) is merely “perverse” (55). Hegel thus designates three specific
aesthetic categories of artistic expressions of the Idea: Symbolic, Classical, and Romantic.
The original expression of the Idea is Symbolic art. This type of art is characterized more
by its dependence on natural/physical objects and the external search for the portrayal of
Spirit than any true presentation of it; Hegel writes, “the abstract Idea has its shape
outside itself in the natural sensuous material from which the process of shaping starts
and with which, in its appearance, this process is linked” (76). Hegel's examples of the
Symbolic, each of which are literary texts, include the “artistic pantheism of the East”
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(77) as contained in the Bhagavad Gita, Hebrew and Muslim poetics (Psalms and Rumi,
respectively), and Christian mystic texts—all of which refuse the iconography of Spirit in
struggling with its physical expression. Thus Symbolic art is flawed; the failure of this
category resides in its acknowledged inability to express the Infinite both through finite,
material means or in natural objects. Nevertheless, this failure is productive in another
way. As the very “foreignness of the Idea to natural phenomena” (76) is made manifest
(a direct opposition to Kant), the resultant response to this incompatibility, on behalf of
the artist and hearer both, is the sublime experience. (The sublime is addressed in Hegel’s
treatment of Symbolic art exclusively and has both positive and negative aspects, but
more on this momentarily.)
Classical art, which represents the beginning of the “higher” Western aesthetic
tradition, attempts to overcome the failures of Symbolic art if not in content, at least in
form. According to Hegel, what distinguishes Classical art from Symbolic is its unity of
concept and reality. Whereas the Idea or Absolute is ineffable in reality for Symbolic art,
it is, in Classical art, also that which created the artist and all that is finite. As a result,
the Absolute finds a physical shape in Classical art appropriate for the Idea’s creation.
“This shape,” explains Hegel, “which the Idea as spiritual—indeed as individually
determinate spirituality—assumes when it is to proceed out into a temporal manifestation,
is the human form” (78). The only extant expression of Classical art, says Hegel, is that
of the Greeks: anthropomorphic gods as expressed in painting, theater, sculpture, and
narrative mythology. The Classical artist sees no conundrum in such expression of Spirit.
Unfortunately, Hegel does. Classical art’s very anthropomorphic unity is also its
Achilles heel: “in this blending of the two [abstract infinite content and concrete finite
form], spirit is not in fact represented in its true nature. For spirit is the infinite
subjectivity of the Idea, which as absolute inwardness cannot freely and truly shape itself
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outwardly” (79). This failure is the dialectical opposite of Symbolic art’s failure.
Finally, in a consummate Hegelian synthesis, Romantic art negates the failure of
Classical art through a partial return to Symbolic art’s abstraction of the Idea coupled
with Classical art’s pseudo-corporeality. Instead of acknowledging the Absolute’s
sublimating ineffability, that is, Romantic ait makes the Idea subjective and internaI and
leads the hearer/viewer toward inner self-knowledge through material means. Specifying
music and voiced poetry as examples of Romantic art, Hegel again advances his Christian
metaphysic when he concludes that in these instances,
the separation of Idea and shape, their indifference and inadequacy to each
other, come to the fore again, as in symbolic art, but with this essential
difference, that, in romantic art, the Idea, the deficiency of which in the
symbol brought with it deficiency of shape, now has to appear perfected in
itself as spirit and heart. Because of this higher perfection, it is not
susceptible of an adequate union with the external, since its true reality and
manifestation it can seek and achieve only within itself. (81)
Put another way, Spirit manifests itself to individuals both perfectly and internally
through the infinite (timeless), abstract, and boundless expressions of music and spoken
poetry. And it is because of this tertiary perfection that Hegel, a proponent of Romantic
art, considers Symbolic art as the only category to be equated with the sublime, where
disunion of content and form concludes with feelings of awe and wonder at Infinity’s
ineffability.
For Plegel, rather, the sublime is properly defined as the “flight beyond the
determinateness of appearance” (303), or, more specifically, as an “attempt to express the
infinite, without finding in the sphere of phenomena an object which proves adequate for
this representation” (363). The sublime experience results when finite creatures
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(failingly) attempt to bridge the ineffable, liminal gap that separates humanity from its
creator via external means. This differs from Kant’s third critique in one crucial way: the
role of Absolute. Calling Kant’s critique “instructive and remarkable” (57), Hegel agrees
that the sublime is a product of the mind’s perception of phenomena. Hegel distances
himself from Kant however, both by making Spirit-centered art the nucleus of the sublime
experience, as opposed to Nature, and suggesting that the sublime results when human
attempts to represent the Infinite are themselves “annihilated in turn by what [the
representation] reveals, so that the revelation of the content is at the same time a
supercession of the revelation” (363). Such representations of Spirit are thus always
already obsolete, and this realization is sublimating. Hegel finally remarks that his reading
of the sublime differs from Kant in that “we need not [as Kant does] place in the pure
subjectivity of the mind its Ideas of Reason; on the contrary, we must grasp it [the
mind’s subjectivity] as grounded in the one absolute substance [i.e. God] qua the content
which is to be represented” (363). In more primitive terms, Kant’s principle failure was,
according to Hegel, his reduction of all categories of knowledge and understanding,
including the categories of beautiful and sublime, to human Reason-his relapse into the
“fixed opposition between subjective thinking and objective things” (56). Human reason,
Hegel might have countered, is itself a component of Spirit (or, more radically, is Spirit).
So how does all of this relate to punk and Christian rock music subculture? To get
a sense of how the Hegelian sublime fits with the negationist subcultures in question, we
must first explore the sublime experience in terms of the religious “conversion.”
Returning to Performing Rites, then, Simon Frith suggests that the band is not the only
group “performing” during a music concert. Rather, “listening” is itself a performance,
writes Frith: “to understand how musical pleasure, meaning and evaluation work, we have
to understand how, as listeners, we perform the music for ourselves” (203-04). More
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detailed analyses of group psychology and postmodern readings of performance are
beyond the scope of this essay; suffice it to say, however, that through the course of a
musical performance a sort of dialogic (dialectical even) reversal occurs wherein the
audience itself becomes the performer, says Frith, as the music is “framed” according to
his aforementioned genre rules that in part predetermine the audience’s response to the
performer. In other words, performance is dependent upon the interpretation—indeed,
very existence--of the audience, which recapitulates the performance for the musician
(e.g., dance); both performer and audience are thus dependent on the “performances” of
each other and simultaneously condition and influence each other’s performance. And
although this may too be the case during a private album listening, as we have seen
nowhere else is the seifs “performance” of the music in question more evident than
during a live concert wherein self-consciousness is conditioned by both the presence and
actions of the actual performer(s) and numerous other selves. The mainstream music
Ians’ performance of their favorite artists’ songs is not in question; but Frith’s theory of
dialogue between artist and audience, the fans’ physical and emotional performance of the
music, is nowhere more appropriate and functional than when read in tire context of the
punk or Christian rock concert where, as we have seen, the alienation (both physical and
emotional “space”) that traditionally separates audience and artist is almost fully
removed—eliding any distinction between the two—and direct voiced and unvoiced
dialogue between the groups is exceedingly common.21
The most significant result of this self-performance in the punk/Christian context
is the “conversion” or what psychologist and pragmatist William James describes, too in
Hegelian terms, as the unification of a “self hitherto divided” (189). According to James
(and here one admits that the citation of James’ definition of religion earlier was not
arbitrary), humans are born with either one of two dispositions: “healthy-minded”
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persons are characterized by an “inner constitution which is harmonious and well
balanced from the outset,” Alternate “heterogeneous” personalities are “oppositely
constituted; and are so in degrees which may vary from something...merely odd or
whimsical...to a discordancy of which the consequences may be inconvenient in the
extreme” (168). This social or moral discordance, the superlative example of which was
St. Augustine, is the manifestation of a divided self. Not until this divided self is unified
can one’s discord be laid to rest; this unification is represented by the conversion
experience. Such conversion may occur gradually or abruptly, continues James. It may
come as the result of feelings, actions, new intellectual insights, or experiences. But
however it comes, it brings unparalleled emotional relief: “and never such extreme relief as
when it is cast into the religious mould. Happiness! happiness! [...] Easily,
permanently, and successfully, it often transforms the most intolerable misery into the
profoundest and most enduring happiness” (175).“
In the punk context perhaps Fugazi singer/guitarist Guy Picciotto described such a
conversion best: “I was covered with afterbirth,” he recalls of his first punk rock
experience, consciously invoking the “born-again” metaphor. “Being thirteen and having
never experienced music outside of giant rock arenas with bands like Kiss and Aerosmith,
then to suddenly be here, with the band five feet away, playing so intensely, with people
reacting in such a visceral way—to be exposed to that level of interaction just blew my
mind wide open” (qtd. in Andersen, 36). Such a literal conversion—having one’s mind
“blown wide open” as Picciotto puts it—is routine at Christian rock concerts as well and
has been so since the 1960s: “For the so-called Jesus People...the individual, if he or she
is to be saved from separation from God and eternal damnation, must experience a
personal relationship with Jesus Christ—must be born-again,” assert Howard and Streck.
“The evidence for this experience is largely based on subjective feelings and [physical]
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responses” (57), and the focus on proselytizing by evoking the ecstatic conversion
response (through hopeful lyrics, spiritual dialogue, stage sermons, dance, and prayerful
calls for Christ to come into the lives of listeners) continues for most separational
Christian rockers. For example, sings John Ellis of the South African Christian group
Tree63 on “Treasure” from their eponymous American debut (2000),
Taken up out of the world
Shaken up with just a word
Turn around so suddenly
I’m alive eternally
Something invisible
Has become so beautiful
I know I am born-again
Laughing and stumbling
Apropos the subject matter, this song is a buoyant and spry pop-rock track: crisp drums
and guitars, very catchy hook, and joyous vocals. Here Ellis (who is Caucasian) relates
his intoxicating experience of Christ not for his own benefit, but for the welfare of the
hearer. The message appears to have been received as Ellis’ aestheticized recollection of
his own “conversion” results in such an experience for the concertgoer: “I heard you...in
Barrie, Ontario...a couple of days ago. [...] When you played T Stand For You’, tears
welled up in my eyes as I sensed the spirit of God calling me higher,” writes one Tree63
fan on the band’s Internet site. “There was a lot of jumping around and [crowd] ‘surfing’
that night that may have given you...the impression no-one [sic] was ‘hearing’ you. But I
was. Your lyrics cut deep to where I really feel them. God Bless You. You touched my
life that night” (“Testimonies”). Howard and Streck go on to cite writer Steve Miller who
puts the number of conversions in the hundreds for each Petra and Mylon LeFevre
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concert during the 1980s (176, 189). And according to Eddie DeGarmo of the veteran
Christian rock band DeGarmo and Key, “more than three thousand people came to Christ
at our concerts [during a single tour], Christians are bringing their unsaved friends and
that’s really how we reach most people. The seeds are planted and we come in and
harvest” (qtd. in Joseph, 44).
But what is really going on here and how do such ecstatic responses differ from
the similar “sublime” responses observable at any rock concert? For a more Hegelian
theoretical take on the negationist “conversion” and its relation to the sublime, then, we
turn to Lacanian writer Slavoj Zizek who discusses the “hysterical conversion” by
combining the sublime with Hegel and Frith’s dialogic performance. The section entitled
“Hegel’s hysterical theater” from his For They Know Not What They Do (2002) is worth
quoting at length:
The elementary form of hysteria, hysteria par excellence, is the so-called
“conversion hysteria,” where the subject “gives body”...to the kernel that
he is unable to put in words.... [0]ne can already guess where the
connection with Hegel lies: a homologous conversion is what defines
“figures of consciousness” in Hegel’s Phenomenology o f Spirit. “Lordship
and Bondage,” “Unhappy Consciousness,” “Law of the Heart,” “Absolute
Freedom,” and so on are not just abstract theoretical positions; what they
name is always also a kind of “existential dramatization” of a theoretical
position whereby a certain surplus is produced: the “dramatization” gives
the lie to the theoretical position by bringing out its implicit
presuppositions. [...] What we have here is quite literally a
“conversion”...of a theoretical impasse...and at the same time the inversion
best rendered by one of Hegel’s constant rhetorical figures: when for
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example, Hegel deals with the ascetic's position, he says that the ascetic
converts the denial o f the body into embodied denial.

(T]he crucial

point is that the Hegelian conversion is “mediated” by an impossibility-since the ascetic is unable to deny the body (this would simply mean
death), the only thing that remains to him is to embody denial itself... [...]
And what is hysteria if not the bodily staging of the same rhetorical figure?
(142-144)
Following a brief digression into Freud and the Kantian sublime, Zizek links his
“conversion” to the Hegelian sublime:
|D]o we not encounter the same [sublime] mechanism in the most
notorious formal aspect of Hegelian dialectics, that of the “concrete,”
“determinate” negation—negation the result of which is not an empty
nothingness but a new positivity? What we have here, then, is the same
reflective inversion of “negation of (determinate) being” into
“(determinate) being of negation”: the determinate being qua negation’s
outcome is nothing but a form in which negation as such assumes positive
existence. (144)
To paraphrase this dense passage and put it in context, the “hysterical
conversion” that occurs for the negationist punk or evangelical Christian rock audience is
the “existential dramatization”—the self-performance—of both the fans’ negation of
culture and, relatedly, their desire to transcend their immediate material situation (i.e.,
access the Infinite) vis-a-vis the religious event. But as we have seen, negation in and of
itself is incomplete and inadequate; the punk/Christian rock self-consciousness does not
so much transform culture or “possess and know” the other they are nullifying as ignore
it (like Hegel’s ascetic, a genuine subjective negation necessarily leads to suicide). Do we
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not, at this point, see Hegel’s earlier descriptions of Stoicism and the first relationship of
changeable and Unchangeable which takes the form of “pure consciousness” resurface?25
The sublime experience just described in the context of aesthetics is not unlike Hegel’s
phenomenological description of self-consciousness’s sense that it is free in Stoic (punk)
terms or linked with Absolute purely and internally (Christian rock). In both cases, this
existential dramatization not only calls attention to the impossibility of negation, but
simultaneously inverts or sidesteps that very impossibility, turning the punk/Christian's
inability to genuinely negate their parent culture into a surfeit of euphoria as manifested
physically by the cathartic performance sublime: in the case of evangelical, “born-again”
(or experientially inclined) Christians an ecstatic (and, as Hegel eventually says,
inadequate) experience of Christ “in their hearts”; in the case of punks, the sublime
concert experience as described above in the context of ecstatic dance, violence, and
incoherent language. In both cases, the negationists’ negation of culture is “embodied” to
the degree that the much desired transcendence of one’s immediate material situation
finally occurs, at least as far as self-consciousness is concerned; simultaneously, the
impossibility of negation is illuminated and immediately displaced through the concert
experience and the concertgoer is literally “converted” (both internally and externally)
during the event in question. This new positivity, the conversion/inversion of the
negation of culture into a physical (sub)culture o f negation, is the negationists’ collective
Hegelian sublime, and is, for these subcultures, accessible only through the dialectic and
punctuates the inadequacy of the Kantiaa sublime in the context of certainly negationist
subculture, if not pop music as a whole.
Of course, Zizek is reading Hegel (specifically Phenomenology) through Lacan,
who calls Hegel “the most sublime of all hysterics” (qtd. in Zizek, For They Know Not...
142). While useful, this may be something of a stretch since the only place Hegel actually
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discusses the sublime is in the Aesthetics; we cannot actually know how Hegel would have
read the sublime in the context of self-consciousness. But even if we cling to the
Aesthetics exclusively we can conjecture a sublime unique to the punk and Christian rock
subcultures, for this sublime is unavailable to the rest of the pop world so far as it
remains the ‘'master.” Returning to the dialectic, that is, it is these music-based groups’
negation itself, specifically as expressed externally during the “religious” concert event,
that results in the incompatibility of religious (Christian) content with dialectical form. In
other words, remembering Hegel’s suggestion that the dialectic (a system which, at its
core, is theological in that it deals with the unfolding of Spirit) is the only “true”
philosophic method (containing its own criticism within itself), having already described
these subcultures’ form as dialectical, we now see that their content is incompatible with
their form so far as the dialectic remains incomplete -, the instant these groups set out to
negate, self-consciously, culture (the status quo) economically, aesthetically, or
otherwise, they are bound, as it were, to the dialectical form which itself desires
completion, again making negation a theoretically unsustainable position. Indeed, Hegel
has already shown us in Phenomenology how any theoretical union of estranged concepts
(whether of aesthet ic form and content or of changeable and Unchangeable) requires the
negation of the negation before any metaphysical suture can even be considered; but as
long as these subcultures maintain their mere external negationism and refuse synthesis,
their Christian content as described above will not match their dialectical (and, for Hegel,
Christian) form, and there can be no union, only sublimity.
But where does music fit in the above model? Since Hegel classifies music as one
of the “perfected” and internalized Romantic arts, he does not consider music
theoretically capable of producing in the hearer the sublime effect: music’s content
(internal) and form (boundless) coincide in a superior manner impossible for Symbolic art
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where content (internal) and form (external/concrete) are incompatible. “Therefore we
may not cherish a tasteless opinion about the all-powerfulness of music as such,” (908)
Hegel argues near the end of Aesthetics, recalling the dubious historical success of bellicose
hymns and warrior dirges in eliciting battlefield victory as proof of music’s nonsublimity. As Hegel suggests sardonically,
Mere bugle-blowing and drum-beating does not produce courage, and it
would take a lot of trumpets before a fortress would tumble at their sound
as the walls of Jericho did. It is enthusiastic ideas, cannon, the genius of
generals which achieve this...and not music, for music can only count as a
support for those powers which in other ways have already filled and
captured the mind. (909)
On the surface, then, there appears to be no direct connection (not unlike Kant)
between music and the Hegelian sublime. But the above comments are perhaps
disingenuous, for as Hegel also admits, almost cursorily: “If music is to exercise its full
effect, more is required than purely abstract sound in a temporal movement. The second
thing to be added is content, i.e. a spiritual feeling felt by the heart, and the soul of this
content expressed in notes” (908). And although he never hints at how, aside from
expressing notes in a pleasing way, one exactly provides “the soul of this content” that
determines “spiritual feeling felt by the heart” for either audience or composer, Hegel does
seem to admit that music can evoke great excitement and enthusiasm among its listeners.
Returning to the notion that the expression of Absolute as the goal of art, Hegel suggests,
“enthusiasm proper has its ground in the specific Idea, in the true spiritual interest...
which can be raised by music into a momentarily more lively feeling because the notes,
rhythm, and the melody can carry the man away who gives himself up to them” (908909).
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But can this “lively feeling” be read as sublimity? Reading Hegel liberally, he
seems to be advocating two versions of the sublime response (the separation of which
may be arbitrary): that which is the response to the failures of Symbolic art, and that
which is the result of superlative Romantic art (the successful union of aesthetic form and
content vis-a-vis the Idea, of which music is a type). One may glean from Hegel, in these
latter comments, then, a defense of music as maintaining a sublimating potential,
especially where “spiritual interest” is included in music’s content; as has been argued,
the content of the punk and Christian rock concert is exceedingly spiritual for the
majority of attendants. And as Hegel admits in Phenomenology regarding the selfconsciousness who maintains a Stoic inner freedom or relationship of pure consciousness
with Absolute: “Its thinking is...a musical thinking that does not get as far as the Notion”
(131, emphasis added). Thus whether the sublime is read as a consequence of a mismatch
in aesthetic form and content or the theoretical impossibility of negation in strict
dialectical terms, the resultant “surplus,” as Zizek calls it, even Hegel describes as musical
(meaning internal, boundless, and positive by virtue of its double negation of time and
space). And as we have seen, it is music that is these particular subcultures’ raison
d ’etre, it is the aesthetic medium that calls these groups into being and directly effects
their adherents’ consciousness. The negationists’ sublime occurs only in the context of
the (religious) musical event, meaning that without this specifically negationist musical
medium the sublime would not occur for the groups in question (at least not in Hegelianaesthetic—terms), turning music into much more than “mere bugle-blowing,” indeed
At this point, then, it is clear that more canonical readings of the sublime are
inadequate to a reading of negationist music subculture (and perhaps music in general),
that the punk and Christian rock sublime (since both subcultures are “religious”
experssions of art) is best understood through Hegelian dialectics and aesthetics. And
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having described briefly both the impossibility of negation and the “religious” character of
punk, this thesis can advance toward a conclusion where the more formal synthesis of the
two subcultures (remembering their traditional positioning of themselves as the negative
opposite of each other) in terms of both form and content is illustrated and described as
occurring simultaneous to their synthesis with popular culture.
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IV
KILLING THE SYSTEM TWICE
“Ever get the eeling you’ve been cheated?”
~ Johnny Rotten1
In 1987 Faye Ginsburg published the first edition of Contested Lives, her
anthropological analysis of the abortion debate in America. A cultural ethnography,
Ginsburg’s study focuses on the philosophies, rhetoric, and membership characteristics
of the pro-life and pro-choice contingents of a single American community. Because it is
“small enough to provide a coherent social universe; yet...sufficiently large to encompass
some diversity in class, ethnic, and religious identities” (3), Ginsburg’s community of
choice is Fargo, North Dakota. In her efforts to be faithful and fair to both sides,
Ginsburg spends countless hours interviewing and observing Fargo pro-choice and pro
lifers, attending their rallies and meetings, and researching the history of abortion in North
Dakota. The result is a comprehensive, unbiased analysis of each group which suggests,
among other things, that the Fargo forensic serves as a microcosm for a grander national
debate, that “this particular place illuminate[s] a larger landscape: the social and symbolic
organization of gender, reproduction, and nurturance in the United States” (17). And
while not her expected result going into the study, perhaps the most interesting and
stunning observation Ginsburg makes is the similarity with which the two diametrically
opposed groups operate—their concerns, goals, and even vocabulary are all strikingly
comparable.
Discussing a third, mediating group called “Pro-Dialogue,” consisting of both proand anti-abortion activists who have come together in Fargo to discuss their differences,
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Ginsburg writes,
Pro-Dialogue offered visible, empirical evidence that the pro-life and prochoice stances, like all genuine dialectical oppositions, have a number of
elements in common. Both sides voice a critique of a society that
increasingly stresses materialism and self-enhancement.... Although their
solutions differ, each group desires, in its own way, to alleviate the
unequal conditions faced by women in American culture. (225-26)
Although the Fargo pro-choice and pro-life groups are completely opposed, ideologically
speaking, they are reflections both in form and even content; and it was not until a
tertiary group surfaced that the two were able to engage in actual dialogue and, hopefully,
advance. The debate continues.
As Ginsburg’s analysis implies, this document’s argument that two ideologically
opposed groups really operate in very similar ways is far from revolutionary. MacIntyre
makes a similar point in comparing Marxism with Christianity; and in The Politics at
God’s Funeral (1983) Michael Harrington, too, weds Christianity and atheism to assert
that “in the late Twentieth Century serious atheists and serious believers have more in
common with one another than with mindless de facto atheists and routine churchgoers”
(10). For Harrington, whose goal is (not unlike MacIntyre) to trace the political
consequences of the post-Enlightenment “death” of the Judeo-Christian God, serious
atheists and people of faith are both threatened by the negligent erosion of spiritual rigor
and community that the death of God heralds. “De facto” atheism, as Harrington calls it,
should be as offensive to atheist/agnostic humanists as it is to people of faith in
contemporary culture because the listless indifference of the majority is a “thoughtless,
normless, selfish, hedonistic individualism. [...] That absence of serious thought about
the human condition is, I would suggest, the common enemy of faith and anti-faith during
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the time of the death of the traditional Western God” (203). Although Harrington’s
subject is theism (or its absence), such a comment could easily be made in the context of
Ginsburg’s abortion activists. That said, what does the union of ideological and
theological opposites in the context of American popular music subculture tell us that the
analyses of MacIntyre, Harrington, and Ginsburg do not?
To answer this question the essay must first be reviewed in brief. Having outlined
the traditional punk and Christian rock opposition to both each other and the cultural
status quo (not to mention the dialectical history of each) in the first chapter, this thesis
gave the two “negationist” subcultures a concomitant Hegelian reading (as the antithesis
of popular culture or the “slave” to pop’s master) in the context of the Phenomenology’’s
second chapter “Self-Consciousness.” Concluding that one representative selfconsciousness (i.e. the punk) selected material nothingness and the other “Christian
bondage” when presented with Hegel’s forced choice, the genres' storied opposition was
cast into stark relief and given clear theological and ideological bases. Following the
dialectical model, then, the third chapter interpreted punk subculture as “religious,”
providing a preliminary union of opposites and implying a synthesis of the punk and
Christian rock subcultures in terms of their content. This particular synthesis of genres
follows not only the first chapter’s gloss of the “Christian punks” who have synthesized
Christian music with punk form (in the non-Hegelian sense; rather, in terms of musical
sound, style, and aesthetic), but the brief introductory description of each genre’s
synthesis with popular culture, as evidenced by the popular (and corporate-sponsored)
punk and Christian rock festival tours. Thus can a series of related, simultaneous
syntheses be seen as having developed for both genres over the course of their existence;
not only do punk and Christian bands periodically negate their subcultures’ negation by
going “mainstream,” but the genres themselves have synthesized with each other.
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Moreover, this paper will argue, following Hegel, that the individual punk or Christian
self-consciousness must negate its respective subculture if it wishes to avoid hitting a
theoretical wall. Put another way, although this entire series of syntheses has been met
with disdain by the more zealous advocates of both the punk and Christian rock
subcultures, it is, this writer suggests in the Hegelian context, predictable (dialectically
speaking), purposive, and necessary for both the individual punk or Christian rock selfconsciousness, and the genres as a whole for despite claims to the contrary, it is negation,
when taken in isolation, that is the subcultures’ true “death.”
This document is relevant therefore in that it provides a heretofore absent
aesthetic version of the type of analysis made by MacIntyre, Harrington, and Ginsburg
(focusing primarily on music and art rather than politics and philosophy). Furthermore,
this thesis goes further than these writers in explicitly tracking and interpreting the
concomitant series of syntheses at work at any given time for these subcultures. The
final punch of this particular juxtaposition hinges, then, on two complementary
conclusions: first, despite the complete opposite ideologies/theologies that originally
inspired and continue to inspire punk and Christian rock negationism, these groups are
actually responding quite similarly to the dominant culture, turning them into “identical
opposites” not unlike Ginsburg’s activists whose aforementioned refusals of each other
are ironic and perhaps unwarranted. More than simply pointing out the similarity of
opposing groups and proposing innocuously that the groups should just “come together”
or develop their own “Pro-Dialogue” group, however, remembering Jameson’s
periodization model from the first chapter, this concordance of ideologically dissimilar
negationist musical genres suggests, too like Ginsburg’s study, a microcosm of something
larger, namely that the negation of culture is at the very least problematic, if not altogether
impossible. Specifically, a conundrum arises if negation is grasped in isolation, for if
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these subcultures’ desire and goal is to challenge, and thus change, the Other they so
despise, their decision to disengage from the world renders their critique of it negligible in
that the dialectic is left unfulfilled. As Zizek has already explained, negation alone results
not in any actual change of Other but merely its displacement. Expanding this notion, the
specific superficial features (form) and the underlying ideological impetus (content) of all
negationist subcultures2are irrelevant in that the sociopolitical consequences that result
for the subcultures following their rejection of cultural hegemony is the same: inefficacy.
But negation is still valuable—imperative even. Moving to the second conclusion,
given the unsustainability of negation as a community response to phenomena in popular
culture, the conceptual area where cultural negation—seen through the eyes of the
dialectic—has succeeded is in supplying individuals with both a lexicon and forum for
cultural and self-criticism, wnieh becomes practical in the context of the broader
parent/popular culture (not to mention the reach for Spirit) only once negation (and the
subculture) itself is abandoned, when the antithesis is itself negated by selfconsciousness, consummating the dialectical triad. Thus negation, while inadequate, is a
necessary step; hypothetically speaking, the more purposive and practical synthetic
move cannot appear for self-consciousness if negation does not first occur.
The Impossibility of Negation
We begin the fuller analysis of the first of these two conclusions in what appears a
backward way: by transferring Harrington’s comments on “de facto” and “thoughtless”
atheists—by which he means the apathetic majority—to the popular synthetic “pop
punk” (e.g., Green Day, Blink 182, Sum 41) and “positive pop” (e.g., Switchfoot, Creed,
P.O.D., Amy Grant) versions of punk and Christian rock music that have, due to their
commercial success, come to define the genres in their entirety for the bulk of
contemporary pop music fans. It is this very synthesis of pop and punk/Christian rock
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that pur'sts of either subculture consider adulterated, inauthentic, even trite versions of
the “real thing,” and it is the commercial success of these bands or artists that ardent
negationists reject. This fierce rejection of synthesis is not without reason, of course: for
most of the genres1original followers, such a development is depressing and reminds them
of Frith’s claim that “It sometimes seems, indeed, as if a genre is only clearly defined (its
secret revealed) at the moment when it ceases to exist, when it can no longer be exclusive”
(88). In the punk context, recognition of this moment resulted in the frequent claim that
punk was “dead” as early as 1978. Again, Legs McNeil:
Overnight punk had become as stupid as everything else. This wonderful,
vital force that was articulated by the music was really about corrupting
every form—it was about advocating kids to not wait to be told what to do,
but to make life up for themselves, it was about trying to get people to use
their imaginations again, it was about not being perfect, it was about saying
it was okay to be amateurish and funny, that real creativity came out of
making a mess.... But after the Sex Pistols tour, I had no interest in doing
Punk magazine. It just felt like this phony media thing. Punk wasn’t ours
anymore. It had become everything we hated. (334)
As we have seen (and shall see again), McNeil’s words are perhaps a bit dramatic for
punk was not dead in 1978, only in a state of dialectical flux: it had returned
“underground” (a direct result of the Sex Pistols’ “popularization” of punk) in the
commercially antagonistic form of hardcore that same year.5 McNeil’s proprietary
comments are valuable, however, in that they show the sincere negationist’s belief that as
soon as “their” genre is no longer marginal—is even remotely synthesized with the
popular-its entire meaning and reason for being become moot. Such a sentiment is not
uncommon amongst separational Christian rockers as well, and it is a familiar criticism of
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the “integrations!” Christian rock described in the the first chapter that such radiofriendly (and more ambiguous theologically) Christian pop has. as Howard and Streck
say, “merely adapted Christ to society rather than bringing society to Christ” (94),
diluting the power of Christ’s message.
MLcIntyre explains the basis for the stern aficionado’s criticism of synthesis in
The. Religious Significance o f Atheism (1969), a post-Marxism and Christianity text co
authored by Paul Ricoeur that explores the effect secular culture (and specifically science)
has on theism. According to the first of MacIntyre’s two chapters, if theism (a term he,
again, uses interchangeably with Christianity) is “successful” it will not—cannot-be
assimilated fully into secular culture, despite secular advances in areas such as science; he
suggests, “When theism rises and flourishes, it breaks the bonds which join the sacred and
the secular,” thus it “cannot be wholly assimilated to the culture of a particular social
group” (20). But when theism loses its power and influence for historical, institutionalpolitical, or even theological reasons, the bonds that link it to the secular culture
strengthen rather than shatter: it becomes a part of (or, more stridently, is) secular culture
and is only further diminished. Thus the assimilation of any “religious” movement into
popular/secular culture compromises the sacred and results in the “death,” as it were, of
theism in its original, and likely most potent, form, thinning all spiritual content.
Accordingly, the very popularization of the negationists’ music alarms both the more
ardent Christian and punk rock partisans not only because it signals the corruption of
their art, but simultaneously mourns their traditional communities’ supposed demise (and
perhaps even illustrates the faith’s “weakness” as MacIntyre might suggest). The
decision to seize synthesis and operate more at the level of mainstream culture removes,
in other words, these groups’ purely subcultural status, strengthening the bonds between
the parent culture and the subculture, which ceases to exist in its original form.
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As we have already seen in the Phenomenology, however, this “death" is
necessary as far as Hegel is concerned: negation (whether Classical art, the French
Revolution, or punk skepticism) is itself an imperfect and inadequate theoretical position
which cannot stand alone. Whether punk or Christian, the bare negation of culture,
potent though it may be, fails self-consciousness in that desire is not satisfied, the master
is not changed or possessed, and the slave has attained no Knowledge of the Other or
Self-Spirit. Remembering Hegel’s comments on the ascetic, here a metaphor for the
groups in question, the negation of the body only brings self-consciousness to a
theoretical cul-de-sac: the body cannot be denied genuinely save death. But even in the
case of suicide, self-consciousness has not possessed, known, or altered the Other, has
not achieved “pure self-recognition [not to mention Absolute Knowledge] in absolute
otherness” as Hegel writes in the “Preface” to Phenomenology. Until self-consciousness
acknowledges the value of (and at least partially adopts) the Other it has rejected, then,
negation shall remain incomplete, insubstantial, even obsolete.
By virtue of the dialectic’s very (self-critical) form, then, negation is a
philosophically untenable and unsustainable position. As a result, McNeil’s lamentations
regarding his personal loss of punk are, while not incorrect in that “punk” content had
truly been diluted to a degree, both self-defeating, shortsighted, and abortive: first, his
own comments insinuate a weakness in his subculture (a weakness this author below
suggests does not exist); second, they imply a certain naivete, for if nothing else even
before a negation-based underground movement finds itself cozying up to the master (and
becomes ideologically or theologically “dead” according to some), if it elects to remain
underground so as to avoid MacIntyre’s assimilation it is mired in paradox. After all, can
adherents of such groups shun the world in which they live but continue to draw from
and contribute to it politically or aesthetically? More significantly, can the punks or
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Christians who desire to change the world do so if they remain external to it? Such
questions challenge the very efficacy and purpose of negation as a community response
to culture. Calling anticultural Christianity a “necessary and inadequate position” (65),
for instance, Niebuhr too raises this point in theological terms for the separational
Christian rocker and posits that self-segregated groups only think they are apart from the
world when, in fact, they mirror it. Thus the Christian anticultural position,
affirms in words what it denies in action; namely, the possibility of sole
dependence on Jesus Christ to the exclusion of culture. Christ claims no
man purely as a natural being, but always as one who has become human
in culture; who is not only in culture, but into whom culture has
penetrated. [...] He cannot dismiss the philosophy and science of his
society as though they were external to him; they are in him—though in
different forms from those in which they appear in leaders of culture. (69)
Roman Church Father Tertullian is one of Niebuhr’s many examples of such paradox;
Tertullian cannot simply recant on his “Romanness” and criticize secular Roman culture
when his theology, his synthesis of Roman and Christian “law,” is at least partially the
result of it: “In almost every utterance Tertullian makes evident that he is a Roman, so
nurtured in the legal tradition and so dependent on philosophy that he cannot state the
Christian case without their aid” (69-70).
All of this returns us to Jameson, whose own dialectical materialism offers an
alternate interpretation of the “impossibility of negation,” putting Hegel's demand for
recognition of the Other in the aesthetic context of postmodern sm. Specifically, the
beginning of the postmodern era that ushered in both the subcu tures in question and the
aforementioned incomprehensible technological sublime also signa'ed the dawn of what
Jameson calls “late capitalism,” his term (borrowed from Ernest Mandel) for the
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globalized, boundless socioeconomic and cultural dominant led primarily by America.
This dominant—characterized by style over substance, representation (Jean Baudrillard’s
“simulacrum”), ahistoricism, pastiche (the elision of any distinction between “high” and
“low” culture, universal and particular), decentered spatial orientation, and, of course, a
multinational capitalist market—moves beyond the aesthetics of earlier theorists such as
Habermas and Lyotard and is postmodernism proper. Thus can the postmodern
dominant be observed everywhere from literature and film to architecture, ideology, and
politics: “from economic value and state power., .to the very structure of the psyche
itself’ (48). Or as Jameson conjectures grimly in the shadow of Soviet communism’s
collapse and on the cusp of first Iraq War (remember too his comments on technology
from chapter three), “this whole global, yet American, postmodern culture is the internal
and superstructural expression of a whole new wave of American military and economic
domination throughout the world” {Postmodernism 5).
Put another way, for Jameson postmodernism is marked primarily by the
decentralization of American capitalism. This decentralization, this “[global] expansion
of [American] culture throughout the social realm” (48) in the context of a “free market,”
can be traced to the cultural “break” already described, and has resulted in a society where
there is no “autonomous sphere” of culture; culture (whether aesthetic, political, or social)
and commerce have become one. If we reduce commerce and culture, respectively, to
master and slave—as Perry Anderson argues was the case in the modernist era wherein the
Vonstitutively oppositional” modernist aesthetic “floutfed] conventions of taste” and
defied “the solicitations of the market” (63)—we can see that Jameson is proposing a
post-dialectic model whereby master and slave too have become one. Speaking in terms
of the ubiquity of late capitalism’s unfathomable space, which he again calls sublime (49),
Jameson thus states that negation in the postmodern era is inexecutable because, at times
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referring specifically to punk. “Critical Distance” is no longer possible: “some of our
most cherished and time-honored radical conceptions about the nature of cultural
politics...which range from slogans of negativity, opposition, and subversion to critique
and reflexivity...[have] very precisely been abolished in the new space of postmodernism”
(48) . The cultural divide that separates the negationist from the market or popular culture
proper has been cinched, that is; so infinite is the market (which has become culture) that
the negation of culture is no longer even an option. As a result, postmodern negationist
subcultures such as punk (Jameson refers specifically to English punks the Clash, but
might as well be discussing separational Christian rock, avant-garde theater, or radical
environmentalism, e.g., the anarchist Earth Liberation Front) “are all somehow secretly
disarmed and reabsorbed by a system of which they themselves might well be considered
a part, since they can achieve no distance from it” (49)-a “demoralizing and depressing”
(49) notion if ever there were one, admits Jameson.
Such a theory is quite gloomy indeed (especially for the iconoclast or dialectician);
and perhaps overdetermined. Verily, the critic might remind Jameson that the example to
which he turns for evidence of negation’s impossibility relies on a punk band that should,
in the first place, be considered synthetic or more popular than all of the truly negationist
bands described in chapter two that have not had their records distributed by
multinational corporations. And is not such an all-encompassing theory self-referential in
a manner similar to Hegel’s in that it suggests the “end” of culture and history, among
other things? If we follow Jameson through to his logical conclusion in Hegelian terms, it
would appear that in the late twentieth- and early twenty-first century self-consciousness
cannot help but be forced into a sort of recognition of the Other: rather the self already is
the other for there is no distinction to be made between traditional opposites. While such
a notion sounds positive at first in that it allows the self to recognize itself immediately in
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the Other, allowing self-consciousness to continue more expeditiously along its dialectical
path toward Absolute Knowledge, in actuality the dialectic has been put to rest: there is
no Other, only thesis, or, more appropriately , synthesis. And if there is no Other, selfconsciousness cannot in fact recognize itself in otherness, leading to a dialectical
breakdown for consciousness. Indeed, Jameson appears to have imagined the very end of
“otherness” itself. If negation is an impossibility in this sense, master and slave have no
opportunity to quarrel with and acknowledge each other: they are already linked. Such a
notion imagines the forced union of master and slave consciousness that results, as we
have seen, in Unhappy Consciousness. But to call the postmodern era the “era of
unhappy consciousness” is a misread of Jameson’s postmodernism, for there is no
independence of master and slave in the first; they cannot coalesce for they were never
autonomous.
In spite of any attempt at his criticism, however, Jameson’s suggestion that the
“cultural turn” that saw these very genres’ birth is simultaneously their hypothetical snag
seems frighteningly accurate: more than a decade after the original printing of
Postmodernism, the so-called free market, as Ian MacKaye laments in “Five
Corporations.” only continues to grow “smoothly,” to the point where “it’s as if [it]
belong[s] and [has] been here all along.” And to repeat, as Friedman suggests in his more
optimistic take on globalization, the world is flat (once again). The spread of Americanstyle capitalism (following the fall of communism) to places as far removed from
capitalist American culture as India, China, parts of Africa, and the former Soviet Union,
in other words, has “leveled the playing field” on a global scale, has truly removed any
and all barriers to the distribution and trading of goods, services, and even culture
worldwide. Included in this distribution, whether they wish it or not, are negationist
producers of culture.
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And although Friedman’s analysis lacks any serious treatment of class structures
(this is not uncommon for his several pro-capitalism polemics), the flattening of the globe
too is a postmodern notion: as the lines separating high and low art, culture and
commerce, vanish, so too do national borders turning the entire world itself into a vast
ocean, a liminal, decentralized, dynamic, and disorienting landscape. As Singer (2002)
notes, discussing the ethics of globalization in a post-11 September 2001 world, “even
without the WTO, the growth of the global economy itself marks a decline in the power
of the nation-state” (11). Usurpmg the nation-state is not the stateless terrorist, however,
but, as Jameson has already argued, the multinational corporation. Thus is the suggestion
that “government is the shadow cast by business over society” (attributed in various
paraphrases to “Founding Father” John Jay, pragmatist/psvchologist John Dewey, and
linguist/philosopher Noam Chomsky), corroborated in terms both theoretical and
material, and the negationist community finds itself stymied.
It was this “demoralizing and depressing” notion—the very inability to negate
global capitalism—that led one writer, also speaking of punk in terminal terms, to ask
whether punk even mattered (in an essay whose title is this very question):
So, in the end, did punk matter? I would answer yes with a number of
crucial qualifications. Young punks made clear, through their criticisms
and activities, that corporate culture engendered only passive leisure. [...]
At the same time, though, these young people could not transform the
corporate domination of culture. This would have required much more
than creating alternative networks, it probably would have required some
sort of public policy that proactively nurtured local cultural production,
something these punks never thought about. When these youth did come
to recognize politics, they often took their activism in the direction of
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style, confrontation, or purely personal protest. Once again, this cut them
off from making a larger impact. A great deal of their politics became,
strangely enough, apolitical. (Mattson)
Although he does feel that, yes, punk mattered, Mattson acknowledges its many
deficiencies. Stacy Thompson too details this conundrum and suggests that by focusing
on the specific failure of Crass, the defunct London anticapitalist anarcho-punk band, the
very difficulties of postrm

"n negation can be effectively framed (although perhaps not

superseded):
The efforts of [Crass] to resist co-optation into commodity culture
successfully map the shape of the very impossibility of such a project. I
do not aim, then, to celebrate Crass or demonstrate the band’s resistance to
the commodity market, but rather to derive from their failure the logic of
their inability to [resist the market]. (“Crass Commodities”)
For Thompson, who looks also to Jameson and Anderson to build his argument, the
postmodern cultural dominant does render negation impossible; however, punk’s sole
success or trumping of impossibility (Zizek would say sidestepping of the problem) lies
in its outspoken verification of Jameson’s argument.
In the context of both Hegel and Jameson, Mattson’s and Thompson’s respective
points are well-made in that they recognize negationism’s failures—or impossibility—and
call attention to them. Their arguments are incomplete, however, in that their conclusions
offer the negationist neither a solution nor escape from the paradox of Jameson's late
capitalism. Therefore, it is clear that in an effort to help prevent the resigned throwing of
countless flummoxed Christian and punk rock hands in the air more must be said.
Certainly one does not wish to suggest, as does Jameson, that the punk and Christian
rock subcultures are completely irrelevant, despite postmodernity; most current or former
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members of either group would argue as much. Thus although both the punk and
Christian rock subcultures seem to have failed, as a result of their very nature and the
nature of the postmodern era, to affect the larger culture around them (at least in terms of
community), they have been effecti/e, this writer will now argue, in successfully
encouraging individuals to change first themselves and then the larger culture when they
take their critical knowledge of self and Other (which they could not have achieved
without negation) away from the negationist subculture and back into the parent culture.
Rather, these subcultures have succeeded in providing their members with political and
philosophical alternatives to the status quo and a venue in and lexicon with which the
mainstream/secular world can be vigorously criticized or challenged, which, in turn, allows
for their Hegelian development of self. And once the oppositional subculture has taken
the “fan” or slave self-consciousness as far as it can in her criticism of the status quo and
“self-recognition in otherness,” the anticulturist can effectively return “above ground” a
more self-conscious/critical synthesized person better able to engage and change the
parent culture. As the reader may have guessed, all of this can only be accomplished
through the fuller implementation of Hegel’s dialectic, which is in fact not dead.
Synthesis and Supersession
Jameson is on par with Hegel at least in that he too feels that negation is
unsustainable, and the negationist is required (perhaps destined) to rejoin the parent
culture in some context; but he is inconect in suggesting that the postmodern era
precludes all negation and that Otherness is an anachronism, for it is at the level of the
individual self-consciousness that Jameson’s theory deteriorates. As Hegel has shown us,
the dialectic is quite alive and even necessary for the development of self; for if we now
recover the dialectic of negationist subculture, we can see that although the punk and
Ciiristian rock communities are, due to negation’s shortcomings, unable to change the
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world or satisfy their collective desire as self-negated communities for reasons theoretical
and practical, the self-consciousnesses who comprise these communities can better work
toward altering the substantive Other if they in turn negate their subcultures and return to
the mainstream/secular world as synthesized or reaffirmed versions o f that Other only
more self-critical, self-conscious, knowledgeable, and even more successful in their
ultimate teleological project of discovering Self-Spirit. For as Zizek puts it, “The system
has to die twice” (Ticklish, 72). In this way the Hegelian negation is not only useful for
punk and Christian rockers but necessary, the dialectic provides a model for not only the
reified refusal of the “wicked” surrounding culture, but the self-critical negation of the
negation that results in a certain clarity of thought for self-consciousness and grounds its
next step: practical, reasoned reemergence (recalling the third section of the
Phenomenology).
Indeed, not only is synthesis necessary, but it is more crucial to self
consciousness’s fulfilling of its desire, altering the Other, and achieving Absolute
Knowledge (knowing better itself and Spirit both). “The paradox of the second negation
is that it is more radical,” Zizek adds, “the moment of infinite pain, self-alienation; but,
for that reason, closer to Reconciliation” (Ticklish, 80). This is not to say that synthesis
does not come without difficulty or consequence, as MacIntyre and Legs McNeil suggest
above; but compromise—which is indigenous to the dialectic—is both unavoidable and
functional: in order for self-consciousness to avoid not only obsolescence and selfcontradiction but another sort of “death,” it must sacrifice so much of what it holds dear.
Despite McNeil, it is the refusal to compromise that is the negationists’ true theoretical
(and as we have seen at times literal) demise.
The notion seems to be the point of writer/director James Merendino’s loosely
biographical film SLC Punk (1998). After years of advocating anarchy and irreverent
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punk misanthropy in one of America's most conservative cities, blue-haired lead character
Stevo (Matthew Lillard), following the accidental drug overdose death of his best friend
Heroin Bob, comes to the ironically phrased and self-critical conclusion that “there is no
future in anarchy.” He thus accepts an invitation to attend Harvard Law School; Stevo’s
ex-hippie father and Harvard alumnus had applied on behalf of his son.4 Concludes the
erstwhile punk as the film’s credits begin to roll, “We [the Salt Lake punk community]
were certain the world was going to end, but when it didn’t I had to do something.''' That
something, Stevo decides in the wake of his best friend’s death, is to leave his negationist
subculture and earn his law degree because he realizes, almost to his own surprise, that he
“can do a hell of a lot more damage in the system than outside of it.” And Stevo’s
revelation is an accurate one: while the Salt Lake City punk movement has certainly done
little to liberalize its repudiated parent community, it has allowed individuals such as
Stevo to speak, to become subjects rather than objects of history, as Marcus puts it, and
articulate (piercingly) their critique of society. But the critique does little good if the
parent culture is not engaged directly. Stevo’s realization that “there is no future in
anarchy” (another mismatch between form and content) thus results in an epiphany of
sorts (the sublime?) and directs the status quo-challenging antihero to seek out more
effective avenues he feels can lead to an altering of the parent culture for the better,
negation and anarchy aside. This earnest altering of mainstream culture only comes after
his subculture has been abandoned. Once such a revelation occurs negation cannot
theoretically be sustained. Still, negation, albeit flawed, is required; it is a necessary'
sequential step in the dialectical chain.
Thus does the individual self-consciousness articulate and reconcile its critique of
the parent culture through the temporary negation of and eventual synthesis back into it.
But if, in the context of the Phenomenology, this sequence is to be applied to individual
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minds, is the paradigm likewise appropriate for small collections of self-consciousnesses—
“integrational” bands who have abandoned their respective negationist subcultures and
confronted the mainstream in an effort to challenge it? We look to the case of punk band
Green Day. In 1989 Billie Joe Armstrong and longtime friend Mike Dirnt formed Green
Day in Berkeley, California. Following the release of two hugely successful and
influential albums on independent label Lookout! Records, Green Day signed to Reprise
Records, a Warner Brothers subsidiary. Green Day released its major-label debut Dookie
in 1994; thanks to the success of singles “Longview,” “Basket Case,” and “When I Come
Around” the album went on to sell upwards of 12 million copies worldwide. Helping
record sales was Green Day’s notoriously filthy set on the much-publicized, pay-perview Woodstock 1994. Shortly thereafter, the walls of 924 Gilman Street, a legendary all
ages punk rock venue in Berkeley where Green Day cut its teeth, read “Billie Joe Must
Die.” As a direct result of its perceived “selling out,” the onetime darlings of underground
punk rock had been all but forcibly cast out of the greater punk subculture by the more
zealous negationists, who felt betrayed by the band.
Having apparently not forgotten its punk roots, however, in 1997 the Berkeley
trio played a benefit concert for Food Not Bombs (a left-leaning activist group that
provides food for the homeless while vigorously protesting globalization and political
violence), pulling in an unprecedented one-day total of $50,000. As former Dead
Kennedys singer Jello Biafra later explained, “I don’t think a small underground show
would have benefitted Food Not Bombs as much. They would raise $400 or $500 bucks
and everybody would feel good in the end, but Food Not Bombs could spend that money
in half a day trying to feed homeless people” (Sinker, We Owe You Nothing 41). Thus the
lucrative success of a concert benefitting an organization that was added, following 11
September 2001, to the FBI’s Joint Terrorism Task Force watch list (for its affiliation
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with such leftist groups as Anarchist Black Cross, the Leonard Peltier Defense
Committee, IWW, and Earth First!) was a direct result of Green Day’s mainstream
popularity. This example begs the question not only of whether punk is truly obsolete or
dead (answer: it is not), but if the individual self-consciousness’s rejection of negationism
(electing to try and “do more damage in the system” away from the punk community)
and Green Day’s assimilation are not different versions of the same dialectical move.
They are similar in that both are syntheses and imply the value and necessity of
negationism; however, these two negations of negation are differentiated in several
important ways. First, the integrational band is mired in a paradox bypassed by the
individual consciousness: to repeat from chapter two, Green Day can no longer be
considered “punk” in the traditional negationist sense and fits not into the earlier Hegelian
reading of the punk self-consciousness who has chosen nothingness; they have
superseded punk despite the fact that the band is considered “punk” in the mainstream
pop context by virtue of their “punk” aesthetic: sound, attitude, and style.5
Consequently, such a band is enmeshed in a sort of awkward, partial version of the
synthesis illustrated in Merendino’s film that does not allow the synthesist band—either
as an entity or its individual members—to achieve Reason or Absolute Knowledge (of self
or Spirit)—or at least not in direct formal (dialectical) terms: they have abandoned
negationist subculture but not punk rock. This is not to say that assimilationist artists,
so despised by their more strident colleagues, are forever prevented from making their
way through Hegel’s Phenomenology or that their self-sacrificial compromise is
unproductive; $50,000 is both commendable and, in material terms, far more important to
the homeless who are in need here and now. The individual negation of negation is
perhaps only a shorter path to the (absolute) knowledge of self. Rather, Green Day's
popular, yet subversive, route (the paradoxical negation of negation, but not the negation
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of “punk”) is beneficial in the short term, but does not, as Mattson suggested above,
“transform the corporate domination of culture” in the same way the individual
synthesist is theoretically better equipped to do.
So what of the synthesis of the Christian and punk rock genres? Where does this
blending fit into the above construction? While it would appear at first that there is
perhaps little Phenomenology to read in this particular synthesis—by virtue of the fact
that it is, as we have seen, typically more superficial or nominal than relevant to selfconsciousness in either ideological or theological terms (e.g., desire, freedom, Spirit)—in
truth, this union suggests a predictable Hegelian recapitulation for the erstwhile unhappy
punk consciousness who has chosen nothingness. We have already seen, in other words,
the punks adopt religious content at their performances and the Christian rockers
appropriate punk aesthetic form in the construction of their songs. Ignoring for the
moment the Christian’s particular appropriation to create “Christian punk,” the secular
punk’s synthesis—whether his adoption of religious content during the performance
event, his full negation of punk subculture, or his band’s negation of punk subculture but
not punk music and style—signals his (perhaps reluctant) swallowing of Hegel’s Christian
metaphysic, his ironically sacrificial selection of somethingness. Thus does the
(formerly) punk self-consciousness come to resemble Christian rock both in terms of its
Hegelian form (triadic) and content (religious/Chrislian), at least on an implicit level. One
can read in this synthesis an attempt to acknowledge the Other and glean from it
knowledge of self in otherness. In this way does one self-consciousness also gain
knowledge of the Other self-consciousness, which Hegel would have us believe leads to
the knowledge of Self-Spirit.
Thus synthesis is no ideological weakness, as McNeil implies; it is a strength not
only for the individual self-consciousness, but for the larger negationist community who
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benefits (as does the parent culture) from the sacrifice of the synthesist (who is typically
an older, more experienced, mature individual better able to rationalize the consequences
and virtues of both negation and synthesis). The punk and Christian rock subcultures as
they are defined in chapter one are strong enough that they will, by and large, remain
underground and unadulterated; there will always be those (typically fiery, young, and
less dialectically advanced enthusiasts) who refuse robustly the status quo, even if (or
perhaps because) bands such as Green Day and P.O.D. find themselves synthesized
across MTV and Rolling Stone. It is still antithesis, after all, that is the precursor to
synthesis, whether for the individual who eventually abandons the subculture or the band
who “sells out.” In this way neither punk nor “Jesus Rock” are dead, despite their
synthesis with both popular culture and each other; moreover, their vitality is twofold:
they will always exist in an perpetually untenable negationist form; and this necessary
move “underground” is fundamental for the development of the would-be synthesist.
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NOTES
CHAPTER I
1. Daughter o f Earth (New York: The Feminist Press, 1987), 21.
2. The Warped Tour event referred to here took place in July 2002. Vans, a California-based shoe
manufacturer popular with both skateboard enthusiasts and punks, been selling shoes since 1966.
According to the Vans web site [http://www.vans.com], Vans shoes “are distributed through over 190
company-owned retail stores and outlets as well as through a nationwide network of independent shoe,
sporting goods and apparel stores.” In June 2004 the company was acquired by the North Carolina-based
VF Corporation—the world’s largest brand apparel company. It is both frustrating and ironic for punk
purists that the largest of all punk festival tours, drawing tens of thousands each summer, today is
corporate-sponsored.
3. Also a 2002 event; for SpiritFest Midwest attendance figures see the SpiritFest web site
[http://www.spiritfestmidwest.com].
4. For recent sales figures for CCM, see Lorraine Ali. According to Ali, CCM was responsible for
$747 million in record sales in 2001-seven percent of overall sales in the American music industry that
year. And according to Bill Anderson, president of the 2,200-member Christian Booksellers Association,
as of 2005 the Christian retail industry exceeds $4 billion in profits annually (Cooperman). On the rise of
punk label Vagrant Records and the commercial success of twenty-first century punk, see Kelley and Ryan.
5. This sentiment comes as no surprise to many early punks who lamented the “death” of punk
subculture as early as 1978.
6. According to Jameson, Sartre’s Marxian Critique o f Dialectical Reason (1960) is “usable
principally for ideologies of small guerrilla bands...and of microgroups” (188) as exemplified by Che
Guevara and Yassir Arafat. It should thus come as no surprise to see Marxism’s draw for punk, as is
explained by Stacy Thompson.
7. See Rosenberg’s Act and the Actor: Making the Self (New York: World Publishing Co., 1970).
8. This notion too anticipates Jameson’s own definition of postmodernism as the “schizophrenic”
breakdown of signifier and signified, as the ahistorical, decentralized blending of not only high and low
culture but of culture and commerce.
9. The folk and R&B genres did not so much negate rock and roll, however, as rock and roll negated
itself following the untimely deaths of Buddy Holly, Ritchie Valens, the Big Bopper, and Eddie Cochran
(“Summertime Blues”); the assignment of Elvis to Germany following his 1958 draft; Chuck Berry’s 1959
statutory rape arrest and trial; and the virtual disappearance of Little Richard and Jerry Lee Lewis.
10. In the interest of full disclosure, of course, one should note a brief caveat: despite rock’s resurgence
and “Beatlemania” both the R&B and country genres never vanished: Ray Charles, James Brown, Stevie
Wonder, Marvin Gaye, and the rest of Motown continued their overall radio dominance in the middle19605; likewise Glen Campbell and most of country/western (which later included the “outlaw” country of
Johnny Cash, Waylon Jennings, and Willie Nelson) never went out of style. Such is still the case. But
these particular genres are here bracketed in that they were of less consequence (in terms of Frith’s notions
of generic marketing and audience demographics) to middle class Caucasian youth than rock and folk.
11. For coverage of this early Detroit show, see McCain and McNeil. And according to Herman (65),
during the height of the antiwar movement Mothers of Invention frontman Frank Zappa once invited
uniformed Marines onstage during the band’s set, produced a doll, and said “This is a gook baby. Show
us how we treat gooks in Vietnam.” Supposedly the soldiers dismembered the doll capably.
12. By this point punk’s internal dialectic was fully underway, the Ramones sound perhaps negating
the “glam” of the New York Dolls et al, who themselves negated the earliest proto-punks (the Velvet
Underground, Stooges, MC5).
13. Apocryphally—and oedipally—speaking,“the year punk bioke” (1977) was the year Elvis Presley
died.
14. D6tournement is a process whereby cultural artifacts (or in the context of an English thesis,
“texts”) are appropriated and reworked, given new meanings in new contexts. Marcus discusses this term
at length in the context of Situationism. But as Adorno and Horkheimer have shown, the dialectic allows
industry likewise to mass produce and market “ddtourned” culture.
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15. Several punk and Christian rock acts, including Amy Grant, Green Day, Blink 182, Good
Charlotte, Creed, and many others have placed in the top-50 of the Billboard “Hot 100” singles chart in
recent years; the “Hot 100” is the chart that tracks requests for all pop songs irrespective of genre.
16. To be fair, punk and anticommercialism do not coincide inexorably. For instance, cynical nihilist
punks are not necessarily, perhaps rarely, anticapitalist ideologues. Moreover, the earliest punk bands
released their records on major records labels (e.g., the Stooges and Doors were signed by Elektra Records,
and the Sex Pistols went through a series of major label deals before their demise). Also, materialist
exploitation is observable in many “punk” versions of American culture; for instance, there is “punk”
pornography.
17. While the album was a commercial failure, “Kyrie Eleison” was heard by millions as a cut on the
soundtrack of Dennis Hopper’s film Easy Rider (1969).
18. Norman's biographical information can be found in both Howard and Streck and Mark Joseph.
19. Also apocryphally speaking, this logo is said to have originated with Norman who, during a
period when one of his index fingers was broken, held up his splinted finger after each song as recognition
for audience applause.
20. Despite the Electric Prunes’ Mass, Jesus music was (as CCM still is) a largely evangelical
Protestant phenomenon.
21. Likewise, Seattle-based grunge rockers Nirvana cover Leadbelly on their Unplugged in New York
album (1994), performing the bluesman’s “Where Did You Sleep Last Night?” And in his four-record
“American Recordings” series Johnny Cash covers multiple punk, metal, “indie” and rock bands, including
Danzig, Nick Lowe, U2, Will Oldham, and Nirvana peers Soundgarden.
22. See, for instance, Greenbaum’s “Spirit in the Sky,” Harrison’s “My Sweet Lord,” Diamond’s “I
Thank the Lord for the Nighttime,” Elton John’s “Levon,” Simon and Garfunkel’s “Mrs. Robinson,” and
several Vanilla Fudge songs from the late-1960s and early-1970s.
23. Showcasing their marketability, early in 2003 subtle Christian punks Good Charlotte and New
Found Glory teamed up with secular punks Less Than Jake and The Disasters for the cross-country “Civic
Tour,” sponsored by Honda Motors and car stereo manufacturer Alpine.
24. One look at the Internet message boards from several punk web sites shows a disproportionate
number of posting visitors either indifferent to or vehemently repulsed by the idea of Christian popular
music or Christian punk. Visit, for instance, truepunk.com [http://www.truepunk.com]. Although
contemporary Christians are less repulsed by rock and punk than their forebears, most still disapprove of
the traditional punk or rock and roll lifestyle; see Christianrock.net [http://www.christianrock.net] and/or
Mark Joseph.
25. See Marty and Harrington for the rise of evangelical Protestantism in the 1950s and 1960s.
26. For more on America’s first generation rockers, see Donald Clarke.
CHAPTER 11
1. Group Psychology and the Analysis o f the Ego, 83.
2. These lyrics were borrowed from the U2 song “Desire” (Rattle and Hum, Island Records, 1988).
3. The “Eastern” character of Hegel’s theological exploration has been noted by many observers, and
such references to pantheism are made in several of his other works, including his Lectures on the
Aesthetics, a reading of which comprises much of chapter three.
4. The Black Flag performance in question can be seen in Penelope Spheeris’ 1980 documentary of the
Los Angeles punk scene, The Decline o f Western Civilization.
5. Of course, the band’s use of nontraditional, stageless venues may have been necessitated by their
prohibition from area clubs: “A lot of people, when we play, they get pretty wild,” Ginn explained to
Spheeris somewhat sardonically, discussing why the group had been banned from so many venues. “We
got a bad reputation for some reason.”
6. Black Flag was not the first American band to adopt this approach to art, of course; early proto
punks such as the Stooges too had little to no talent. The reason Black Flag, and even the Dead
Kennedys, are the best examples here relates to both their broader negationist aesthetic: record sleeves,
flyers, song length/speed.
7. Biafra admits the debt this song owes to the Ramones’ “Kill the Girl,” of which it is said to be a
parody (Sinker, We Owe You Nothing 39).
8. Indeed, Biafra’s biography bears out his predilection for physical action against the dominant
culture and his willingness to accept action’s consequences: following a surprising fourth place finish in
the San Francisco mayoral race of 1979, Biafra was publicly harassed by conservative religious and
political groups for his leftist leanings; later the singer was charged with “distributing harmful matter to
minors” by the California Attorney General for the reproduction of an H R. Giger painting (“Penis
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Landscape”) in the band’s 1985 album Frankenchrisf, and after the band’s breakup Biafra was assaulted by
a group of skinhead punks in Berkeley in 1994 for “selling out,” likely the result of his successful spokenword career and accelerated political activism.
9. Arguably founded by English punk band Crass circa 1977, anarcho-punk is a thread of punk whose
bands and fans advocate anarchism. More than just singing about anarchy for shock value as the Sex
Pistols did, however, most anarcho-punk collectives such as Crass and the Minneapolis-based Profane
Existence community practice(d) a literal on-the-ground anarchy, refusing social hierarchy and promoting
pacifism, anticapitalism, and even animal rights.
10. On “God Save the Queen” Johnny Rotten sneers “we mean it, man” condescendingly, in reference
not only to the song’s title, but his band’s short-lived rebellion. Johnny Rotten’s claims of authenticity
aside, most observers, including the band’s manager Malcolm McLaren, agree that the band did not, in
fact, mean it.
11. Minor Threat represented an enormously positive turn for hardcore as a band that rejected, in sixty
second songs, alcohol and drugs (“Straight Edge” and “Out of Step”) and presented themselves, just
teenagers at the time, as stoically “free” in a manner altogether different from the Sex Pistols or Black Flag
with the song “Minor Threat” which suggests that materia! bonds are of no matter for the young punk
(“Make do with what you have / Take what you can get / Pay no mind to us / We’re just a minor threat”),
but also acknowledges the physical and emotional “bonds” that come with age (“We’re not the first / 1 hope
we’re not the last / Because 1 know we’re all heading / For that adult crash”).
12. As MacKaye told the editor of Punk Planet in 1997, Fugazi carries itself as a democratic unit of
equally valuable partners, none of whom would ever be replaced: “Any one of the four of us has a firm
grasp on the plug. 1 think that the knowledge that any one of us at any time could stop the band is what
makes us go on and on. We all know that we have the power to stop” (Sinker, We Owe You Nothing 22).
As a recording label, Dischord, which does its best to eliminate any division of labor among its few
employees, does not sign contracts with bands whose albums it releases and publicizes albums only via
independent media, word-of-mouth, and the Internet.
13. The five corporations MacKaye was likely referring Vo at the ti ne of the song’s composition (ca.
1997) were Warner Music Group (Time-Warner), Bertlesmann Music Group (BMG), Seagram, EMI Group,
and Universal Music Group (Vivendi Universal). In August 2004 BMG merged with Sony Entertainment,
resulting in even fewer global corporations that produce and distribute, depending on one’s methodology,
at least eighty-five percent of the albums released each year worldwide.
14. “Five Corporations” is definitely a pre-Enron song, composed at a time when the American
economy was expanding at an unprecedented (and unsustainable) rate, and saw countless corporate mergers
and/or hostile takeovers in many industries, especially the technology and entertainment industries.
15. The Voidoids album doubled as the soundtrack to the Ulli Lommel film of the same name (1979)
in which Hell starred.
16. It is this notion Nietzsche has in mind when he pejoratively calls Christianity “slave morality” in
The AntiChrist (1895).
17. This is not to suggest that the self-consciousness who gives up its search for union with the
Absolute must necessarily commit suicide, only that it has chosen nothingness, and thus “unhappiness,” as
its material being. Different self-consciousnesses respond to this nothingness in different ways, including,
but not limited to, suicide.
18. State of the Union speech, 20 January 2004.
19. Despite the value of Paul Tillich’s work in this arena, I have chosen to make Niebuhr’s typology
my point of entry in the “Christ or culture” debate. I do this for several reasons. Whereas Niebuhr is
historically tracing the varied Christian response to culture as followers of a man who advocated a focus on
the Kingdom of God as opposed to this world, Tillich (much of whose work on the subject postdates
Niebuhr’s) instead develops a “theology of culture” in which he articulates the theological or “Christian”
aspects of art, philosophy, science, education, government, and other cultural institutions. Tillich does
this because he considers the separation of religion (which he repeatedly defines as “ultimate concern”) and
culture an abstraction: “For the religious and the secular realm are in the same predicament. Neither of
them should be in separation from the other...both of them are rooted in religion in the larger sense of the
word, in the experience of ultimate concern” (Theology o f Culture, 9).
20. Niebuhr, a student of sociologist-theologian Ernst Troeltsch, is here building upon his work in
The Social Sources o f Denominationalism (1929) where he critically suggests that Christendom has
achieved “success” by ignoring the precepts of its founder: “Denominationalism in the Christian church
is...unacknowledged hypocrisy. It is a compromise, made far too lightly, between Christianity and the
world” (6).
21. The better analyses of gnosticism, such as those by Jonas, Rudolph, and Pagels were published
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only after the library of ancient gnostic manuscripts (including the “Gospel of Thomas”) discovered in
Egypt in the 1940s could be interpreted and analyzed; translations of the vast majority of these manuscripts
were likely unavailable to Niebuhr.
22. German expatriate philosopher Erich Voegelin made note of the relation between gnostic thought
and both Hegel and Marx. See, for instance, “Politics and Gnosticism.”
23. The majority of these groups have been orthodox Protestant groups such as the Amish,
Mennonites, Quakers, and other Anabaptist denominations; and countless nondenominational evangelicals
and Pentecostals.
24. See, for example, Acts 4:32-35: “Now the whole group of those who believed were of one heart
and soul, and no one claimed private ownership of any possessions, but everything they owned was held in
common. With great power the apostles gave their testimony to the resurrection of the Lord Jesus, and
great grace was upon them all. There was not a needy person among them, for as many as owned lands or
houses sold them and brought the proceeds of what was sold. They laid it at the apostles’ feet, and it was
distributed to each as any had need.”
25. As opposed to “eros,” “agape” is an Attic Greek word, translated as “brotherly love” or the love of
one’s neighbors.
26. One can certainly read Hegel’s ministerial advocacy as an attempt to deflect criticism from both the
powerful Roman Catholic and Protestant Churches of his day. Read more liberally, Phenomenology
appears to be offering a system which synthesizes the Eastern and Western traditions. On the one hand,
that is, Hegel acknowledged the value of the priestly consciousness; on the other hand he suggests, in both
subtle and not-so-subtle ways, the “pantheism” of the East and the latent divinity of all beings. In
addition, Hegel supposedly completed Phenomenology as Napoleon Bonaparte waged the Battle of Jena
around him; Hegel was certainly aware of Napoleon’s predilection for religious freedom and reportedly saw
in Napoleon’s aggressive social, political, and religious reforms the progression of history and blossoming
of human freedom.
27. The writer admits that Norman himself would likely deny any Hegelian union with Spirit, any
“completion” of self. But following Hegel’s phenomenological model we can see in Norman the brooding,
mediated relation of Essential and unessential, the “too conscious” unhappy consciousness who has
adopted the Hegelian metaphysic and has found there peace of mind and an implicit (if not explicit),
naturalized union of opposites.
28. Before concluding, the author will note that a certain chronological difficulty arises in the present
sketch: the representative bands do not necessarily flow historically. For instance, the two acts interpreted
as representing the third/final stage of their respective dialectical movements began their careers earlier than
those acts described as coming first in the seifs internal dialectic. Larry Norman and Richard Hell are
treated as the final dialectical level of their specific movements of self-consciousness, in other words; but
Norman was writing and performing well before both Petra and Resurrection Band. Should not Norman
have been read in place of Petra as the first relation of cha ngeable and Unchangeable via “pure
consciousness” if the dialectical development of self-consciousness is to coincide with the Hegel’s
evolutionary description of the development of self-consciousness? No, for (with apologies to Hegel) it is
more complicated than that here. Historically speaking, for example, many of these acts were writing and
performing at the same time. Petra, Larry Norman, and Resurrection band all were releasing albums in the
1970s, 1980s, and 1990s; likewise, Richard Hell was technically “active” in the punk scene (if winding his
musical career down) at the same time as the earliest versions of Crass, Black Flag, and the Dead Kennedys
played. Thus one cannot so easily define the “breaks” between stages of self-consciousness and the “phase”
of their career particular acts (some of who have been performing for over thirty years) best represent the
stage into which they have been typed (i.e., it is all but impossible to determine qualitatively whether or
not Crass developed their skeptical response to popular culture in London before, during, or after Black
Flag developed their stoic response in Los Angeles). Moreover, each of these stages are still visible: even
today there are aesthetic negationist punks, who cling to the late-1970s punk sound and couture, just as
there are ecstatic Christian rock bands, as chapter three explains. This thesis only means to suggest that in
their development, the “negationist” punk and Christian rock subcultures can be read dialectically not only
in relation to popular culture but for the individual as well—that the individual punk or Christian selfconsciousness can be read in the context of Hegel’s Phenomenology and that the stages this selfconsciousness goes through are best represented by the above bands. The reader will thus remember that
the above theoret ical reading describes not the dialectical evolution of the Punk and Christian rock genres
as they occurred historically in the actual world, but stages in the dialectical development of a single
consciousness, and specifically the “slave” consciousness who fancies himself a member of one of these
two subcultures.
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CHAPTER III
1. This line comes from the Constantines song “Steal this Sound” from their eponymous debut album
(Three Gut Records. 2001).
2. Sinker, We Owe You Nothing 20.
3. The concert in question took place at the Grand Forks, North Dakota, Knights of Columbus Ciub
on 18 February 2004.
4. See The Future o f an Illusion 17, 55.
5. MacIntyre found a more accepting audience for this idea upon the text’s broader publication in
1968, when academic Marxism was at a high point in the West and America’s second “Red Scare” was
largely over.
6. Chomsky also made a similar suggestion when he remarked that “Marxism itself has become too
often a sort of church, a theology” (74).
7. This statement is perhaps ironic given MacIntyre’s later conversion to Catholicism.
8. This writer does not mean to imply that Christianity is the only traditional religion, of course. But
asking whether punk can be read as replacing any other Western religious tradition such as Judaism or
Islam—or even major Eastern faiths such as Hinduism and Buddhism—is beyond the scope of this paper.
The synthesis of punk and Christianity is the subject here because punk is being read in relation to (and
opposing) both a Christian philosopher/apologist and. Christian rock music. Moreover, this thesis follows
MacIntyre’s model which suggests the “Christianity” of secular Marxism.
9. Marx’s Eleventh Thesis on Feuerbach: “The philosophers have only interpreted the world in
different ways; the point is to change it.” This statement is also Marx's epitaph.
*
10. See Engels’ The Peasant War in Germany (originally published in 1850).
11. Both Leyden and Meuntzer led separate brutal and disastrous peasant uprisings in GermanyFrankenhausen and Munster, respectively-against the Roman Catholic Church. Both also maintained
strong dualistic “good versus evil” theologies (the basis of which was second century gnosticism) and saw
institutionalized Christianity, not unlike Larry Norman, as the true heresy.
12. To be fair, sacrificiai/redemptive violence, ecstatic dance, and “preaching” are not unique to the
Christian religion. But this theoretical reading of predominantly American subcultures is being presented
in the context of the religion that has been dominant in Western culture for centuries and may have
experienced the greatest (and continuing) upheaval from the Enlightenment’s ushering in of “secular
religions” that resemble Christianity as MacIntyre suggests. Moreover, as CCM is largely an evangelical
Protestant phenomenon, the reading of the punk event as religious in (ecstatic) evangelical Protestant terms
seems most appropriate.
13. Later in their career, the band wrote “Out of Step,” a seventy six second song whose only lyrics
are: “I don’t smoke / 1 don’t drink / 1 don’t fuck / At least 1 can fucking think / 1 can’t keep up / I’m out of
step with the world.”
14. This is not to say that punk lyrics are fully coherent on record, but that many punk bands tends to
be at least somewhat more precise and clear in their records and less distinct generally—having sped up the
delivery of the song—while performing.
15. The song’s lyrics: “Let’s gather ’round the carcass of the old deflated beast / We have seen it
through the accolades and rested in its iea / Syntactic is our elegance, incisive our disease / The swath
endogenous of ourselves wiii be o,M‘ quandary / We’ve nestled in its hollow and we’ve suckled at its breast
/ Grandiloquent in attitude, impassioned yet inept / Frivolous gavel our design, ludicrous our threat /
Excursive expeditions leave us holding less and less / So what does it mean when we tell ourselves it’s
only for a while we've been deceived? / And it’s only for a moment that the treasures of our day make life
easier to complicate, the treasure thrown away? / I’m so tired of all the fucked up minds / Of all the
terrorist religions and their bullshit lines / Of all the hand-me-downs from all industrial crimes / All the
weeping mothers and those who are led so blind / From the plastic protests and the hands of time / And
the pursuit of mirth and all hating kind.”
16. This notion sidesteps the aforementioned fact that most punks don’t know how to play their
instruments well anyway. Still, even the most terrible musician or punk begins to learn how to play
his/her band’s songs after several practices/pertormances and typically becomes reasonably proficient at
playing them correctly and would have to try to continue to play poorly after a time. Nevertheless, such
routine saves not the most ecstatic punk performer during a rousing live set.
17. Indeed, such is the suggestion of David Fincher’s film Fight Club (1999; based on the novel by
Chuck Palahnuik) which tells the story of a subculture of urban males who seek to transcend their
postmodern ennui and alienation (from Spirit, self, and other self-consciousnesses) by engaging in regular
bare-knuckle boxing matches with one another. Not unlike the punks described in the preceding pages, the
members of the underground fight club find themselves, for various reasons, rejecting to both the Hegelian
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meEaphysic and their consumer-obsessed parent culture Thus they fe.d estranged from not only culture,
but themselves and a sense of meaning and purpose. Having denied the Christian Hegel, however, the
group finds community and a philosophy that allows for the transcendence of their immediate material
situation in the loosely Marxian Fight Club, which evolves from a self-contained, localized group that
organizes basement and warehouse fights into a multinational movement that commits acts of anticapitalist
terrorism.
18. In addition to DeMan and Lyotard, other recent authors to tackle the contemporary sublime include
Thomas Weiskel, The Romantic Sublime: Studies in the Structure and Psychology o f Transcendence
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976); Barbara Claire Freeman, The Feminine Sublime:
Gender and Excess in Women’s Fiction (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995); and Joseph
Tabbi, Postmodern Sublime: Technology and American Writingfrom Mailer to Cyberpunk (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1995).
19. Mr. Toynbee was gracious enough to provide me with a draft copy of the presentation he gave at
the 2004 Experience Music Project Pop Conference in Seattle (April 2004). Despite my brutalizing him (1
am perhaps the antithesis to his thesis), I am indebted to Toynbee for his cooperation, kindness, and help
in focusing my own thinking on this subject. I also acknowledge that his theory on the pop sublime may
have evolved since the presentation.
20. This is not to suggest that punks and Christian rockers cannot be moved to the Kantian sublime at
all, only that Kant and Burke are, despite Toynbee’s assertions, inappropriate in the pop music context,
especially when the musical genres in question are dialectically negating their parent culture.
21. All of this in addition to punk’s remedial technical nature-even the untrained or amateur
“musician” can easily play punk rock.
22. James acknowledges that such a conversion need not be religious in nature to be characterized in a
similar way (176).
23. See especially pages 52-59 and 90-96 in chapter two.
CHAPTER IV
1. Johnny Rotten’s final comments to an audience as a Sex Pistol, spoken at the close of their
terminal San Francisco show, 1978.
2. Here the context is music, but the medium could be expanded to include theater, film, or other
negationist aesthetic endeavors.
3. The Sex Pistols “popularized” punk not only by inspiring countless imitators but by virtue of their
media exploits which incited a fervent, genuine dislike for the band among people of all generations in
both Europe and North America.
4. Responds Stevo’s father at one point to his son’s charges that he had “sold out”: “I didn’t sell out,
son. 1 bought in.”
5. This mainstream popularization of punk is what McNeil had in mind when he called punk “dead”;
but, again, this author suggests a distinction: punk is here defined as negationist, and negationist punk is
not dead; Green Day is not (no longer) negationist and therefore not punk in the same sense as McNeil
defined the genre.
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